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FOREWORD 
This study first saw the light of day as a research paper submitted in 
partial fulfllment for a Master's Degree in Development Studies at the 
Institute of Social Studies in The Hague in 1986. I would like to thank 
various individuals for assisting and encouraging me to complete the 
task at hand. 
To my supervisor, Freek Schiphorst, fell the main burden of helping 
me to refine my argument and improve the quality and readability of 
the paper; together, we logged many hours of fruitful and pleasant 
discussions. Henk Thomas and Henk van Roosmalen contributed further, 
complimentary advice, which I very much appreciate. Further academic 
inputs were received from fellow partjcipants, particularly from Omolara 
Olanrewaju, Nelson Neocleous and Mohammed Taher, who was kind 
enough to share with me his knowledge and experience of the Comilla 
programme in Bangladesh. 
From across the seas, Kenneth Wain and Frank Ventura, staff 
members of the Faculty of Education at the University of Malta, provided 
useful criticism. Edith and Saviour Rizzo and Edward Zammit, my 
workmates at the Workers' Participation Development Centre (WPDC), 
provided indispensable support facilities. More of these were forthcoming 
from my parents and parents-in-law who kept me posted on developments 
in Malta during my absence. 
I would like to express my appreciation to the Chairman and members 
of the WPDC Committee for their financial support during my stay 
in The Netherlands as well as for nurturing my research interests. 
On leaving Holland and having returned to Malta, I revised the text, 
following further advice from Freek Schiphorst and Henk van Roosmalen. 
I also took the opportunity to update and refine the contents, making 
them more accessible to a wider, less academic readership. Here I must 
acknowledge the assistance of Reverend Fortunato Mizzi, Richard 
Matrenza and the Chairman of the Cooperatives' Board, Joe Galea. 
Further thanks are due to the ISS Publications Committee and 
supporting staff, as well as to the two anonymous referees, who spurred 
me on to undertake the tough but challenging exercise of extensive draft 
revision, which has led to this actual text. I must also thank the Labour 
& Development programme secretary at the Institute of Social Studies, 
Lijske Schweigman, as well as library staff, both at the Institute and 
the University of Malta, who patiently handled my many queries and 
requests. 
Finally, a special acknowledgement to Anna, my wife, for her 
encollrageIIleI1t at c!ifficult mOIlle!!ts of the project and for beinga,!! 
understanding companion in the pains of creative writing. To her goes 
the credit for the typing of innumerable drafts. My sincere apologies 
to her and to my son James for neglecting them, in favour of books 
and documents, over many months. 
To them I dedicate this work. 
Godfrey Baldacchino 
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Marsascala, Malta 
November 1988 
'Give men a better environment, 
and they will respond to it 
by becoming better workers, and better men' 
ROBERT OWEN 
'The cooperative system will never transform 
capitalist society. To convert social production 
into one large and harmonious system of free and 
cooperative labour, general social changes are 
wanted, changes of the general condition of society' 
KARL MARX 
'It is only by pursuing the impossible 
that the possible becomes true' 
MAX WEBER 
iii 

1 INTRODUCTION 
The Issue 
The issue of worker cooperation remains at the top of the agenda for 
workplace organization today, although the history of worker (or 
producer) cooperatives is littered with failures. Yet, despite the glaring 
and disappointing evidence, the establishment of cooperative forms of 
work organization continues unabated; indeed it has gathered momentum 
over the last few years, in both industrialized and industrializing eco-
nomies. 
These initiatives have been forthcoming from a motley band of 
proponents: on the one hand, government officials, economic planners, 
trade unionists and management consultants have shown themselves 
disposed to finance, advise or even create worker cooperatives from above. 
On the other hand, an even more diverse collection of underprivileged 
groups or individuals is striving to preserve employment or otherwise 
hoping to fashion for themselves a more meaningful work environment. 
A Warranted Field of Study 
A cardinal principle guiding this text is that it would be premature to 
dismiss the worker cooperative as yet another misguided Utopian vision. 
The dismal evidence of failures to date is staggering and cannot of course 
be refuted, but a fair dose of optimism in the feasibility of worker 
cooperation is not totally unwarranted. 
Firstly, although it is difficult to defme a successful worker cooperative, 
there are a few lonely beacons of success, model organizations in terms 
of quantitative criteria (profitability, productivity per head, employee 
turnover) or qualitative ones Gob satisfaction, motivation, power dis-
tribution). 
Secondly, the promises of worker cooperation are tempting and 
taunting; they have been hailed as a 'third sector', emerging from the 
forces of big business in the West and of the centralized colossus of 
the East. 1 The cooperative organization of production offers an improved 
access to economies of scale which are reaped by medium to large scale 
enterprises without sacrificing the pride of skill and self-control usually 
associated strictly with self-employment. The combination of the interests 
of capital and labour within the same individuals, as owner-workers, 
could defuse normative conflict and the resulting bitter and acrimonious 
industrial relations. Worker cooperatives offer a potential for satisfying 
workers' desire for greater self-actualization, for more control over th~ 
conditions of their work and for a more just and equitable share in 
the fruits of their efforts. Cooperative production can rectify the lack 
of access to certain products and services in economies geared to the 
production of profit rather than of use value and social needs. The possible 
contribution by worker cooperatives towards job creation or preservation 
becomes particularly attractive in the current scenario of global open 
unemployment and underemployment.2 
Lastly, more traditional ways of arranging production can be unjust 
and oppressive. In the standard economic systems of the world today, 
it is in small minorities that power is vested, with all its ramifications: 
decision-making, income distribution, profit allocation, personnel mana-
gement and organization of production. Consequently, the vast majority 
suffers, sometimes in poverty and powerlessness, often in resigned silence.3 
It is partly in reaction to these conditions that experiments with worker 
cooperation continue to be made. In the meantime, both western style 
capitalism and Soviet style central planning appear to have run their 
course and reached a dark alley, from which the only way out is to 
grant greater self-determination and freedom to the worker. They also 
appear increasingly to appreciate and resort to the advantages of 
cooperation and of work humanization.4 These initiatives might only 
be cosmetic concessions which serve to further legitimize established power 
relations.5 Nevertheless, the general climate in the world today appears 
more disposed towards worker cooperation.6 
Over the years, though, the dismal record book has taken its toll 
among the proponents of worker cooperatives. Many sympathizers have 
concluded that their conception of a democratic transformation of the 
classic workplace was pure fantasy; they have consigned the topic of 
worker cooperation to that of Utopian literature. Such a shift of opinion 
is quite easy to justify: all too often, worker cooperatives have been 
victims of either economic failure or of economic success.7 
The bitter reality has had its positive spinoffs, however. Ongoing 
experiments in worker cooperation mean that there exists a ready market 
for consultancy, education, research and other services provided by the 
apologists. Concurrently, the latter have been forced to adopt a sharper, 
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more profoundly critical analysis of worker cooperative failure. Looking 
back, one can perceive a general trend in such an analysis: initially, 
a purely enterprise-based perspective had been adopted, which often 
suggested the wholesale export and transposition of successful- invariably 
first world - models to other, alien contexts. Nowadays this approach 
is largely recognized as erroneous and simplistic and the emphasis has 
shifted markedly. Firstly, thanks to advances in social anthropology, 
there is a greater appreciation of the wider, macro framework, which 
considers specific cultural, political and socio-economic forces as sig-
nificant intervening variables in determining worker cooperative success 
or failure. Secondly, the study of internal cooperative units has benefited 
from social psychology and delved deeper into the structures, processes 
and developments which contribute to successful group activity. 
Although there is a better understanding of the issue, a glaring gap 
remains between academic contributions and actual initiatives in worker 
cooperation. Only a few of those concerned with the development of 
the discipline from a theoretical point of view have direct experiences 
of worker cooperatives. At best, most have undertaken interviews or 
non-participant observation, retreating back to university campuses to 
write their books and articles. Their contributions may be milestones 
within the sphere of academia, but they are unsuited to advising and 
motivating would be or practising cooperative workers. 
The Text at Hand 
The argument I would like to present is oriented towards policy makers, 
cooperative members, worker leaders and educationists, with particular 
reference to those in Malta, my home country. 
The text presents itself as a critique of the potential for successful 
worker cooperation. As an educationist I am consciously concerned with 
the role of education in successful cooperative development. Success is 
understood in terms of both economic viability and democratic par-
ticipation in decision making. In Part One, the argument is posited within 
a broad theoretical framework and reviews the voluminous literature 
on the subject. It analyses the wider conditions influencing the perform-
ance of worker cooperatives, which in turn lead to a consideration of 
them as spearheads of social democratization, identifying the main 
prospects and problems of such a project. In Part Two, the general 
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issues raised in the theoretical chapters are applied to the Maltese 
experience, which serves as a test case. This is, however, not simply 
a Maltese study. The empirical application of theory is crucial for 
appraising the practical usefulness of theoretical constructs, but I hope 
that those constructs have also a general appeal and relevance. 
Education and Cooperation 
The main justification for my focus on education and its contribution 
towards successful worker cooperatives is pragmatic. As a research officer 
and educationist engaged in promoting workplace democratization in 
Malta, the choice of the theme was a natural one, arising from an actual 
situation. The text is addressed implicitly to my colleagues at the Workers' 
Participation Development Centre.8 My reliance on secondary data to 
present my case is also corroborated by my own experience in an 
educational, research and consulting agency. The WPDC has been 
involved in cooperative development for a number of years now and, 
in the process, has gone through the frustration and disillusion which 
follows the appraisal of the actual state of cooperative organization in 
Malta. 
The affinity of education to successful worker cooperation was ac-
knowledged by the followers of Robert Owen, who inspired some of 
the earliest cooperative ventures in an industrial setting. Owenism was 
essentially a movement which believed that education in the principles 
of the new social system was a vitally important matter and a requisite 
for practical success.9 Robert Owen was a pioneer in the field of coop-
erative education and opened the Institution for the Formation of 
Character at New Lanark, in 1816.10 The Rochdale Pioneers, established 
under Owenite leadership in 1844, aimed not only at enrolling members 
but at making good cooperators of them in a very broad sense. This 
included the inculcation of a clear awareness of the principles of coop-
erative trading, as well as a new insight into the problems of citizenship 
and of the moral and material forces that were shaping the industrializing 
Britain of their time. The group therefore encouraged education in both 
its technical and cooperative aspects, and they were eager to attend to 
the education of their children as well as their own. ll As early as 1853, 
two and a half per cent of the Pioneers' trading surplus was allocated 
to financing their educational activities, which included the maintenance 
of a newsroom and library.12 
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While education in technical and cooperative skills was already 
recognized that long ago as a requisite for successful worker cooperation, 
it has apparently not been enough to prevent either liquidation or 
degeneration. Harmony Hall, the location of Owen's self-managed 
community, ironically became the seat of a bitter conflict within only 
a few years of its establishment. 13 The Rochdale Pioneers Manufacturing 
Society, looked upon as a model of success, was converted into an ordinary 
joint-stock, profit-making concern in 1862.14 The Christian Socialists were 
already disillusioned with the idea that worker cooperatives could ever 
be viable democratic structures by 1851, when the large majority of the 
cooperatives they had helped establish and finance had already withered 
away. IS 
In a sense this study re-enacts the appraisal of the British Christian 
Socialists of 1851, but goes beyond their despair by suggesting a way 
out of the impasse that worker cooperatives apparently must face. 
Summary of the Argument 
Following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2 examines the socio-
economic conditions, that have led to the emergence of the worker 
cooperative as a production unit. Chapter 3 assesses the worker coop-
erative's potential advantages from the various politicai, economic, social 
and psychological perspectives. Optimism is guarded by a consideration 
of less noble and dignified reasons for cooperative promotion. Chapter 
4 undertakes an appraisal of worker cooperative performance and, finding 
it largely uninspiring, identifies a cluster of failure-inducing constraints. 
Economic viability is recognized as insufficient to ensure the success 
of a worker cooperative. Indeed, it may be economic success which leads 
to a worker cooperative's downfall. Rather certain socio-economic (infra-
structural) and socio-cultural and political (superstructural) variables are 
identified as crucial contributors to this so-called degeneration problem. 
But how are these to be countered for worker cooperatives to succeed? 
One possible answer is to foster an environment amenable to cooperative 
development. To do so requires a dual approach: firstly, from a position 
of strength, a progressive social movement would promote, finance, 
defend, inspire and possibly even legislate in favour of cooperative 
development; secondly, and complementarily, a counter-hegemonic edu-
cational programme would be organized, initially by the same social 
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movement, while and until the worker cooperative sector develops and 
nurtures its own. Such a strategy would seek to reform the social 
environment so that a cooperative sector could survive and function 
withiIljj:.R~lQ~L tD1l,D Q~ing j~ands in a hQsjil~ 9GS:;:!J}, oc QaSedD~aJl 
arid desert - these being the analogies commonly reserved for cases of 
worker cooperation - the strategy seeks to create the suitable environ-
mental condition whereby cooperative forms of production would flourish 
as normal entities, along with other non productive, cooperative or-
ganizations. In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, these considerations are next applied 
rigorously to the specific socio-economic, cultural and political- context 
of the Mediterranean island state of Malta. In conclusion there is an 
overview of the main argument and suggestions for further research in 
Chapter 8. The appendices give relevant background information about 
the Maltese environment. 
6 
NOTES 
I. This identification of three motivational or institutional frameworks of human 
development is found, for example, in Clayre (1980) and Vanek (1988). 
2. Open unemployment refers to persons without a job and looking for work 
(International Labour Organisation, 1976, p. 3). The underemployed refer to (a) persons 
who are in employment of less than normal duration and who are seeking or would 
accept additional work and (b) persons with a job yielding inadequate income (Ibid., 
pp.17-18). 
3. See, for example, Arendt (1958); Marcuse (1968); Oakeshott (1978, chapter I); 
Blauner (1964) and Marx's treatment of the concept of alienation in Marx (1970) and 
in the chapter on alienated labour in Marx (1959). 
4. The pioneering work of Mayo (1949) and subsequently of McGregor (1960), Argyris 
(1964), Herzberg (1966) and Weitzman (1984) identify the importance of a human 
relations approach to the work process, in contrast to scientific management and 
Stachanovism. This is reinforced by the progressive abolition of routinized labour 
operations with the onset of new technology and automation. The expansion of tertiary 
sector activities and the increasing professionalization of a better educated labour force 
also increases the actual provision as well as demands for job discretion and self-
determination at the workplace. See Levin (1981), Rus (1984a) and Trist (1980). 
5. The recent proliferation of worker participation schemes - quality circles, joint 
labour management boards, autonomous work groups, employee share ownership, 
profit-sharing, worker-directors, and so on - are often incorporatist in intent, seeking 
to defuse trade union consciousness, improve labour productivity and foster class 
harmony. See Panitch (1978); Greenberg (1983); Clarke (1977). However, such par-
ticipatory schemes might lead to democratization, which would mean more participation 
of workers in management, control and ownership. See Cressey & MacInnes (1980); 
Kester & Schiphorst (1986) and Gorz (1973). 
6. Defourny (1986) tabulates statistical evidence showing the increasing number of 
worker cooperators in Europe in recent years. The winds of perestroika blowing across 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are also more supportive of both private and 
collective self-employment. See, for example, Cox (1987). The contemporary crisis in 
Yugoslavia is likely to condone worker cooperation as a more market responsive form 
of self-management which rewards entrepreneurship. See, for example, Sik (1986) and 
Vahcic et al. (1988) . .I 
7. 'Bad organization can often mean defeat. This is a truism. More interestingly, 
however, is the fact that good organization can also lead to defeat, i.e., for the purposes, 
goals and interests which were the original reasons that the group organized' -
Abrahamsson (1977, p. 227). 
8. The Workers' Participation Development Centre is an educational, research and 
consultation centre, which was established on a semi-autonomous departmental basis 
at the University of Malta in 1981. It seeks to support and promote the process of 
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participatory management within the Maltese economy and the wider society. See WPDC 
(1987, pp. 18-24). 
9. Cole (1944, p. 71). 
10. Ibid., p. 16. 
11. The seventh principle of the Rochdale Pioneers stated that their society should 
serve as a means of educating its members as well as of promoting mutual trade. 
Ibid'.~ pp. 64, 71-2. 
12. Ibid., p. 85. 
13. Ibid., pp. 57-62. 
14. Cole (1944, p: 90) and Oakeshott (1978, p. 16). 
15. See 'Report of the Society for Promoting Working Men's Associations' (1852), 
quoted in Cole & Filson (1951, pp. 440-3) and paraphrased in Boggis (1973). See 
also Thornley (1981, p. 21). 
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PART ONE: THEORY BUILDING 
2 THE CASE FOR WORKER COOPERATIVES 
Definition 
There appears to be confusion about what ideological and functional 
aims a worker cooperative purports to achieve: to the right of the political 
spectrum, a worker cooperative may present the image of collective 
entrepreneurship, of self-willed effort and motivation which improves 
competitiveness and serves to push down prices, of self-reliant initiatives 
in the face of unemployment which mitigate the necessity for state 
intervention. To the political left, the worker cooperative may be seen 
to serve as the living banner of a nascent, non-capitalist mode of produc-
tion, of a class-conscious vanguard of the labour movement, a symbol 
of Marxian 'responsible anarchism'. This conceptual ambiguity helps 
to explain the wide moral, political and practical support that the worker 
cooperative has gained. However, it also reflects the basic tensions, at 
times contradictory, in steering a happy middle course between pure 
commercial viability and pure democratic control. I 
The organizational forms of worker cooperation are myriad.2 But, 
without going into complexities, worker or producer cooperatives may 
be generally referred to as production units which are controlled by 
their own workers. A loose but widely accepted definition suggests that 
worker cooperatives embody a number of principles: 
workers are (or can become) members of the firm, by nominal holdings 
of share capital; 
- formal provision exists for direct participation in the firm's control 
and management for the worker-members; 
- control is autonomous, usually on the basis of one member, one vote; 
- worker-members share in the firm's surplus; 
- capital is rendered a fixed and limited return.3 
Origins in the First World 
In Western Europe and the United States, the worker cooperative has 
emerged as an alternative form of working, a reaction to the conditions 
9 
of hardship and helplessness caused by industrial capitalism. The factory, 
the division of labour and mass production were introduced to exploit 
fully the efficiency and productivity of the new technology. But in doing 
so, workers were robbed of their traditional control over workingcondi-
tions, of the implements of production and of the very product of their 
labour. New habits had to be formed and a new labour discipline imposed 
- by supervision, keeping time and rhythm, money incentives, threats 
of redundancy and starvation wages. Worker skill and craft pride were 
being transposed into machines with increasing sophistication.4 Increasing 
boredom, the meaninglessness of repetitive, fragmented operations and 
the powerlessness to do anything about it fostered a condition of estrange-
ment and loss of interest in work.5 
Such miserable and degrading conditions could not easily be avoided. 
The vast majority of rural workers were eventually forced to submit 
themselves and their families to an impersonal cash nexus and sell their 
labour power to survive, having been evicted from the land and cut 
adrift from traditional feudal obligations of security and patronage. The 
wretchedness of early industrialization could not fail to generate a number 
of different, reactive responses, some of which are still present today. 
A number are escapist, accepting labour's condition as a given and seeking 
compensatory satisfaction elsewhere, for example in religious enthusiasm, 
alcoholism, leisure, and earning black money.6 Other responses are 
reformist in character, proposing a betterment of labour's conditions 
,such that workers ameliorate or outrightly usurp their pitiful status as 
mere factors of production. The latter include the principles of trade 
unionism, socialism, chartism and political democracy. To them one may 
also add the worker cooperative movement. Early inspiration was 
forthcoming from the Owen cooperatives of 1832 and the Rochdale 
Pioneers of 1843, as well as from the writings of Proudhon, Fourier, 
Kropotkin and others. They were united in their concern to establish 
mechanisms through which a basic principle of political democracy 
government by the consent of the governed - could be extended to the 
workplace.7 
Worker cooperatives today account for less than one per cent of 
total industrial and commercial activities in industrialized capitalist 
economies.8 In this context, the cooperative logic is subsumed by powerful 
socializing agents, which transmit and inculcate the legitimacy of non-
democratic, hierarchical and inegalitarian principles that fashion capitalist 
lO 
production relations. 9 Foremost among these principles is the acceptance 
of inequality in the distribution of power and wealth on the basis of 
private property; the consideration of Labour as a commodity and the 
selective deposition of knowledge among experts.1O Even democracy is 
generally understood as interest group representation within an institu-
tionalized pluralist scenario, rather than signifying high and dynamic 
levels of civic participation. I I 
Labour organizations in the western world - particularly, but not 
exclusively, trade unions - have been largely incorporated within this 
dominant ideology, accepting implicitly its fundamental rules without 
question. 12 Such an acceptance, however, limits the range and style of 
labour collective action.13 Consequently, the assumed balance of power 
between organized labour and other relevant interest groups - a condition 
which is a prerequisite for real pluralism to function - does not exist. 14 
At best, therefore, western trade unions bargain over the price of wage 
labour, accepting the status of wage labour as a given. 
In tlie Second World 
Shifting attention to the socialist countries following the doctrines of 
Marxism-Leninism, the official ideology promulgates monism - the insti-
tutionalized harmony of interests. This ideological unity is all-embracing, 
obligatory and self-righteous. 15 The notion of proletarian class rule as 
expressed via the vanguard party of the working Class implies that those 
who govern have to be at the same time both the representatives and 
the employers of the ruling class. 16 What this contradiction means in 
practice is that trade union organizations act as western-style managerial 
bodies; and any conflicts generated by an organized opposition are 
illegitimate. 
The operation of worker cooperatives in the Marxist-Leninist setting 
is curtailed strongly because of the institutionalization of democratic 
centralism. This replaces market allocation by central planning. Worker 
cooperatives or similar self-managed initiatives cannot be condoned in 
such a planned economy because they would undermine or disrespect 
the latter's authoritative and allocative functions. 17 Thus, while certain 
cooperative forms of workplace organization are allowed to function, 
they are granted. a limited measure of independence on sufferance for 
good behaviour, such as producing beyond the set production targets. IS 
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However, all major plans and decisions continue to require state 
approval. 19 
And the~Thir7IW{)tld 
Different conditions and patterns of cooperative development prevail 
in industrializing economies. The conditions of state non-intervention 
and a prevailing attitude of laissez-faire with respect to economic affairs 
- circumstances from which the cooperative movement in Europe emerged 
- are noticeably less widespread. Rather, late industrializing countries 
are in a race against time to develop their nations's productive capabilities 
as rapidly as possible, pushed on by popular demands and rising 
expectations.20 In such a situation, indigenous development has depended 
considerably on state initiatives. Trade unions in this setting are generally 
spawned by pro-independence political activity during the latter periods 
of colonial rule. They continue to operate under strict collaborative, 
neo-corporatist arrangements with the ruling political elites, where 
antagonism is not permissibleY 
In such a context, numerous top down experiments with cooperative 
forms of organization have taken place, mainly in the large, agricultural 
sector. Here, cooperative organization has been introduced in the hope 
of liberating productive resources, reaping economies of scale and 
channeling products towards local or, better still, export markets. All 
.this is achieved, however, without going through the social dislocations 
of rampant collectivization or the uncompetitiveness of a sheltered 
nationalized agro economy. Government-sponsored cooperative federa-
tions have also served as discrete yet powerful channels of central, political 
or religious control over the peasant masses.22 
The Potentials of Worker Cooperation 
Having looked briefly at the different socio-historical social settings in 
which worker cooperatives find themselves today, it is now possible to 
make a strong case in their favour with a number of good psychological, 
social, economic and political arguments. Worker cooperation thus 
assumes the status of a third sector, the attractive alternative to both 
large-scale private capitalist and state socialist models. 
Both of these have proved themselves to be effective mechanisms 
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of long-term labour controlY The price of this achievement, though, 
has been workplace dehumanization, which demands the servile obedience 
of workers to superordinate forces and structures - the vagaries of an 
unpredictable market, the dictates of profit maximization, of cost 
efficiency, of technological rationalization, of the targets set by the 
Ministry of Planning. The consequence is a situation of chronic power 
inequality and conflict, latent or manifest, often reflected - albeit only 
partially - in a basic dualism between management and the rank and 
file. 24 This situation is very costly indeed. Firstly, in financial terms, 
because of reduced motivation and productivity and other forms of 
individual or collective reactions (absenteeism, sabotage, rapid labour 
turnover, industrial action). Secondly, in human terms, qualities such 
as worker resourcefulness, initiative,. and the ability to make decisions 
remain untapped, when they could be nurtured through the direct 
experience of work.25 Democratic control and management in a worker 
cooperative can prevent this dichotomy of interests between managers 
and managed, as well as the wasteful human and financial implications 
that accompany it. 
Conventional organizations the world over are increasingly aware 
of this resource waste, and new forms of labour management, involving 
greater worker participation and initiative, are being devised to tap this 
energy source.26 The workplace in general appears thus to be undergoing 
a process of democratization, although only insignificant changes are 
taking place in terms of the social relations of productionY 
The impetus for this change comes from the present socio-economic 
environment in which productive organizations must function. The world 
stands at the threshold of a post-industrial age: the labour force in the 
manufacturing sector is being replaced by automated processes, while 
new jobs are to be found in the tertiary services sector.28 Many of these 
jobs cannot be pinned to a routine, since they involve a highly discre-
tionary, flexible and unstructured approach to work. So, occupations 
become more professional in character as organizations assign their staff 
more responsibility and expect from them a flexible orientation to shifting 
market forces. 29 Hence the global shift away from the FordistlTayloristic 
management practices, which involve a highly specialized division of 
labour, low skill requirements, job discretion and rigidly hierarchical, 
bureaucratic, centralized decision-making.30 The modern organization 
involves increasing interdependence of personnel, job enlargement, greater 
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space for individual and subgroup autonomy and initiative, and a non-
routine approach to work.3! These developments could presage a more 
participatory future for the workplace. 
Closely attuned to the above is the psychological perspective, grounded 
in the normative vision of human beings possessing both a will and 
a potential for growth. After all, work is central to most people's lives, 
not simply as a necessary condition for survival, but also as an avenue 
for self-actualization and as a bestower of self- and social identity.32 
The latter become more powerful worker expectations when the basic 
conditions of survival and security are relatively guaranteed and when 
the educational level of the workforce improves; These intrinsic conditions 
are by and large present among a significant proportion of the labour 
force in the world today.33 
Whilst the idea that work is a bestower of self-identity and a channel 
for self-growth is a main component of the ideology of work, nevertheless 
it often clashes with the actual structure and experience of work.34 Noble 
ideas of the self as worker are often very quickly cut down to size once 
one actually starts working.35 Work then becomes for many a drudgery, 
devoid of intrinsic satisfaction. Through the experience of work, workers 
are often led to accept the status of professional management as being 
the sole depository of skill, power, knowledge, judgement, initiative and 
responsibility. The status of labour is reaffirmed as that of a commodity, 
to be bought or sold, hired or fired, according to the exigencies of some 
invisible force, a Deus ex machina, be it a free market or a state economic 
planning bureau. Work experience is a powerful socializing agent in its 
own right. 
In contrast to this scenario, worker cooperatives offer the promise 
of self-control, elevating work to a more fulfilling, rewarding and eman-
cipatory experience. The worker cooperative provides a likely solution 
to the condition of ideological and normative dislocation which indus-
trialization has brought about. It makes it more possible for a task to 
be tailor-made for each person (rather than vice versa) and to recapture 
social support and a collective moral fabric via the formation of occupa-
tional groupS.36 
Worker cooperation offers possibilities of increased job responsibility, 
job enlargement and a rotation or division of decision-making posts 
among a large proportion of the workforce, while the one member, 
one vote system ensures that all members have a guaranteed minimum 
and equal access to influence decisions. 
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It is worth emphasizing the educational value of working in a coop-
erative, which has been hailed as the school of democracy. Indeed, the 
worker cooperative holds the potential to create decentralized and 
accessible structures for the discussion and implementation of workers' 
ideas and for workers to become responsibly involved in planning and 
management. The practice of democratic and dialogic participation at 
the workplace is in itself an educational, self-supporting and self-
generating process - the more one participates, the better one participates. 
Thus participation forces or socializes individuals to be free via socially 
responsible action, which becomes in itself a form of action learning. 
Cooperative forms of work organization, involving associated producers 
who control their interchange with nature rationally, have been called 
the most superior or the least alienating forms of production. This is 
because they provide for the highest degree of political and economic 
liberation of men and women, affording them the highest form of freedom 
at work.37 
A powerful economic attraction of worker cooperatives is that they 
offer the possibility for the preservation of the pride of craft and self 
responsibility often associated exclusively with self-employment. Over 
and above this, however, worker cooperatives enjoy vital economies of 
scale generally reaped by large enterprises. Workers may therefore band 
together in a cooperative framework because of a perceived common 
interest in pooling equipment, land, finances and knowledge in produc-
tion, where they would otherwise perform inefficiently and in competition 
with one another. In the absence of sufficient capital or know-how, the 
cooperative organization of work may be the only avenue for small 
producers to become viable and to exercise greater influence over the 
vagaries of the market. 
It is difficult to compare the economic performance of worker 
cooperatives with that of conventional capitalist firms. Some researchers 
have tried to identify statistically significant relations between the 
economic results of self-managed firms and indicators of worker par-
ticipation; while others have compared economic results of firms before 
and after their conversion into self-managed enterprises.38 The validity 
of such an analysis can be strengthened by comparing the two kinds 
of firms operating at the same time in the same activity. Nevertheless, 
any econometric comparative studies must falsely assume a similarity 
of the firms' objectives, which influence and shape organizational decisions 
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and performance.39 All the same, major if not definitive theoretical and 
quantitative work over the last few years appears to establish that 
cooperative units of production outperform comparable conventional 
firms.40 Such commendable economic performance has been linked to 
the greater incentive for cooperative members to be more productive 
and efficient in view of the direct connection between personal effort, 
enterprise performance and personal gain, reinforced by group pressure 
and democratic decision-making.41 The greater readiness towards flex-
ibility and job rotation reduces the problems and the labour costs 
otherwise incurred by absenteeism and job demarcation. Labour costs 
also tend to be more stable because they are less liable to individual 
or collective production disruptions such as, for example, wage demands, 
strike action, rapid turnover of personnel, and sabotage.42 The possibility 
of functioning efficiently with minimal supervisory staff, because workers 
exercise self supervision, also reduces overhead costS.43 This increases 
the attraction for worker cooperatives to opt for a more labour-intensive 
type of production organization than do capitalist firms.44 
Of course, employment creation or preservation is very often the 
primary objective for worker cooperative establishment. In this, they 
appear as ideal organizations for group and self-help mobilization, with 
a potentially considerable contribution to make. There are many cases 
of worker cooperatives having taken over capitalist enterprises or 
springing up where the profits to be made were insufficient to lure capitalist 
investment. Indeed, the ebb and flow of interest in cooperative ventures 
has been strongly linked to the social system's economic dislocations.45 
The Rochdale Pioneers and the early worker cooperatives in England 
emerged during the 'hungry forties'.46 Hundreds of other cooperative 
bodies sprang up in Europe and the United States during the depression 
of the 1920s and 1930s, some with direct state investmentY During the 
present time, a reduced demand for labour accompanied by an increase 
in the size of the labour force has led to employment crises worldwide. 
Both state and private enterprise seem unable - some might say unwilling 
- to provide full employment.48 So there are powerful contemporary 
reasons why worker cooperatives should be seriously considered as viable 
mechanisms for an innovative and diversified approach to job creation. 
This is particularly so in Third World countries where unemployment 
and underemployment levels are of greater magnitude and of greater 
concern because of the paucity of welfare provision.49 
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Dangers 
A few words of warning are in order at this point. Worker cooperatives 
are not a panacea for contemporary economic recession and unemploy-
ment. Literature on the subject abounds with an exclusive emphasis on 
the impressive and commendable credentials of worker cooperatives, 
including job creation, labour productivity, economies of scale, worker 
motivation, democratic management, skill preservation, as though they 
provided the magical answer to reduced worker morale, deskilling, 
alienation, industrial action and stagflation.50 The case for worker 
cooperatives remains, but its proponents may be motivated by less noble 
and more disquieting reasons than those outlined above. 
The current growth of worker cooperatives (particularly those formed 
from scratch or from rescues of existing fIrms) in a condition of recession 
and labour surplus should be seen alongside the more spectacular growth 
of the so-called informal sector of the economy, which comprises small-
scale industry, subcontracting, sweat shops and homeworking. All of 
these embody forms. of production relations where jobs are highly insecure. 
The insecurity results from pressure due to extreme competition, from 
the lack of legislative safeguards as well as from weak trade union power 
and presence.5! Indeed, such harshly competitive areas are the most 
accessible ones of the economy where relatively little capital is required. 
These areas include restaurants, book stores, print shops and repair 
services. 52 Production units in these areas may be seen to perform a 
reserve army role, forcing workers to exploit themselves and receive wages 
at levels lower than the industry standards. 53 They also tend to serve 
residual, highly unstable markets which generate insufficient profIts and 
where the conditions are not favourable to foster stable wage-labour 
relations. As a result, conventional capitalist fIrms in such areas would' 
not be interested. 54 The existence of this production periphery is one 
of functional articulation with the formal sector of the economy. 55 
Worker cooperatives could easily be seen forming part of this informal 
economy and serving as functionally articulated organizations in a 
predominantly non-cooperative setting, particularly during the latter's 
periods of restructuring and dislocation. In the capitalist context, such 
crisis periods afford the possibility for exploiting a labour abundant 
situation by pushing down labour costs. One of the ways of doing this 
is to reduce the size of the fully proletarianized section of the labour 
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force, pushing out labour into non-wage labour sub-systems. This explains 
the contemporary re-emergence of the informal sector, even in indus-
trialized economies, in the guise of sweat shops, homework, part-time 
work, large scale subcontracting and worker cooperatives. 56 Small·scale 
worker cooperatives, like other small-scale producers, provide goods and 
services at lower prices under pressure from extreme competition in a 
volatile market environment; these subsidized goods and services then 
serve as inputs to larger producers. For this reason, their labour time 
. does not exchange equally on the market, because they embody less 
than is socially necessary abstract labour time. 57 
Even in centrally planned economies, cooperative forms of production 
perform a role of functional articulation. They fill in some of the gaps 
in the supply of goods and services generated by the dysfunctions of 
large scale production and bureaucratic allocative mechanisms; they also 
provide employment to handicapped citizens.58 
A second note of warning with respect to cooperative development 
is that, rather than being progressive reactions to the exploitative and 
alienating effects of capitalism, cooperatives could be from the outset 
(or could degenerate into) expressions of capitalism and conservatism. 
A number of cooperative forms can cover non-cooperative relations of 
production, disguised to benefit from tax concessions, for example, or 
to obtain access to certain means of production. 59 Others, although 
democratic in principle, nevertheless operate in a conventional manner 
with the cooperators acting as (or becoming) shareholders employing 
second class, underpaid labour to widen their operations and secure 
even greater profits.60 Still others adhere to private ownership and 
individually transferable shares, motivated primarily by the opportunity 
to make hefty wages.61 
Indeed, the most economically successful form of cooperative in 
Western Europe and the United States has been the agricultural service 
cooperative, a business conglomerate, which represents conservative 
reactions by agricultural and dairy producers. Initially, they banded 
together to purchase bulk supplies and requisites and then marketed 
their produce collectively, thereby increasing their power in the market 
to quasi-monopoly conditions. Such businesses tend to be highly capital-
intensive and suppress rather than stimulate labour demand in agriculture. 
The highly strategic nature of their products also contributes to such 
cooperators becoming highly effective lobbyists, even contributing finan-
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cially to politicians in a position to influence decisions concerning milk 
and agricultural products.62 
The Needfor External Supervision and Support 
The degeneration problem has received increasing attention of late, not 
least because of the track record of worker cooperation. Some consensus 
appears to have been reached concerning the vital need for developing 
a supportive and supervisory structure, that would ensure cooperatives 
are able to offer and maintain acceptable standards relating to minimum 
wages and other conditions of work, as well as ensuring credit availability, 
technical aid, democratic control and other provisions for social security, 
health and education. 63 
It is also clear that not all cooperatives have the infrastructure and 
the necessary funds to provide such conditions themselves, in bottom 
up fashion. If this is the case, then these conditions can only be provided 
and maintained top down, with the active support of a powerful social 
force - most notably, but not exclusively, the State. Pending the emergence 
of strong,federated, autonomous cooperative structures, government 
action may be quite indispensable to ensure proper supervision, financing 
and development and to guard against a misuse of the cooperative 
structure for exploitative ends. It is the nature and form of this top 
down support, its educational input, and its potential for social change, 
that this text proposes to consider in some depth in forthcoming chapters. 
Conclusion 
Looking back at· the argument there appears to be a powerful case to 
be made for worker cooperation: the strongest contemporary argument 
perhaps being the urgent need to redress the hardship and poverty 
worldwide of countless unemployed and underemployed by a more 
innovative approach to job creation. Without the support and supervision, 
though, from an external agency, notably the State, cooperatives, if they 
are to survive at all, could turn out to be either non-democratic, capital-
intensive monopolies or else small, undercapitalized firms performing 
a reserve army role within a capitalist economy. Looking at its actual, 
track record, therefore, the hopeful middle-ground of common ownership 
and collective control is not quite so inspiring. It has been noted, however, 
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that wherever worker cooperatives are flourishing, strong support organi-
zations do exist.64 But why is it, then, that worker cooperatives, if they 
are such attractive structures of work organization, fail dismally, unless. 
they are comph::mellted by an e:~Jernal supportive. and supervisory .body.? 
The following chapter will probe the reasons for cooperative failure and 
suggest what is the contribution that educational provision could make 
to improve such a condition and to transform worker cooperatives as 
agents of social change. 
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NOTES 
I. Both Rothschild-Witt & Witt (1986) and Greenberg (1983) make use of Olin Wright's 
(1976) concept of a contradictory class location to describe the worker cooperative 
as a site of conflicting ideological tensions; Clarke (1984) describes the divergent 
possibilities of self-management at the economic, organizational and attitudinal levels, 
based on a series of contradictory tensions. 
2. Perry & Davis (1985) dwell on this prior to proposing a detailed definition of 
what is a worker-owned firm. 
3. These principles defining worker cooperative organization are suggested, for example, 
by Jones (1980, p. 42), Thornley (1981, pp. 3-4) and Bogardus (1964, pp. 19fT). 
4. For general, classic descriptions of the effects of the Industrial Revolution on the 
emerging working class in Britain, see Thompson (1963); Engels (1971) and Cole (1944, 
Chapter I). See Braverman (1974) on the progressive des killing of industrial work 
and Thompson (1967) on time discipline within industrial capitalism. 
5. As Marx painstakingly argued via his Labour Theory of Value and his concept 
of estrangement or alienation. 
6. Cole (1944, p. I) singles out religious fervour and gin. Wilensky (1960) theorized 
on the compensatory leisure hypothesis, following on Engels and de Tocqueville. 
Productive activity out of working hours, especially in the form of self-employment, 
reaffirms work as intrinsically an edifying and satisfying activity, aside from serving 
tax exemption purposes. 
7. For reviews of the advocates of workplace democracy in Europe and the United 
States, see Vanek (ed.) (1975, pp. 16-21); King & Van der Vall (1978, Chapter I) and 
Mason (1982, Chapter 6). 
8. Clarke (1984, p. 97). 
9. Bendix (1963) provides a thorough analysis of the development of managerial 
ideology in Britain and the United States. 
10. See Galbraith (1958, Chapter 3) on what he describes as the economics of despair; 
on the mystification of knowledge see for example I1Iich (1977). Drama, literature, 
games and mass media are clear indications of the pervasive process of socialization 
into the logic of capitalism: for example, Hymer (1971) analyzes Robinson Crusoe 
as a study in capital accumulation and managerial control. TV serials like Dynasty 
and Starsky and Hutch, as well as popular games like Monopoly and Tycoon, revolve 
around implicit property prerogatives. 
II. The shifting interpretation of democracy towards a legitimation of contemporary 
pluralism is well handled by Pateman (1970). 
12. J.T. Dunlop's (1958) definition of industrial relations and the systems approach 
to organizational studies of Nobel Prize Winner Herbert Simon (1960) are grounded 
in this implicit respect for basic rules, whose transgression is illegitimate and therefore 
punishable. 
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13. In a pluralist setting the range of union activity is restricted because certain crucial 
areas of decision-making are managerial prerogatives; the style of union action is one 
of structured antagonism via collective bargaining. 
14. Fox (1974, p. 207) and Schuller (1958, Chapter 2). 
15. This description is from Djilas (1957, pp. 73ff). 
16. A contradiction elaborated upon by Bendix (1963). 
17. Historical examples of such intolerance include the dismantling of Workers' Councils 
in the Soviet Union just after the October 1917 Revolution and the fate of the Kronstadt 
Communes. Other examples include the reactions to workers' councils in Czechoslovakia 
(1968-9) and to the emergence of an autonomous trade union structure in Poland 
(1981,1988). 
18. As put by Oakeshott (1978, p. 217). 
19. Galeski (1977, p. 22). 
20. Gerschenkr0n (1966) relates development strategies to the relative time reference 
when industrialization is initiated. Korner et al. (1986) relate development strategies 
and rising expectations to suggest a vicious circle model or'Third World debt. 
21. See Bean (1985, Chapter 10). 
22. See various contributions in the social anthropological collection edited by Nash, 
Dandier & Hopkins (1976). 
23. Indeed, actual worker experiences reveal these labour control processes to be 
surprisingly similar: compare the two volumes on work experience in Britain edited 
by Fraser (1968, 1969) with the autobiographical materialof a Hungarian skilled worker, 
Haraszti (1977). . 
24. As discussed in detail by Fox (1971). 
25. The untapped resources of ... workers constitutes a criminal waste of energy 
and achievement, as a result of which the majority of workers go through life without 
even a glimmer of what they could have attained and contributed to their fellow human 
beings.' Roberts (1977, p. 149). 
26. Preston & Post (1974) argue that participation, defined as the inclusion of persons 
and groups involved and concerned with the diverse outcome of managerial activity 
as participants in the managerial process, is the contemporary revolution in management 
practices. This is corroborated by a vast volume of literature collectively referred to 
as the Human Relations approach to management. See Chapter I, Note 4. 
27. Forms of participatory management and other humanization of work programmes 
rarely challenge, but rather disguise and therefore strengthen the exercise of power 
by management and shareholders. See Chapter 1, Note 5. 
28. See, for example Bluestone & Harrison (1982) on the deindustrialization of the 
United Stat~s. Thirlwall (1982) elaborates on deindustrialization in the United Kingdom. 
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29. On the trend towards professionalization see Rus (1984a). 
30. Taylorism or Scientific Management is based on the ideas of Taylor (1911) and 
Fayol (1949). The concept of bureaucracy as signifying the rationalization of tasks 
in a context of predictability is analyzed by Weber (1947). 
31. Various studies compare the Taylorist and Human Relations models of Organi-
zational Design. See for example Burns & Stalker (1961), Likert (1961); and Abell 
(1985). 
32. See Berger (1963, pp. 98-100) on work and self-identity and Maslow (1954) and 
Horvat (1982) on self-actualization. 
33. See 'The New Industrial Relations', Business Week, Special Report, II May 1981. 
34. This 'ideology vs structure' thesis is elaborated by Berger (1964, pp. 211-22). 
35. Festinger (1957) elaborates on this adaptation via the concept of cognitive dissonance. 
36. The normlessness or anomie caused by rapid social qhange .. was a central theme 
of Durkheim (1933). 
37. See, for example, Mill (1911, p. 573), Vanek (ed.), (1975), Horvat (1982), and Marx 
(1972, Chapter 48, Section 2). 
38. These are reviewed in Defourny (1987). 
39. A point made, among others, by Thomas & Logan (1982, Chapter 5). 
40. Empirical works include Stephen (1982); Jones and Svejnar (1982); Batstone (1983); 
Cable & Fitzroy (1980); Berman (1967, 1982); Bellas (1972); Frieden (1980); Conte 
& Tannenbaum (1978). Pryor (1983, pp. 158-9) cites conflicting evidence. 
41. Levin (1984, pp. 24-6); Horvat (1982, p. 260); Bradley & Gelb (1981). 
42. See, for example, Vanek (I970); Espinosa & Zimbalist (1978, pp. 143-6); Cable 
& Fitzroy (1980); Thomas & Logan (1982, pp. 49-52). 
43. As described by Greenberg (1984, p. 193) in relation to the United States, and 
by Batstone (1983, p. 144) in relation to France. 
44. See Levin (1984); Jones & Svejnar (l982); Berman (1982); and Jones (1982, p. 
61) on the United States Plywood cooperatives. However, dividend maximization exerts 
pressure for a run down on membership: see Vanek (ed.), (1975, Chapter 28) and 
Roca (1975). 
45. Jackall & Levin (1984, pp. 3-4). This is why Tucker (1983, p. 26) calls worker 
cooperatives the children of crisis. Similarly Ramsay (1977, 1983) and Poole (1975) 
equate developments in workplace democracy to time periods when managerial authority 
is felt to be under threat, such as a recession. 
46. See Cole, (1944, Chapter I). 
47. Refer, for example, to Infield (1945) on state support for cooperatives in the United 
States following the New Deal; also reported in Pryor (1983, p. 138). 
48. As argues Kalecki (1976, pp. 61-5). 23 
49. Squire (1981, p. 72) reports underemployment estimates of 39 per cent for Africa, 
26 per cent for Asia and 20 per cent of the labour force for Latin America in 1970. 
Sabolo (1975) estimates unemployment in the same year at 9.6 per cent in Africa, 
7.1 per cent in Asia and 5.1 per cent in Latin America. The corresponding figure 
in the same year for industrialized countries stood at 2.2 per cent. The latter has 
since then increased and levelled off at about 9 per cent. (These global statistics are 
to be used with caution because of differing definitions and data-collection procedures 
used by individual countries.) 
50. As is done by Young & Rigge (1983, pp. 22-32); Louis (1983); Jones (1978); Linehan 
& Tucker (1983); Boggis (1973); Oakeshott (1978, Chapter 2) and, with respect to 
Malta, Rizzo (1985a). 
51. See, for example, the conditions of female workers undertaking manufacturing 
homework in Britain and Italy in Mitter (1986) and Solinas (1982) respectively. 
52. Jackall & Levin (1984, p. 9). 
53. See, for example, Defourny (1986, p. 4), Thornley (1981, pp. 173-4) and Estrin 
(1985, p. 353). 
54. As discussed in relation to Tanzania by Bienefeld & Godfrey (1975). For an 
econometric discussion see Vanek & Espinosa (1972). 
55. For wider reading on the 'articulation' debate in Marxism see overviews by Bradby 
(1975) and Foster-Carter (1978). Refer also to Chapter 3, Note 77. 
56. Thus the renowned Japanese enterprise corporatism only operates effectively because 
of the widespread existence of small-scale industries which operate without life-time 
employment. In times of crisis, workers from the corporatized sector can be shed by, 
for example, being transferred to a subsidiary, which is then forced into bankruptcy. 
See Dore (1983) and Hoynden (1958, Chapter 5). Bluestone & Harrison (1982, pp. 
257-62) suggest that Employee Stock Ownership Plans in the United States should 
be viewed equally critically. Already there are cooperatives which subcontract from 
industries that are suffering from foreign competition, and from those which are 
rationalizing their most profitable operations. See Thornley (1981, p. 98). 
57. See, for example, Leys (1973) and Bienefeld (1975) with respect to Kenya and 
Tanzania. 
58. See, for example, Oakeshott (1978) and Bislev (1985) with respect to Polish worker 
cooperatives. 
59. In Mozambique, agricultural cooperatives were set up in the interests of .small, 
capitalist farmers because this was a precondition for them to obtain access to tractors 
and other equipment. See Harriss (1980). Similarly, associations have been formed 
as legal cooperative entities in Sicily, Italy, to exploit generous government subsidies 
for the purchase of agricultural machinery - Schneider & Schneider (1976). Zwerdling 
(1980, p. 67) argues that ESOPs are mainly being used as financial gimmicks to evade 
tax on investment capital. 
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60. As in the case of the Sugar Cooperatives of Peru. See Roca (1975). 
61. This is evident in the legal structure of worker-owned firms in the United States, 
which is usually based on individual shareholding among workers who form the firm. 
See Greenberg (1984, passim) for a discussion of this feature with respect to the United 
States plywood cooperatives. See Carnoy (1981) for a general discussion. 
62. Nash & Hopkins (1976, pp. 10-11). Hence the large agricultural subsidies meted 
out by EEC countries as part of their Common Agricultural Policy, which allows 
farmers to overproduce, or to be paid for keeping their fields fallow. 
63. Estrin (1985, pp. 367-8) argues that, to guard against dubious motives for cooperative 
establishment, one should set up 'an entrepreneurial support agency with model rules 
to prevent the degeneration process and with its own financial or banking department.' 
The functions of this support agency go beyond what Vanek (ed.), (1975) and Horvat 
(1982) call a shelter organization. Other proponents include Dickstein (1988); Jones 
(1986); Thornley (1981); Wright (1979); Lindenfeld & Rothschild-Witt (1982); U ca (1983, 
p. 202); Commission of European Communities (1981). Trist (1980) calls this a referent 
organization. 
64. Commission of European Communities (1981, p. 28). 
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3 A STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL WORKER COOPERATION 
Introduction 
A worker cooperative must do more than simply survive and prosper 
to be successful; indeed, success involves a salutary but often elusive 
combination of commercial viability and democratic, human-centred 
organization of work. Such orientations may indeed present themselves 
as mutually exclusive, so that one has to be sacrificed for the other. 
The general outcome is that survival rates, while they are very poor 
for successful new businesses, are even poorer for successful worker 
cooperatives. Success stories, like Scott Bader in Britain, Hirondelle in 
France, Edilfornaciai in Italy, Cruz Azul in Mexico, the Cheeseboard 
in the United States and the Mondragon Group in Basque Spain, are 
few and far between.' Quite naturally, these are considered as notable 
exceptions to what looks like a pervasive, general rule. The result is 
that, over the years, many social scientists and economic planners have 
dismissed worker cooperatives as Utopian dreams, and consigned them 
to the dust heaps of history.2 
This chapter hopes to challenge this approach. Firstly, it identifies 
the various reasons put forward for explaining the poor worker coop-
erative record. Next, it analyzes these conditions in macro, environmental 
terms, relating them to specific socio-economic, but also cultural and 
. political factors. The analytical approach adopts a radical perspective, 
therefore, which goes beyond classical Marxism and ascribes a pivotal 
importance to cultural conditions and values per se, rather than treating 
them simply as reflectors of the all-important social and economic 
relations of production. Only by usurping conventional Marxism is the 
identification of an evolutionary reformist path to social democratization 
possible. Conditions that are necessary to execute such a strategy 
successfully include both voluntaristic and structural elements. Among 
the latter is the abatement of the threat of degeneration. However, with 
adequate educational provision and support from an appropriate shelter 
organization, it seems feasible that a prosperous self-supporting coop-
erative sector could be achieved. 
26 
A Typology of Failure 
There is no difficulty in assembling the variables to explain the generally 
dismal performance of worker cooperatives. Unavoidable laws of ten-
dency had already been designated in the nineteenth century and these 
are readily resorted to in understanding contemporary cases.3 Other 
reasons for failure can be gleaned by examining primary data relating 
to individual case studies of worker cooperative successes or downfalls.4 
Various typologies have been postulated already as well over the years.5 
The list below has been compiled independently, making ample use of 
the three sets of source material identified above. Like all typologies, 
a subdivision of factors may appear . neat but superficial, effectively not 
doing justice to the dynamic relationship, which to some degree exists 
between the variables themselves.6 
- Failure due to small size, economic marginality and capital shortage. 
Many worker cooperatives tend to get set up in risky and harshly 
competitive product domains where failure rates are invariably high. 
Often the result of rescues or conversions, which are almost always 
due to serious economic problems, many worker cooperatives are, 
economically speaking, lame ducks from their very inception. In such 
conditions, and often without sufficient capital, the cooperatives are 
unable to achieve economies of scale. Survival is usually in the short-
run only, and worker-members put in excessively long hours for a 
subsistence wage.7 
Failure due to lack of managerial skills. Many small cooperatives cannot 
afford to employ managerial expertise. Others could, but do not, all 
the same. Cooperative members may actually fail to recognise the 
need for skilled managerial personnel - these may be considered as 
simply overheads or symbols of capitalist power relations they could 
either do without or which they could replace easily themselves. The 
relative equality of pay and status may make it particularly difficult 
for worker cooperatives to attract managerial staff with the best 
credentials, whose market price would tend to be higher than most 
cooperatives are able or willing to offer. 8 
- Failure due to internal dissension. The absence of conventional authority 
figures and disciplinary structures in a worker cooperative could lead 
to insubordination, a vacuum of accountability and responsibility and 
leadership crisis.9 Efforts to reduce differences in power and influence 
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may generate resistance in giving legitimate authority to positions 
or individuals. Conflict may be suppressed, taken to imply a failure 
in human relations, or else handled badly by an ambiguous distinction 
between union and management structures, if such a distinction exists 
at all. The practice of democratic management may be seen as fiiiie-
consuming and hopelessly unproductive, especially if the participants 
lack cooperative skills. The acquisition of such skills and techniques 
is even more difficult when the cooperative is a rescue or conversion 
from a capitalist firm, in which workers were used to pursuing their 
interests via antagonistic trade unionism. 10 
- Failure due to economic success and large size. If a worker cooperative 
is successful economically, it will also tend to expand. Large size, 
however, necessitates bureaucratization and consequently the intro-
duction of measures of representative (instead of participatory) democ-
racy. II There is also considerable evidence that, as the size of an 
organization increases, member commitment or attachment declines. 12 
This may therefore introduce a diffusion of responsibility and lead 
to a lack of participation and initiative. 13 This tendency to degenerate 
may come about as a result of economic success per se. It seems 
that, just as a hard and difficult life may stir the cooperative spirit, 
the urgency to cooperate may disintegrate once the hard life is 
overcome. Economic prosperity increases the incentive to limit mem-
bership and employ cheap second class labour. 14 
Otherwise, the cooperative may become a target of private capital, 
which may coax a buy-out from the worker-members by lucrative 
offers;15 or else the cooperative could become infiltrated by members 
of the higher socio-economic strata via the sale and purchase of shares. 16 
In any case, the effect is that the original cooperators are transformed 
into (or replaced by) capitalist shareholders. 
Analyzing the Causes of Failure 
Examining the failure-inducing constraints, it is clear that not all are 
specific to worker cooperatives; a number could apply equally well to 
non-cooperative enterprises. 17 Take the conditions of small size and small 
scale. They have been considered advantageous with respect to working 
conditions, economic efficiency, human relations,job control and reduced 
alienation. 18 They also contribute to the preservation of direct, partic-
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ipatory democracy.19 The reality of the small scale enterprise, however, 
is very often different. Workers in many small fIrms experience lower 
wages, worse working conditions, less trade union representation and 
less protection from arbitrary management decisions than do workers 
in similar jobs in large fIrms.20 Small fIrms, being often underflnanced, 
may be able to survive only via such an intensifIcation of labour ex-
ploitation. It is therefore no coincidence that large fIrms eventually 
predominate in advanced stages of industrialization;21 while smaller fIrms 
generally have much shorter life-spans.22 
The typology of worker cooperative failure, though, goes beyond 
the maladies associated with small size and scale. It is clear that worker 
cooperatives suffer other specifIc pressures because their structures and 
ideology of work are anomalous with mainstream social conditions. The 
ultimate pressure here is the 'success breeds failure' syndrome. These 
pressures collectively cause a degeneration process, driving the cooperative 
structure into either performing a 'reserve army' role, which eventually 
leads to its liquidation; or, if economically successful, erode the coop-
erative's internal democratic organization of work.23 
From where do these specifIc, degenerative pressures emerge? In 
political and economic terms, they emanate from power relations estab-
lished at the point of production, leading to a social structure with an 
unequal distribution of power. This is defended, reproduced and legit-
imized by social institutions which act to socialize members into the 
ethos of the status quo and discriminate in their operations against non-
conforming forms of production. In cultural terms, the degenerative 
pressures emerge from a dominant ideology which fosters values alien 
to worker cooperation. For this reason, most societies provide at best 
only marginal skills and episodic experiences in democratic participation. 
Evaluating Educational Policies 
Such a perspective permits a critical evaluation of educational policies 
that have been implemented to encourage worker cooperation. The 
supporting role of education in this respect has been recognized for over 
a century. The objectives of such education are to mitigate some of 
the failure-inducing constraints tabulated above. Training programmes 
in management, administration, marketing and accountancy seek to 
generate a higher level of managerial competence among cooperative 
29 
members; training seminars in committee procedure, group dynamics, 
the history and practice of worker cooperation and industrial sociology 
seek to improve the skills and knowledge needed for effective democratic 
management. More broadly, instruction in political science, political 
economy, social psychology and industrial law seek to enhance the 
competence of workers generally, making them more capable of pursuing 
their interests as workers and citizens. This kind of educational strategy 
has been set in motion by most centres of worker and cooperative 
education worldwide.24 
Such a policy is undoubtedly praiseworthy and commendable. Yet, 
undefended from the merciless degenerative forces of the wider environ-
ment, it can only end in failure. At best, educational provision in the 
sense described above might counter the effect of the dominant ideological 
fabric on one's own value system; it could convert individual workers 
to the values of cooperation, but it cannot affect in any way the 
fundamental power relations existing in the wider society, nor can it 
influence the institutional supports, the socializing processes and the 
cultural patterns which legitimize and reproduce these same power 
relations. 
The Third World Condition 
The importance of assigning a major consideration to the specific socio 
economic, political and cultural environment can be evidenced from the 
large scale attempts at introducing viable worker cooperation in the Third 
World. Although essentially a First World specimen, the cooperative 
model was imported on a massive scale into industrializing economies, 
first by colonizing powers seeking to restructure indigenous agriculture 
along more commercial lines and later, by post-independence governments 
seeking rapid modernization without the evident undesirable side-effects 
of either private capitalism or state socialism. 
The potential, then, for creating a wholesale third sector appeared 
to be fulfilled most effectively in the Third World, where strong state 
support for the cooperative project was forthcoming. The idea was 
attractive, both for its economic consequences, and for its ideological 
appeal as an instrument for fostering desperately needed national con-
sciousness. It was also understood that certain indigenous collectivist 
structures and traditions presented a natural breeding ground for modern 
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worker cooperation. Mter many experiments and just as many failures, 
though, most of this optimism has evaporated. The worker cooperative 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America has not heralded the long sought-
for third alternative. By and large, it has served rather as an instrument 
to reinforce the existing power relations.25 The inquest on Third World 
worker cooperation highlighted the importance of peculiar environmental 
variables, which substantially influence the chances of worker cooperative 
success. Put differently, there were stilI degenerative forces, albeit different 
ones, at work in industrializing countries. Generalizing about three-
quarters of the globe must be a simplistic exercise, but, for the sake 
of identifying some key factors, a number of Third World environmental 
conditions can be singled out: 
- The prevalence a/pre-capitalist relations a/production. Many producers 
in industrializing countries, particularly in Mrica, are still engaged 
in a small-scale family-based subsistence, rural economy with a minimal 
division of labour, in conditions of mutual isolation and with an 
open option of self-sufficiency. There is therefore little basis for capital 
accumulation, no incentive for change and an autonomy that enables 
one to escape policy demands from distant sources such as the state.26 
A perseverance in traditional production practices that have stood 
the test of generations is of course a wise and functional adaptationP 
Seen from the point of view of cooperative development planners, 
though, it appears as a manifestation of stubborn conservatism which 
stifles attempts at modernization of agricultural organization. Within 
the context of pre-capitalist production relations, too, class interests 
are not easily developed - rather it is racial, ethnic and religious interests 
that predominate and shape power relations in the society at large.28 
- The role 0/ the state. The development strategy of late industrializers 
has relied heavily on Governments to take the initiative.29 The political 
leaders of industrializing states are in a race against time to maximize 
the development potentialities of their societies and meet the needs 
and demands of their peoples. Hence the prevailing ideology and 
practice towards the economy is less liberal and non-interventionist 
than in Europe and the United States. In the latter cases cooperative 
movements developed autonomously, without state support, in the 
nineteenth century. 30 
By contrast, in industrializing economies, the very establishment of 
cooperatives often depends heavily on the State itself, usually serving 
31 
a triple purpose within an overall development strategy: cooperative 
development avoids a head-on clash with the large peasantry, promises 
to accumulate capital and establishes structures of 'top-down' ideo-
logical influence.3l It follows almost logically, therefore, that there 
is considerable interest by the State in the regulation of cooperative 
affairs, so that, in some cases, cooperatives have been turned into 
organs of state control.32 In other cases, cooperative structures have 
evolved as power bases independent of and in competition with the 
ruling administration, in which case they are broken, tamed or 
otherwise tolerated with closely circumscribed circuits of influence.33 
- The economy of affection. Within many industrializing countries ther~ 
are invisible organizations of people connected by blood, kin, com-
munity and religion, which pervade all spheres of life, including the 
economic. 34 The maintenance and cultivation of an individual's 
position in this network of support and interaction is an important 
personal concern. This process delays the development of a public 
morality that sustains' effective state power and a functional legal 
rational bureaucracy.35 Cooperative structures can therefore easily fall 
victim to mismanagement, corruption, nepotism and manipUlation 
of rules, because these are perceived as legitimate or unavoidable within 
such an economy of affection. This makes the cooperative structures 
dependent on traditional power holders, since they are usually in a 
position to grant favours and credit and make concessions. 
- The existence of indigenous, traditional, communal practices. Elements 
of mutual aid in peasant and tribal society, such as at harvest time, 
planting and house building, and the solidary ties of kinship, marriage, 
religion and community, have been suggested as advantageous and 
perhaps necessary preconditions for the creation of modern cooperative 
ventures. 36 The idea is attractive but suspect; the solidarity of many 
traditional communities is often an idyllic oversimplification which 
camouflages harsh and bitter tensions, inequalities and authoritarian 
relations. 37 All the same, even if a common indigenous culture of 
cooperation exists, taking on the formal institutions of modern 
cooperatives, such as rational accounting and managerial control, 
could challenge the very bonds of trust and solidarity on which the 
community is based. 38 
Faced with these powerful and pervasive conditions, the likelihood of 
effective worker cooperation appears just as elusive in the Third World 
32 
as elsewhere. Indeed, it has been suggested that, for effective worker 
cooperatives to be developed in industrializing countries, the society in 
question must necessarily first pass through the transitional evil phase 
of capitalism, to develop a rational bureaucracy, weed out the economy 
of affection, replace traditional power relations with class relations and 
liberate the productive forces of its workers.39 
Focus on Environmental Change 
The lesson to be learnt, therefore, is that, if minimal consideration is 
paid to the specific socio-economic, political and cultural environment 
where the cooperative venture is to be established, then the cooperative 
will fail, in democratic terms if not in economic ones. The degeneration 
problem, once properly diagnosed, highlights first of all the importance 
of counter-institutional support for worker cooperation. Given the fact 
that legislation, education, banking systems, research laboratories, con-
sultancy and accounting firms are geared by their very nature to operate 
in support of conventional (capitalistletatist) organizations, then it is 
to be expected that they are not intended to support anomalous initiatives 
- such as worker cooperatives. Hence the case for alternative laws, schools, 
banks, research labs and support organizations to supply their crucial 
services to worker cooperatives.40 
The degeneration problem also highlights the cultural condition. Social 
institutions, apart from providing the social order with required services, 
act as powerful socializing agents. They impart the dominant values 
to members and therefore contribute to the survival of the given social 
order. A successful worker cooperative cannot neglect to have its own 
'socializing force', imbuing the workers with the values salutary to 
cooperative organization. Apart from the actual experience of work in 
such an organization, which is a very powerful socializing process, a 
democratic consciousness, a spirit of collectivism and a common occu-
pational culture act to forge bonds of solidarity between present and 
would-be worker cooperators, also distinguishing them culturally from 
non-cooperative workers who therefore serve as anti-referent groups. 
The institutional and cultural dimensions of degeneration as emergent 
from our typology of failure are supported by an examination of the 
world's viable cases of worker cooperation. In practically all cases, re-
search identifies the existence of both strong support organizations, as 
well as commitments to collectivist or democratic values.41 
33 
All things being equal, then, the case for successful worker cooperation 
must focus, not simply on the cooperative firm proper, but on the 
environment which spawns and breeds it. It is clear that cooperatives 
are alien products, foreign bodies in their environment and so it is no 
wonder that they suffer for it. It is also clear that where cooperatives 
succeeded, it was only because they transformed their environment to 
the extent that they developed an institutional and cultural framework 
within which worker cooperation becomes a normal, legitimate under-
taking. 
Such a diagnosis clearly involves a painful, revolutionary shift in 
perspective. Shoring up cooperatives against the inevitable forces of 
degeneration may be a viable proposition but only in the short term. 
The best form of defence is attack, based on diluting, or counteracting 
the forces of degeneration proper. An obsession for a defensive posture 
cannot produce a workable alternative. 
At first sight, this may appear impossible to implement in practice. 
But it can be argued that it is the stark reality of so many cooperative 
failures which has conditioned the cases for worker cooperation. This 
dismal record has invariably imposed a paradigm of worker cooperation 
which is restricted in scope and method.42 
Nowhere is this more clearly manifested than in the analogies, by 
now quite popularized and reserved for worker cooperation: oases in 
an arid, hostile desert; lonely beacons of enlightened democracy; foreign 
bodies bound to succumb to the social system's alert defence mechanism; 
islands in an alien (capitalist/etatist) ocean. 
This terminology and what it stands for must be usurped to give 
worker cooperation the chance it merits to genuinely succeed.43 One 
must not succumb to the disillusion of so many failures 'and focus 
persistently on negative iron laws. If there exist degenerative forces which 
eat away at the bulwarks of worker cooperation, then there are also 
strong countervailing, regenerative forces, which can contribute to the 
building of new cooperatives or to the extension of existing ones.44 As 
in the domain of the physical sciences, there is no simple and irreversible 
law of entropy, but an interplay of fission and fusion in the living 
universe.45 
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Models of Social Change Considered 
If the strategy to establish successful worker cooperation must be based 
on a degree of social transformation, even in a limited sense, then the 
job is much easier said than done. After all, the environmental variables 
to be' transformed are functional expressions, developed over time, of 
a particular social and economic history, and reflect specific power pat-
terns, which are not so easily dislodged. 
All the same, a number of models for engineering social change have 
been theorized,46 while others can be identified from experience: 
A demonstration effect strategy. This postulates that an autonomous 
spillover or ripple effect will take place, once a test-case is established 
and is visibly advantageous. This effect occasionally works, perhaps 
because, being initially an isolated phenomenon, it does not threaten 
traditional power 6lites and so does not generate too much hostility. 
Often, success has depended, though, on the mobilization of powerful 
socio-political support and the existence or development of a suitable 
ideology.47 
- A radical strategy of starting from scratch. This is based on the premise 
that the only way to neutralize traditional value systems and power 
structures is to scrap all existing institutions from a position offorce.48 
Such a radical strategy requires a very powerful state apparatus which 
can effectively defend itself from political opposition, economic 
pressures and a deterioration of its ideological commitment towards 
change. Even then, traditional value systems may be so pervasive 
that they still persist and refuse to be reformed.49 Reorganized, post-
revolutionary structures may, as a result, only go through a cosmetic 
change. 50 Citizens and workers at large may then remain subdued 
in the same culture of powerlessness and passivity; they remain victims 
of power and policy, to be taught, led and managed by experts and 
elites. 5 I If the masses are only involved through the agency of various 
mediating devices that merely bear their name, then they do not 
effectively participate. 52 
- A reformist, incrementalist strategy. This lays its hopes in the potential 
of education spearheading a gradual social transformation. Education 
is perceived to be a powerful instrument, which can bring about social 
change under the condition of broad social consensus. 53 The model, 
though, refuses to consider the functional relationship between educa-
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tion, the respective socio-economic structure and the ideological super-
structure. The purpose of school socialization to reproduce labour 
power and the governing relations of production - functions which 
aJ:e inc()n~iste_nt with t:he v;:tlues of coop~rat:iQna[1(:l 9Qlk~ivej:on­
sciousness - are subsumed beneath the liberal myth which proclaims 
education as the means by which merit, skill, and knowledge might 
ultimately provide social mobility. 54 Thus, left in splendid isolation, 
without wider social support and inspiration, an educational pro-
gramme will not only collapse but, in degenerating, end up serving 
the interests of the dominant social classes. In this way, rather than 
promoting social change, an educational programme may make it 
even more unlikely by legitimating, and therefore strengthening and 
reproducing, the existing division of labour. 55 The development of 
a learning society will not foster social change as long as the educational 
process remains rooted in the established cultural and political setting. 
- A 'social movement' approach to change. A different strategy of social 
change is based on a power model of society, but, nevertheless, aims 
at an evolutionary sequence for transforming power relations and 
overcoming vested interests. Such conditions could be met via the 
existence of a progressive social movement: a socio-political force 
whose leadership is capable of influencing the behaviour and values 
of citizens at large by its appeals and statements from a position 
of authority, usually accompanied by a supportive ideology.56 A social 
movement could prove to be a continuous source of support for worker 
cooperatives financially, vocationally and ideologically. It could insti-
tutionalize a power base and thereby provide a basis for legitimizing 
worker cooperatives within the community, while at the same time 
adapting these to best fit the local conditions. A social movement 
could resolve the dilemma between continuity and change by providing 
continually relevant responses to local problems by virtue of its 
dynamic character in the face of changing social conditions. It can 
itself be both an initiator and a motor of progressive social changeY 
A number of difficulties nevertheless reside with this approach. Firstly, 
it takes time to mature. Secondly, during such lengthy time periods, 
the social movement's power base must be strong enough to withstand 
hostility from those who might feel threatened, if genuine cooperativism 
and worker management take root: property and business interests, 
the judiciary, the bureaucracy, the military and foreign interests. 
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Thirdly, such hostility may emerge from within the ranks of the social 
movement itself. It appears contrary to human nature for a powerful 
social force to purposely adopt a strategy which, if managed success-
fully, would lead to an increasing legitimacy and acceptability for 
worker cooperativism in the wider social context.58 Developing a power 
base which, in the long run, becomes independent of the social 
movement that established it in the fIrst place, involves a dilemma 
between promoting autonomy and preserving influence. 59 
The Gramscian Vision 
If a social movement evolutionary approach to change is adopted, then 
the corresponding tactic in military terms should be one of 'a war of 
position'. This was the term used by the Italian Antonio Gramsci whose 
insights are useful in clarifying the role of education and of a social 
movement in the broader process of social transformation towards worker 
cooperation.60 
The young Gramsci would have fully approved of a project aiming 
at bottom-up, incremental social transformation. He placed great trust 
in worker cooperative production and other forms of worker management 
as a means for educating workers to socialism, and serving as the incu-
bators of a new society. The outcome of the 1920 Turin strikes, however, 
led Gramsci to identify the importance and success of political support 
for any initiative in workplace democratization. 
Gramsci's vision of the functioning of the capitalist system matured 
to develop the key concept of Hegemony: 'An order in which a certain 
way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality 
is diffused through society in all its institutional and private manifestations, 
informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political 
principles and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and 
moral connotations.' 61 
Gramsci thus identifIed the superstructure as the depository of 
dominant culture and the apparatus of hegemony. He goes beyond the 
classical Marxist ascription of the exclusive primacy of the economir:: 
sphere: The logic of domination is seen to go beyond economics into 
the terrain of culture and ideology. The capitalist system has its own 
paradigm, that is a shared conception of what is legitimate and possible,62 
determined by a complex network of institutions, practices and day to 
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day routines (of which the economic sphere is but one) which act as 
ideological mediators.63 
For such a logic and ecology of domination to be eroded, it must 
be replaced to some extent by a counter-hegemony. Indeed, the principiI:: 
of hegemony itself is to be transformed from one which mystifies social 
conditions to one which exposes their inner workings.64 This counter 
hegemony is to emerge from the mass organization of the working class 
under the banner of a political party which will invest in counter-
hegemonic education aimed at developing proletarian institutions, values 
and culture. Concurrently the counter-hegemony seeks to pervade and 
conquer systematically all the institutional agencies of civil society. In 
the Gramscian extended metaphor of warfare, the counter-culture would 
confront the established (for Gramsci, the bourgeois) hegemony in a 
'war of position' of trenches moving back and forth in an ideological 
struggle ove!" both the consciousness of citizens and the social institutions 
operant in the same society. Only when the new superstructure has 
engulfed the old would it make sense to take over state power. The 
leaders of the Turin Strikes in Italy (1919-20), the leadership behind 
the worker and student unrest in France (1968) and Allende in Chile 
(1970-73) apparently had underestimated the strength and pervasiveness 
of capitalist ideological and cultural domination, by adopting a frontal 
attack strategy, what Gramsci calls the 'war of maneouvre'. 65 Such could 
only work in contexts where capitalism was not hegemonic. Thus tzarism 
in Russia, founded on ignorance, apathy and repression, not on the 
voluntary consent of its subjects, could indeed be overthrown by a frontal 
attack. 66 
The Gramscian vision of social transformation can be criticized for 
focusing exclusively on the political and cultural aspects of proletarian 
domination; it misses to consider the economic constraints of such a 
transformation - the flow of investment capital, exports and imports 
of goods and services, and the location of the society within the 
international economic system appear to constrain significantly any 
departure from the dominant hegemony.67 It is highly Utopian to imagine 
a cooperative economy, whether industry-based, regionally or even 
nationally organized, which is not circumscribed within a larger non-
cooperative framework. It may be more feasible and realistic, then, 
certainly in the medium term, to propose that social change be directed 
to the extent of creating a cooperative environment within the wider 
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social context and leading to a state of dual power, with a cooperative 
environment alongside a non-cooperative one.68 
What are the prospects for such an emergent bi-polar hegemonic 
condition? From the cultural perspective, if appears clear that the seeds 
for a counter-hegemony already exist, because no society is structurally 
and culturally completely homogenous.69 At the macro level, it is this 
potential for a counter-culture which has been described as the seat of 
all emancipatory movements and of social evolution.70 A countervailing 
factor to cultural domination exists in societies having a strong working 
class movement, party ideology or culture; these can serve as more 
nourishing environments for the advance of worker cooperation.7l Nor 
need counter cultural values emerge in revolutionary scenarios. They 
may simply form a transposition of values beyond one site of social 
practice - such as the family or government - in which they are perceived 
as legitimate, even by the dominant culture, to another. 72 
Such sites of social practice which do not harbour and reproduce 
the dominant (capitalist/etatist) ideology are also much more wide-
spread than may be intuitively realised.73 Capitalism/etatism even in 
unmediated societies without a visible countervailing movement, do 
not pervade all areas of social activity. These conditions also find 
expression at the micro, individual level in ambivalent attitudes to 
power and authority, or in what Gramsci called a contradictory con-
sciousness.74 
The prospects of a bi-polar hegemonic condition must also be assessed 
from an economic viewpoint. The existence of non-hegemonic relations 
of production alongside hegemonic ones has been an historical condition 
for many years in both etatist and capitalist economies.75 Literature on 
such an articulation of modes of production,76 each of which is governed 
by specific, distinct social and technical relations of production, is very 
vast. 77 The general conclusion of the analysis is that non-hegemonic modes 
enable a higher degree of labour exploitation and that such modes, while 
harbouring different social and technical relations, are effectively sub-
servient to the dominant productive mode. Similarly, work cooperatives 
have tended to play the underdogs in this situation, serving to subsidize 
and contribute to the recuperation of the hegemonic economy from 
periodic crisis.78 
Whether circumscribed or paralleled by impersonal and commercial 
market transactions, or bureaucratized and centralized planning decisions, 
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worker cooperatives can· adapt in many ways without necessarily suc-
cumbing to a subservient status, as implied by the articulation theorists. 
Worker cooperatives can produce special products or services that meet 
demands_ which the ordinarymarkeLcannot or is unwilling to_satis[y;7~_ 
they can and should verticalize their production by building chains of 
loyalty and solidarity among themselves and other social groupings. 80 
The affiliation to and the provisional support of social movements would 
also serve as an alterna.ti:v.e, ready market for the cooperatives' products.8l 
It has been suggested that the only viable economic strategy to counter 
a hegemonic economic system is to delink from it.82 This is very difficult 
to execute or maintain given the existence of entrenched commercial 
and political interests, persisting economic dependence and outward-
oriented cultural tendencies and aspirations.83 These can be mitigated, 
if not actually overcome, by a cooperative economy, that is as self-
sustaining as possible, and an ideology, that is culturally self-reliant. 
Both of these are to be established and maintained, certainly during 
the process of cooperative maturation, by social movement support. 
Thirdly and lastly, the case for dual power also finds supportive 
psychological indicators. The existence of an external, non-cooperative 
environment can act as an anti-referent group for the worker cooperators, 
fostering a spirit of ethnocentrism and self-identity which strengthens 
the cooperative spirit, whether based on a collectivist ideology or on 
ethnic and cultural ties.84 
If one goes back to Marx's historical determinism, it may be suggested 
that the seeds of the downfall of capitalism (as he would put it) are 
not located in the contradictions of the economic sphere: the class struggle 
and the fall in the rate of profit do not appear today to have the 
revolutionary potential one could validly postulate 120 years ago.85 
However, there may be discrete but powerful gravediggers of capitalism 
at work in the cultural and ideological spheres. That societies, in particular 
capitalist democracies, tolerate a war of position may be both their 
strength and their weakness. It is this tolerance which must be exploited 
by the social movements disposed towards change to tip the scales in 
favour of evolutionary social transformation. 86 
Conclusion 
An appraisal of the performance of worker cooperation has identified 
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various forces and pressures at work, which emanate from the envi-
ronmental contextuality of these cooperative ventures. The agents of 
degeneration have been diagnosed as expressions of dominant socio-
economic power relations and cultural values. The argument has therefore 
proposed that successful worker cooperation is possible only when this 
hegemony is sufficiently mitigated by a counter-hegemony: the latter 
would nurture an attractive environment, wherein worker cooperation 
would be a natural state of affairs. This project is envisaged to unfold 
via an appropriate political programme of evolutionary social change: 
a Gramscian-style war of attrition, which involves the inspiration and 
support of a social movement and, in particular, the operationalization 
of counter-hegemonic education. 
In implementing this strategy, certain problems can be foreseen in 
advance. Apart from the voluntaristic conditions to this evolutionary 
strategy, there are also structural limitations, which reflect the tenacity 
of traditionally established values and patterns of social behaviour, as 
well as the trained incapacity of social agents, that is persons and insti-
tutions, which are themselves products of a given social fabric they are 
purportedly keen to transform. 87 A continuous dialectic presents itself, 
therefore, between the hegemonic/degenerative forces on one hand, and 
the counter-hegemonic/regenerative forces on the other, in the process 
of attempted directed social change. The function of education in sup-
porting successful worker cooperation is a case in point to explore these 
dynamics. They will be examined in practical details in Chapter 4. 
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NOTES 
1. The Scott Bader Commonwealth is described in Oakeshott (1978, pp. 75-8; 82-3); 
Hirondelle in Oakeshott (1978, pp. DO-I); Cruz Azul in Smole-Grobovsek (1986); 
Edilfornaciai in Thornley (1981, pp. 158-9); The Cheeseboard of California in Jackall 
(1984) and the Mondragon Movement in various texts but notably in Thomas & Logan 
(1982). 
2. For example, Clegg (1960, p. 126) and Blumberg (1968, p. 3) consider worker 
cooperatives as inappropriate structures for industrial democracy. 
3. These laws include those of Oppenheimer (1896); Michels (1958); Webb (1920); 
Gide (1930); Luxemburg (1970) and Meister (1973). 
" 
4. The large corpus of literature on cooperative case studies includes Bernstein (1976); 
Bradley & Gelb «1983); Fals-Borda et al. (1976); Gamson & Levin (1984); Nash & 
Hopkins (1976); Meister (1969); Oakeshott (1978) Dickstein (1988); Stephen (1982); 
Thornley (1981); Vanek (ed.), (1975); Worsley (1971) and Sandkull (1984). Alternative 
assessments of why cooperatives fail resort to a historical, diachronic approach, 
observing the unfolding drama leading to a worker cooperative's downfall. This is 
undertaken, among others, by Galjart (1975) and Batstone (1983). 
5. These include Potter (1891) and Webb & Webb (1920), both reported in Young 
& Rigge (1983); Pryor (1983, pp. 161-2); Webb (1928) reported in Cornforth (1983, 
pp. 173-4); Thornley (1981, pp. 10-11, 26-8) and Oakeshott (1980). 
6. In this particular case, the resort to a typology hopefully qualifies as valid since 
the subsequent analysis shall indeed examine the variables identified in combination, 
relating them to a common, primordial condition. 
7. The limitation of small scale saw the end of Little Women in Sunderland, England, 
. while capital shortage led to the winding up of the Triumph Motorcycle plant at Meriden, 
also in England. See Thornley (1981, p. 75) and Bradley & Gelb (1983, passim) 
respectively. 
8. The Ousebourne Cooperative Engineering Works in Newcastle, England, was started 
in 1871 but was forced into liquidation within four short years, particularly because 
it entered into the tough and sophisticated market of engine production without adequate 
managerial, marketing or costing skills. The trade union movement lost £60,000 in 
the process, a handsome sum in those days. See Oakeshott (1978, pp 57-8). Alchian 
& Demsetz (1972) argue that remuneration rates for managerial staff which are low 
relative to counterparts in capitalist organizations will not attract top quality expertise 
and will therefore impede the growth and success of collective organizations. 
9. Webb (1920, p. 72) concluded that, even when professional management is enjoyed 
by a cooperative, the relationship between management and rank-and-file members 
in such democratic contexts becomes an impossible one .. Shirom (1972) and Jensen 
& Meckling (1979) reach a similar conclusion based on more recent research. 
10. This was one factor leading to the demise of Kirkby Manufacturing and Engineering 
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of Liverpool, England. No distinction was made between union and management 
structures at the firm and discipline could not be imposed. Details from Young & 
Rigge (1983). For a complete case study see Eccles (1981). 
11. The 'iron law of degeneration' of Meister (1973) and the 'iron law of oligarchy' 
of Michels (1958) make a similar point. 
12. See, for example, Olson (1965) and Ingham (1970). 
13. A strike in 1974 at Ulgor, the largest cooperative in the Mondragon group, was 
indeed blamed on the sheer size of the workforce which had led to inadequate 
communication networks and to worker alienation. See the brief report in Thomas 
& Logan (1982, pp. 35-6) and in Zwerdling (1980). As a rule, subsequent to this strike, 
workforce size in the Mondragon cluster has a maximum ceiling of five hundred. Young 
& Rigge (1983, p. 137). 
14. Barkai (1977) and Ben-Ner (1982) discuss this phenomenon in relation to the Israeli 
Kibbutzim. Roca (1975) discusses it with respect to the Sugar Cooperatives in Pl!ru. 
15. A similar process occurs in centrally-planned economies, where economically 
successful cooperatives have been absorbed by the state-owned sector - see Oakeshott 
(1978, p. 217). 
16. This led to the demise of the Rochdale Pioneers. See Oakeshott (1978, p. 16). 
17. Wilson (1982) and Chaplin & Cowe (1977) have argued that many problems faced 
by cooperatives are the same as those faced by other small businesses. 
18. As argued by Boissevain (1981), Storey (1982) and Bannock (1981). Schumacher 
(1973) is generally hailed as a main exponent of the 'small is beautiful' theory. He 
does not plead for independent small scale firms, however, only for a humanization 
and decentralization of large scale production. 
19. As argues Galjart (1975). 
20. See Curran & Stanworth (1981); Rainnie (1985a, b); Jefferis (1988). 
21. Anderson (1982, p. 923) mentions several reasons to explain this widespread 
condition. 
22. This is demonstrated empirically with respect to the United States by Bluestone 
& Harrison (1982, Chapter 7). Brusco & Sabel (1981) suggest, however, that highly 
capitalized, market-sensitive small firms are exempted from these conditions. 
23. Rosa Luxemburg (1970, p. 69) condemns worker cooperatives to failure due to 
either liquidation or degeneration into pure capitalist firms. Gide's famous paradox 
(1930, p. 7) states that the more successful cooperatives are economically, the more 
liable they are to fail socially. Oppenheimer's law of transformation (1896) suggests 
how a dominant economy brakes, arrests and remoulds anomolous production units 
to conform to the dominant model. Oppenheimer's views are paraphrased in Nash 
& Hopkins (1976, p. 17). 
24. One very comprehensive review of these is provided by Hopkins (1985). 
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25. As conclude the studies edited by Nash et al. (1976) and the UNRISD studies 
of the early 1970s. See Apthorpe (ed.), (1970); Apthorpe (1972); Fa1s-Borda (1971); 
Fals-Borda et al. (1976); Inayatullah (1972); Inayatullah (ed.), (1970); Carroll et al. 
(1969). 
26. See for example Foster (1965); Huizer (1970) and Hyden (1983). 
27. As Chambers (1983) argues convincingly. 
28. Inayatullah (1972, p. 263). Shaw (1986) argues how ethnic interests become more 
pronounced in times of economic hardship. Russell (1984) examines the effect of ethnicity 
on the formation llnd degeneration of taxi cooperatives in Los Angeles, USA. 
29. As expounded by Gerschenkron (1966). Conditionalities imposed by World Bank/ 
IMF directives on debt-ridden countries as well as corrupt public administration have 
provoked outcries for a minimalist public role in development policy. See Toye (1987) 
and Sandbrook (1985). 
30. Inayatullah (1972, p. 270); Spear (1982); Hyman (1979) and Bean (1985, Chapter 
9). 
31. As described in detail by Worsley (1971) and by Reed (1977). 
32. As, for example, Spear (1982, p. 41) reports in the case of India and Inayatullah 
(1972) with respect to Sri Lanka. 
33. As argues Gagnon (1976) in the case of cooperative movements in Tunisia and 
Senegal. 
34. This condition is comparable to those of Gemeinschaft and Mechanical Solidarity 
which are associated with pre-industrial life. See Tonnies (1955) and Durkheim (1933) 
respectively . 
.35. Such problematic consequences are discussed broadly by Birungi (1986). 
36. See, for example, Adeyeye (1978) on West Africa and Lowdermilk (1964) with 
respect to the Punjab. Mandel (1968, pp. 30-6) cites from anthropological literature 
other examples of indigenous cooperation with reference to Dahomey, New Guinea, 
Borneo, Russia and elsewhere. See also Dore (1971) and Galjart & Buijs (1982, p. 
81) for a wider but conditional treatment of this hypothesis. 
37. As revealed by Gosselin (1970) with respect to African communities and by various 
other contributors in Nash et al. (1976). 
38. Worsley (1971, passim). A remarkably similar point is made by Titmuss (1971) 
to explain the reduction of blood donations in the UK when a gift relationship became 
commoditized. 
39. This view goes back to Engels and to Lenin's debate with the Narodniks. Meillassoux 
(1972) and Hyden (1983) are notable contemporary adherents to a similar view. 
40. There is apparently even a case to be made for alternative technology. Conventional 
equipment may import ordinary production relations based on the division of labour, 
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as happened to the French cooperative, Boimondau. See De Bettignies & Hofstede 
(1977). 
41. These include: the strong presence of Scandinavian immigrants in the US Plywood 
Coops; East European Jews in Kibbutzim; Basque Nationalists in Mondragon. See 
Gamson & Levin (1984, pp. 225-7). The concept of an occupational community used 
by Lockwood (1966) and Parkin (1967) is also useful in explaining working class 
consciousness and collective identity. Hofstede (1980) presents an interesting compar-
ative study of certain cultural traits. This has been applied to workplace democracy 
by De (1984) and ViJJanueva (1988), among others. On the importance of a support 
organization see Chapter 2 Note 63. The requirement is stipulated also by Bernstein 
(1976) and Rothschild-Witt (1979). Refer also to Chapter 7 Note 85. 
42. Kuhn (1962) developed the concept of a paradigm to exemplify, historically and 
culturally, a specific vision of reality which effectively inhibits and restricts progress 
in the area, until an alternative paradigm powerful enough to take over the preceding 
one is developed. 
43. The effect of vocabulary in common usage to serve as a vehicle of self-righteous 
capitalism is undertaken by Schuller (1981). 
44. Gouldner (1955) suggests that there exists an iron law of democracy to counter 
the iron law of bureaucracy posited by Michels. He accuses many social scientists 
of becoming morticians, all too eager to bury men's hopes for a better working life. 
Batstone (1983) argues that a resurgence of democratic values may follow the 
degeneration phase. Other studies suggest that, it has never been forcefully established 
whether cooperative firms are more prone to failure than conventional ones. See Jones 
(1979, 1980); Jones & Svejnar (1982); Stephen (1982). Over and above these points, 
there inevitably remains a strong normative basis for affirming this claim. 
45. The paradigm that all matter must degenerate into unusable energy has given way 
to models which can now postulate an infinite, self-generating universe. The analogy 
with worker cooperation is obvious. 
46. For example, different strategies of cooperative-oriented social change are discussed 
in Clayre (1980). 
47. The strong cooperative movement (especially before 1973) in Cyprus is a case 
in point. A progressive Cypriot established the first credit cooperative society in his 
own native village but then lobbied Parliament to enact supportive legislation - see 
Cyprus Cooperative College (1975). For an evaluation of the demonstration effect 
in Africa see Apthorpe (1972, pp. 100-2). The spillover effect has been criticized on 
the grounds of being unlikely in contexts where access to and influence over educational 
mass media facilities and socio-cultural processes by workers is limited. See Baumgartner 
et al. (1979). 
48. The Leninist-Marxist strategy of revolutionary change led by a vanguard party 
of the working class is one variant of this approach. 
49. As happened both in the case of Tanzania and Algeria. See Ergas (1982) and 
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McHenry (1976) on the former case; and Clegg (1979) and Raptis (1980, pp. 65-74) 
on the latter. 
50. Where radicalism has won, 'it begins to look suspiciously like conservatism'. J.E. 
Thomas (1982, p. 35). Bendix (1963) makes a similar point in his critical comparison 
of management ideology inpre~- and post~revolutionaryRussia. 
51. See Horvat (1982, p. 258) and Greenberg (1983, p. 193). The same implication 
governs the works of Kerr et al. (1962) and Bell (1961). See the criticism in Cox (1977, 
p.409). 
52. Raptis (1980, p. 131). 
53. As, for example, described by Spear (1982, p. 45). 
54. See Kessler-Harris & Silverman (1979) and, more extensively, Bowles & Gintis 
(1976) for a critique elaborated on in Chapter 4. 
55. This point is made, among others, by Galjart (1975, p. 75). A classic case of this 
model's weakness is the project of the Comilla Academy of Bangladesh. The project 
was hoping to catalyze a complete reorganization of the social and economic village 
structures with a considerable investment in educational training and collective decision-
making. The outcome, however, was a reinforcement, rather than a transformation, 
of existing social inequalities. See, for example, Blair (1978), Abdullah et al. (1976) 
and Inayatullah (1972). 
56. Touraine (1981) defines a social movement as a collective identity bearing a common 
field of action and an antagonistic relation to an opposed group. 
57. Such a perspective was proposed by the UNRISD project on popular participation. 
See Fals-Borda et al. (1976) for an overall appraisal. 
58. This is the process of social objectification of democratic management, described 
among others by Bernstein (1976); Kester (1980); Stephens (1980) and Horvat (1982). 
59. The dynamic resolution of dependency versus autonomy is discussed further in 
Chapter 7. 
60. See Gramsci (1975). His position has been reformulated by Carnoy (1981) and 
Gorz (1968), among others. 
61. Williams (1960), cited in Carnoy (1981, p. 245). A detailed analysis of the origin 
and meaning of hegemony is also undertaken in Hoffman (1984, especially Chapter 
3) and Merrington (1968). 
62. Refer to Note 41 above. 
63. Sharp (1980, p. 116). See also Bowles & Gintis (1986). Horkheimer & Adorno 
(1975) refer to this as a cultural industry. 
64. Femia (1981, p. 53). 
65. For Gramsci's analysis of the failure of the Turin Strikes see Anderson (1976). 
For insight into the Allende era in Chile and reasons for its bloody demise see Winn 
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(1976); for an interpretation of its failure in the light of Gramscian theory, see Hoffman 
(1984, pp. 158-67). For an econometric analysis of the Chilean self-managed textile 
sector, see Espinosa and Zimbalist (1978). 
66. Lenin (1950, Vol. II, p. 429), quoted in Parkin (1979, pp. 159-60) suggested that 
bourgeois democracy was a much less transparent system of oppression than Russian 
tsarism; it was a relatively simple matter to win the Russian proletariat for revolution. 
See also Femia (1981, p. 191). 
67. Johnson (1981) thus relates the demise of leftist governments in Western Europe 
in the immediate post-war period to the provision of Marshall Aid. The demise of 
the Allende regime in Chile has also been attributed in part to the trade practices 
of the United States and West Germany. In contrast, many cooperative experiments 
in industrializing countries have been successful, only to the extent of better linking 
dependent capital in the world capitalist system. See Gagnon (1976). 
68. The notion of dual power has been applied by Raptis (1980, p. 133) and Glucksmann 
(1968, p. 104) to denote the state of affairs in France during the May 1968 events. 
The notion is not to be taken as suggesting two mutually exclusive categories, since, 
as critics of dualist models have sufficiently pointed out, such a mutual compart-
mentalization is not borne out by social reality. See, for example, Breman (1976). 
69. The notion of counter-culture and counter-hegemony are in conformity with the 
Hegelian notion of antithesis. 
70. Wertheim (1974) calls this the counterpoint phenomenon. His concept is applied 
to peasant resistance by Huizer (1975). 
71. Greenberg (1983) calls it a countervailing factor to cultural domination present 
in mediated societies. Levin (1980) equates the potential for counter-culture with 
'principles of contradiction' which govern social institutions such as schools. Stephens 
(1980) considers these cultural and political variables, which are conducive to social 
democratization, as the factors that will determine whether industrial democracy ends 
up serving cooperative or transformative goals. 
72. Bowles & Gintis (1981). 
73. Baudelot & Establet (1971) argue how French working class counter ideology is 
disseminated by trade unions. The theology of liberation expounded by Latin American 
Catholic priests and Islamic Fundamentalism can similarly be seen as the ideological 
arms of religious social movements. One can also mention at least four lay social 
movements active in the United States since the 1960s: the feminist, ecological, racial 
and gay/lesbian, which have attempted to develop the elements of a counter-hegemonic 
and oppositional culture. See Aronowitz (1981) quoted in Giroux (1984, p. 125). See 
also Castells (1983) on urban movements and Douglas (1983) on the third sector in 
contemporary societies. 
74. Studies of industrial relations by action sociologists confirm the existence of two 
levels of normative reference, an abstract conceptual one and a situational one couched 
in conflict terms. See Batstone, et al. (1976); Parkin (1972, p. 95); Gorz (1982). The 
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conflict and consensus schools have emerged from these two perspectives when the 
evidence suggests that they are complementary. Gramsci manages the reconciliation 
by his exposure to both deterministic Marxism (Lenin, Bukharin) and Italian Renaissance 
li.um'!QismjVico, G.roce}. Se~Eel)1illJ19.8L pp~JD.:::.5) .. 
75. As argues for example, Wolf (1982). 
76. Articulation means both linkage and giving expression. See Post (1978, pp. 18, . 
45). 
77. The AMP thesis postulates that capitalism lowers costs by separating the sphere 
of commodity production from those of subsistence production and reproduction. See 
Meillassoux (1972), Scott (1976), Bennholdt-Thomsen (1982) and Wolpe (1980) for 
AMP applications. Ecological niches are also recommended by Stryjan (1983, pp. 277, 
280) and Hedberg (1980). Oakeshott (1978, p. 67) suggests that the survival of the 
old British coops was strongly due to concentration on a range of 'stable' products 
and on servicing a specific group of customers. 
78. As has been described in Chapter 2. 
79. Sandkull (1984); Rothschild-Witt (1979). Worker cooperatives may be also the only 
production units willing to produce use-values and public goods (utilities) rather than 
exchange-values (commodities). See Marx (1970, especially pp. 43-9). 
80. Collaboration between cooperatives is highly developed in Italy, France and Basque 
Spain. See Young & Rigge (1983, Chapter 5). This kind of reciprocity is the sixth 
cooperative principle adopted by the International Cooperative Alliance in 1966. 
Solidarity links by worker cooperatives with political parties, communities, trade unions, 
progressive social movements and non-profit maximizing enterprises are plentiful. See 
also Jordan (1986). 
8 J. Supportive bodies, such as governments, may provide phased-out monopolies or 
guarantees of specific product demands as a tangible means of economic support for 
cooperative initiatives. This was initially understood, for example, in the case of the 
self-managed EMAB furniture factory in Mali. See Kester & Sidibe (1986). Similar 
suggestions are made by Jones (1986, pp. 278-9). 
82. Frank (1983) is a major proponent of delinking strategies with reference to 
industrializing economies as an escape from remaining satellites in the world capitalist 
system. He sees social movements as important agents of social transformation, which 
involves delinking. See Frank & Fuentes (1987). A criticism of Frank's ideas is 
exemplified by Palma (1978). 
83. One recent example of such delinking in crisis is Burma. 
84. Ethnocentrism refers to the view of things in which one's own group is the centre 
of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it. The study by 
Sherif et al. (1961) is a classic on anti-reference group engineering. Refer also to 
Touraine's definition of a social movement in Note 56 above. 
85. Neo-Marxist attempts to re-define class encounter difficulty when attempting to 
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ope rationalize the concept on the basis of property ownership. See Wright (1980), 
Carchedi (1983). The diffusion of the Marxist revolutionary threat is put forward, 
among others, by Dahrendorf (1959), Parkin (1979) and Offe (1985). 
86. One may eschew a historic trend in the transmutation of authority, in that work 
democratization may be seen as the immediate and inevitable next step following upon 
the democratization of royal absolutism, of executive government, of franchise, of 
contract of employment and of ownership. See Revans (1981). 
87. 'Trained incapacity', a concept coined by Veblen, refers to 'that state of affairs 
in which one's abilities function as inadequacies or blind spots'. The concept is similar 
to Warnotte's notion of 'professional deformation'. See discussion in Merton (1968, 
pp.251-2). 
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4 AN IDEOLOGICAL BATTLE: FOCUS ON EDUCATION 
Introduction 
Liberal ideology would have one believe that schooling is the means 
towards realizing the ideals of democratic participation. l Accordingly, 
the school offers to all an equal opportunity towards full personal 
development, based on impartial and objectively assessed competition. 
In this way, social class inequality can be overcome through individual 
social mobility, for which school serves as a direct access mechanism.2 
Those who fail to measure up have only themselves to blame. 3 
A political economy approach, however, suggests that, rather than 
having an egalitarian effect on social class inequalities, the school serves 
to perpetuate the hierarchical division of labour, which can be seen as 
a modern variant of the class structure.4 The ideology of meritocracy 
and social mobility sanctifies individual rather than class struggle in the 
liberal dream of a white-collar, well-paid job for all.5 The school's major 
functions are argued to be more correctly understood as those of 
reproduction and legitimation: the school reproduces the existing social 
system by socializing the young generation into adequate and appropriate 
civic and occupational roles, making them 'good' citizens and workers, 
able to comply with the political and occupational demands of their 
society. 6 A structural correspondence may be said to exist between the 
school's social relations and those of production, such that the former 
replicate the hierarchical division of labour. 7 In the process, the school 
also serves to legitimize the existing socio-economic relations and power 
inequalities such that power domination persists via consent and not 
coercion. Thus, in a capitalist society, it legitimizes economic inequality 
by providing a seemingly open, objective and scientific meritocratic 
mechanism of assigning individuals unequal status and economic po-
sitions; it legitimizes and rewards the pursuit of individual effort and 
achievement and of inter-personal competition by its individually-based 
norms of assessment, achievement and of sanction imposition; it legi-
timizes and enforces power distance, obedience and respectful submission 
to authority. Thus the school functions as an integration process for 
the younger generation into the logic of the actual system and cultivates 
conformity to it.8 More broadly, the school can be seen as a reproducer 
and legitimator of forms of domination wider than class - as this is 
narrowly understood in structural Marxism - such as patriarchal, racial 
and age relations.9 
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The regenerative and legitimating functions of the School are opera-
tionalized by the teacher adopting the triple role of custodian (master 
of ceremonies, arbitor of rules and director of the stage), moralist (sub-
stituting for parents, God and the State, indoCtrinating the pupil about 
what is true or false, right or wrong) and therapist (authorized to delve 
into the personal life of his pupil, persuading him to adopt a particular 
vision and morality).l0 In extreme forms of this condition, there is nothing 
on which the children have to cooperate in order to get things done. 
The teacher will do it for them anyway. Hence, when the teacher requests 
cooperation, it is merely a request for submission. In milder forms of 
this condition, the teacher will see to it that children practise cooperation 
- in deciding whether to study the Greeks or the Romans, in nominating 
class officers, in organizing a class project. But these are usually small 
and trivial matters; all along, the teacher remains ultimately in command, 
and the intellectual and organizational skills associated with genuine 
group work and cooperation are played down, or are manipulated for 
individual benefits. 11 It is therefore hardly surprising that many young 
people are in no way prepared to undertake cooperative efforts (amongst 
other things), after so many years of uninterrupted schooling. Pupils 
get used to having their scholastic life planned in minute detail by the 
teachers hour after hour; while the subject matter is meticulously devised 
far away by curriculum developers. 12 Little of what might be called 
metaphorically the production process is left to chance. The schooling 
process implicitly tends to regard men and women as passive beings, 
meant to conform, adapt themselves and submit themselves to superior 
authority. The principles underlying such schooling have been identified 
as follows: 
a) The teacher teaches and the students are taught; 
b) The teacher knows everything and the students know nothing; 
c) The teacher thinks and the students are thought about; 
d) The teacher talks and the students listen meekly; 
e) The teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined; 
f) The teacher chooses and enforces his choice and the students comply; 
g) The teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through 
the,action of the teacher; 
h) The teacher chooses the programme content, and the students (who 
were not consulted) adapt to it; 
i) The teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his own pro-
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fessional authority, which he sets in opposition to the freedom of 
the students; 
j) The teacher is the subject of the learning process, while the students 
are mere objects. 13 
One has only to insert the word manager for teacher and workers 
for students to have an accurate description of relations in the traditional 
workplace. 14 The correspondence is not coincidental: the school, as a 
social institution, remains functionally addressed towards producing the 
workers and the skills required by occupational demands; it also produces 
the values and behaviour patterns which legitimize the undemocratic 
structure of economic life, the dominance of the employer/owner over 
the worker. 
A more idealistic view of education, traced back to Rousseau and 
Mill,15 upholds that the school could and should serve as a means by 
which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality, 
discovering how to participate actively in the transformation of their 
world. The function of education is seen in this vein as that of fostering 
the acquisition of a full range of powers - political, physical, emotional, 
cognitive, spiritual and aesthetic - to control one's existence and contribute 
actively to community development. 16 Such a development is however 
not likely to occur unless in a context of social and economic justice, 
based on equality, reciprocity and active political involvementY 
Introducing the Dilemma 
This is the kind of democratic context which is intended to coalesce 
around a worker cooperative economy. How to get there, as has been 
theorized in Chapter 3, depends also on the provision of counter-
hegemonic education. But if the educational system is an integral 
component and reproducer of the existing dominant hegemony, how 
can it ever, even with the best of intentions, prove to be counter-
hegemonic? 
This is a crucial dilemma which must be resolved. It applies not 
only to education, but to all the forces, agents and structures intendecl. 
to lead the counter-hegemonic process under the aegis of a social move-
ment approach to social change. 
Social movements are themselves products of a given social fabric 
and the inputs they must rely upon - particularly people and institutions 
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- are integral parts of the social system that the social movements are 
purportedly eagerly seeking to transform. How then to build a new social 
order when all the raw materials for the task are products of the old 
one? It is therefore no wonder that degeneration is a common occurrence 
among those bodies and· prbcesses, <and riOt just worker coopenitives, 
which seek to challenge the established social order in their organizational 
goals. 18 
Counter-hegemonic education for worker cooperation, then, is itself 
liable to degeneration, and may end up reflecting, reproducing and so 
effectively reinforcing, the established power relations and cultural traits 
it was meant to challenge. 19 In view of its political long-term objective, 
counter-hegemonic education is meant to be the site of a battleground 
where different ideologies cross swords. Its objective is to develop a 
conceptual framework, that challenges the dominant value system and, 
at the same ~ime, presents a comprehensible, alternative character. This, 
when all the ingredients available are themselves products of the dominant 
value system: the subject disciplines, the aids and technology, the teaching 
styles, the very teachers and students of the learning process. Even the 
language is a product of the dominant ethos, so that, for instance, the 
terms teacher and student embody authoritarian power-unequal rela-
tions.20 This chapter seeks to consider briefly a number of aspects relating 
to the counter-hegemonic teaching process. The threat of degeneration 
is exposed, alongside the regenerative measures intended to push forward 
the counter-cultural process.21 
Subject Categories 
The process of counter-cultural educational provision involves the impart-
ing of knowledge about the nature of society, which enables one to 
probe deeper into its inner logic, clear away any assumptions implicit 
in the judgement of social phenomena, and therefore question what one 
may be otherwise inclined naturally to take as a given.22 Social studies 
is perceived as adequate ground to cultivate such a social literacy. It 
promotes an understanding of social institutions and the role of the 
individual within them, which, it is felt, can be well grounded in the 
basic principles of economics, sociology, law, political science, psychology 
and anthropology.23 
It is all too easy, though, to maintain the artificial academic sub-
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divisions between these school subjects and this is often constrained by 
the availability of teaching personnel, who are only competent in one 
specialized domain. Effective teaching, though, should recognize that 
these are unreal fragmentations of the total human experience. One should 
be free, as a group, to adopt a holistic approach, to draw on different 
formal disciplines and treat whole problems and issues, if they are con-
sidered relevant, at any particular time.24 This may prove easier when 
the educators are not professional teachers. Workers from the production 
line, trade unionists, managers, leaders and animators in social and····. 
community affairs could perform a very relevant role incounter~"" 
hegemonic education.25 They could take to a problem-solving, multi-
disciplinary approach more easily and naturally. 
Teacher-Student Relations 
A second issue related to professional teachers is that they tend not 
to be student-centred in their normal routines at school. They are 
concerned with keeping time, imparting a set package of information, 
abiding by an established curriculum, keeping aloof and insisting on 
authoritarian control of the classroom. Such constraints are carried over 
and assumed even outside formal schooling in adult worker education. 
The consequence of such a transposition is that the educational pro-
gramme becomes counter-productive, reinforcing rather than challenging 
and replacing the anti- or a-cooperative skills and attitudes inculcated 
by the school and the wider society. The requirements of educational 
activity for worker cooperation are such that the style of the activity 
itself 'should be cooperative to the greatest possible degree as much 
as self-management itself'. 26 
This does not imply that there is no longer any room for any teaching, 
that is, for the imparting of knowledge and skills by individuals appointed 
for that purpose. If one extends the parallel between the practice of 
education and that of self-management referred to in the quotation above, 
then the importance of teaching can be equated to the existence of 
competent, professional management, that has been recognized, even 
within worker cooperatives, as a prerequisite for viable economic per-
formance. But then, such managerial staff remain ultimately accountable 
to the workforce. So, generally speaking, a change is necessary in the 
authoritarian relation between teacher and student, which would reflect 
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better the relation between a manager and any worker-member in a 
worker cooperative. 
This is not an easy task, since both sides of the learning process have 
Deen mou1oed in the old style. Potential students may give. in to the 
scorn and ridicule encountered from peers for going back to school. 
Even when and if such social pressures are overcome, they may still 
seek authoritarian scenarios, as they have been accustomed to do. For 
their. Pl'!rt;: . .trained as professional disseminators of information, the 
teadiers may be predominantly concerned with the preservation of the 
control over cultural capital, that is, knowledge.28 One way this manifests 
itself is in the imparting of information, especially one's own brand of 
information. This is considered so important that little time is left for 
anything else.29 In this way, educators might be fostering the growth 
of a new paternalism, not only because of the absence of good intentions 
but in spite (and sometimes even because) ofthem.30 
Group Work 
One pedagogic technique, which is especially relevant to the development 
of cooperative skills, is group work. It is suggested from social psycho-
logical research that there are many ways in which cooperation can 
be taught and understood, and that such methods can often lead to 
better individual and group performances, in addition to improved 
interpersonal relationships.3l Teaching strategies, though, should incor-
porate tasks that are appropriate to a cooperative structure and construct 
groups in a way that allows individuals to participate equally. There 
ought, then, to be careful preparation of topics, as well as of personnel 
and physical components. 32 Otherwise, group work sessions may be 
manipulated by domineering individuals who stifle group discussion and 
assume leadership status, which the rest of the group may be all too 
willing to concede. Such authoritarian led groups may perform effectively 
in the short run and in the presence of their leader; democratically led 
groups, in contrast, would tend to take more time to reach agreement 
but then perform more effectively in the long term, even in the group 
leader's absence.33 
This is not to say that leadership is some intrinsically evil phenomenon 
to be weeded out from democratically run units, be they worker 
cooperatives or educational group sessions. On the contrary, evidence 
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suggests that the question of leadership is quite a crucial one, particularly 
in cooperative structures.34 The point, rather, is that such leadership, 
which may indeed be charismatic, remains accountable to the general 
membership and respectful of its participatory rights. 
A recent innovation in group work technique is the T-Group. It 
comprises some eight to twelve individuals, with an experienced trainer, 
concerned to learn more about themselves and the way people relate 
to one another in order to influence change within organizations and 
the wider community. Compared to the traditional role of a teacher, 
the trainer is passive, intervening in the discussion about as often as 
the other members of the group. When such interventions take place, 
it is not to take up the traditional didactic role, but rather to encourage 
the members to observe and reflect on group processes, to offer 
interpretations of member behaviour and to suggest that other group 
members share their feelings in relation to group events. 35 
Games and Play 
Other educational devices and formats, which foster group consciousness 
and need not be rooted in authoritarian relations between the two sides 
of the learning process include role play and other games.36 These allow 
students to live situations in which they can bring their own experiences 
and skills to bear, taking realistic decisions and facing the consequences. 
In the process of participating in such educational activities, the student 
becomes deeply involved, and may start understanding the socio-
psychological processes which influence one's own and others' behaviour, 
the relations of power between different people, the usefulness of group 
cooperation as against competition. Hence, the direction of the pro-
gramme is towards the awakening of consciousness, a change of mentality 
involving an acute, realistic awareness of one's locus in nature and in 
society; the capacity to analyse critically its causes and consequences, 
and rational action directed at its transformation.37 
Participation in the Management of Education 
Democratizing. education also means involving more people in its 
management. Such an involvement could be developmental, starting from 
such areas as seminar organization, course timetabling and progressing, 
57 
to include the fixing of educational objectives, the definition of subject 
matter; handling problems of method and of pedagogy, and dealing 
with salaries and regulations.38 The involvement of students in such areas 
of decision making may be thwarted by the initiators of the educational 
programmes. The lattermaycofisidet-such student· iiivolvement as 
unnecessary and presumptuous interference, as well as an invitation to 
trouble, since students would be expected to manipulate the process of 
decision making to their own advantage. While this may be true, the 
possibility remains that, even if avenues for co-management are insti-
tutionalized, they may be manipulated, perhaps quite unconsciously such 
that students may be presented with afait accompli, which makes further 
deliberation superfluous. Or else, students may be overawed and subdued 
by the professional authority and persuasive talents of their educated 
mentors. This, in itself, is an argument for providing worker education.39 
Otherwise, the condition is likely to lead to management interest only 
being put on the agenda and eventually being advanced. The experience 
is closely paralleled by that of workers involved in participation in decision 
making within undertakings where managerial rights tend to be con-
solidated and managerial authority more strongly legitimized.40 
Selection Criteria 
Traditionally, most institutions of learning have been receptive only to 
,such students who have completed a prescribed set of studies and 
performed at a specified level on accepted examinations. Such selection 
criteria are to change if one is not to discriminate against the multitude 
without the conventional credentials. Consequently, such details as work 
experience, activism in worker and community organizations, leadership 
qualities and experience in participatory structures should be included 
among alternative selection guidelines. 
Nevertheless, a lack of conventional credentials is not the major 
obstacle to enrolling on counter-hegemonic education programmes. More 
fundamental constraints include lack of finance, unavailability of time, 
domestic support or study space. Such constraints are more difficult 
to mitigate, and are particularly responsible for low levels of female 
enrolment. Public and trade union funds may be forthcoming to subsidize 
worker participants, but still they could be dissuaded due to a considerable 
loss in terms of opportunity cost; they might well have to forfeit overtime 
58 
or a supplementary job to attend classes and study. The lID adopted 
Convention number 140 in 1974 in favour of paid educational leave; 
ratification of this by governments, or inclusion of a clause to this effect 
in union-management collective agreements, would act as a partial 
solution. Up to 1985, seventeen countries had ratified the convention. 
The principle, though, is mainly applied to formal types of education.41 
Distance Learning 
Distance learning, via the radio, newspapers and, more recently, television, 
is being increasingly used for worker education purposes, exposing a 
larger number of persons to educational stimuli, even though they cannot 
provide the depth and scope of coverage that is possible in a more 
extended course of study. In industrializing countries, with still widespread 
illiteracy, radio is the only advanced communication technique which 
has found a proper place. Its low cost, adequate reliability, low main-
tenance requirements and widespread distribution have been used to 
good effect in a number of countries.42 Still, people seem to be mesmerized 
by the reputedly greater efficiency of other media, notably television, 
particularly since the latter reproduces both audio and visual cues. All 
too often, though, sophisticated communications technology ends up 
transmitting western produced software imbued with western values; 
therefore the technology acts as an instrument of cultural domination.43 
More importantly, such technology, sophisticated as it might be, allows 
only one-way traffic, which is amenable not to discussion but to rhetoric 
and vests considerably more power in the hands of the transmitter vis-
a-vis the receiver. In contrast, a significantly larger educational role can 
be played by interactive networks, such as the postal service, the telephone 
or the two-way radio, which can be extended to conference circuits. 
Such distance learning aids would help to facilitate access between 
participants in the learning process and develop in them a sense of self-
sufficiency to pursue their own education. In contrast, one way traffic 
technology (which often includes the teacher) mystifies the source of 
knowledge.44 
Focus on Women 
From experience, it has proved very difficult to organize educational 
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courses for working women, particularly wives and mothers, because 
such a dual burden does not permit them the necessary time, energy 
and commitment. Unless this issue is handled and faced squarely, then 
the appeal for a cooperative culture and society will be impliCitly an 
appeal for preserving the patriarchal structure of social and political 
life. Participation, democracy and cooperation at the workplace would 
be thus implicitly treated as the preserve of men, while, behind the scenes, 
women continue to provide the material and emotional support essential 
for the reproduction and maintenance of labour power. It is so much 
a part of our life, that it is easy to miss this crucial point; the male 
workers, who are to enjoy the new opportunities and responsibilities 
of cooperative management, would be in a favourable position to do 
so precisely because they have wives.45 
Although women now account for a substantial proportion of the 
occupational labour force in many countries, female workers remain 
culturally, socially and economically disadvantaged. They are not re-
presented equally in the various sectors of the economy; they are apt 
to be less skilled than men; when skilled, they usually hold subordinate 
posts with little prospect of promotion; their wages for identical work 
are generally lower than those of their male colleagues, in spite of basic 
equal wage for equal work legislation.46 They also tend to be concentrated 
in part-time or casual occupations, with low security of employment 
and limited entitlement to various social welfare provisions, particularly 
.so if they are married mothers. For this reason, they are the most likely 
victims of reduced labour demand. Women's frrst responsibility in the 
eyes of society (and of their menfolk?) still tends in many cultures towards 
the home and motherhood. Most of those women who take up paid 
employment do so as part of a double shift; one paid at work and 
one unpaid in the home. In this manner, women, as a whole, remain 
structurally inhibited from taking their place as equal participants and 
ftill members of democratic workplaces. Their disadvantage with respect 
to men is witnessed by the relative scarcity of women engaged in extra-
home, community affairs. It could be that radical changes in the domestic 
sphere as well as the workplace and in the wider community should 
be the targets of counter-hegemonic education. Demands for cooperative 
management must go beyond the factory and the state, and encompass 
areas of work that occur in the family and home. 
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The Normalization of Cooperation 
This chapter has identified in practical terms the dialectic between the 
hegemonic and the counter ideology and values which reflect the condition 
of dual power that a cooperative sector would have to live with. The 
discussion focused on education and on various issues involved in the 
educational process to highlight the conforming and regenerative func-
tions of social institutions. It also establishes one of the guiding principles 
for institutional support to worker cooperation, that is, an identity 
between the practice of self-management and the practice of iristitutional 
(in this case, educational) support for self-management.47 
The outcome of the ideological battle waged on the educational front 
will no doubt also depend on the wider educative process underway 
in the society at large by the supportive social I1).ovement. This educative 
process is the extent to which experiences of cooperation and collective 
action are normalized and legitimized within the wider social environment. 
The most obvious way of bringing about such an escalation and nor-
malization of worker cooperation is by setting up worker cooperatives, 
which foster a cooperative culture from the very experience of cooperation 
at the workplace. 
Going further, one can devise ways and means of promoting 
cooperative experiences outside the school and the workplace. One such 
channel is community participation. This would create wider spaces where 
cooperative experience, consciousness and legitimacy can be fostered. 
Such experiences already exist in most societies, but they require con-
solidation and expansion. 
One can also consider the possibility of investing in counter-hegemonic 
pedagogical provision out of the school system. Relieved from the con-
straints imposed by the economy's demands and by the needs of the 
social structure to reproduce and legitimate conventional capitalist values, 
an out-of-school educational programme can be more easily directed 
towards achieving counter-hegemonic aims. 
Such and similar initiatives would serve to enhance the legitimacy 
of work cooperation in education, production and civic life. They act 
to normalize the cooperative condition and socialize participants into 
its logic and values. This, in turn, should lead to an autonomous expansion 
of cases of worker cooperation. In the long run, the dependence on 
external agencies for cooperative education, in terms of technical and 
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cooperative skills, as well as in counter-cultural terms, may well end. 
These same initiatives, though, are still affected by the tension between 
transformation and degeneration. They are also vulnerable to economic 
and cultural pressures, which manifest themselves in specifically different 
forms. 
Conclusion 
Once the strategy for worker cooperation is posited as a vigorous reform 
of a given social structure, in both economic and cultural terms, the 
various obstacles to this strategy loom ominously. A number of these 
are voluntaristic, dependent on the willingness to decentralize decision-
making, to expand participatory experiences, to bring about legislative 
and financial reforms to support worker cooperation. They depend on 
the leadership of the social movement in question and on a masterful 
approach to the myriad pressures brought to bear upon it, from inside 
and outside the movement. 
There are also structural difficulties to be surmounted. Counter-
hegemonic provisions have their own pitfalls and their success would 
depend considerably on the success achieved by the wider, broader process 
of making people aware of and familiar with cooperative activity in 
society. The difficulties of counter-hegemonic education have been 
highlighted in detail to serve as an example of how the theory on 
hegemonic struggles translates in micro terms. Such counter-hegemonic 
education is nevertheless possible. The Mondragon worker cooperative 
movement began through the efforts of five graduates who had studied 
at a small technical school that had been established before by a Jesuit 
priest in that Basque community. While the curriculum is focused on 
technical subjects, the school itself - now developed into a fully-fledged 
polytechnic and a students' factory is operated according to the same 
cooperative principles as the other cooperative firms.48 
Since the text has put forward a plea for a greater appreciation of political, 
economic and socio-cultural co ntextualization , it is now proposed to 
use the theoretical constructs developed above in application to a specific 
case. Only in this way is the pragmatic value of the theoretical perspective 
put to the test. It is also via such an empirical investigation that the 
discussion can be pulled down to investigate the pivotal role of key 
individuals and institutions in the process of social change, from both 
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voluntaristic and structural positions. This also permits a successful blend 
of a macro, structural approach with an action perspective at the micro 
level. Without this difficult marriage, the degeneration vs regeneration 
thesis carries all the flavour, and the flaws, of a reductionist model.49 
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NOTES 
1. 'Schooling is the age-specific, teacher-related process requiring full-time attendance 
at an obligatory curriculum.' See Illich (1972, pp. 25-6). 
2. The liberal myth of education as the avenue of social mobility is critically discussed 
with respect to the United States by Kessler-Harris & Silverman (1979, pp. 605-7) 
and Bowles & Gintis (1976, Chapter 1). 
3. Bowles & Gintis (1976, p. 4). 
4. Bowles (1974, p. 220). 
5. Price (1986, p. 193). 
6. This takes place irrespective of socio-political and economic context. Unequal 
schooling perpetrates a structure of economic inequality which originates outside the 
school system in the social relationships of the capitalist economy. See Bowles& Gintis 
(1976, p. 242). While, in the Soviet Union, the organization of many school activities 
stresses group achievement rather than individual excellence ... The top scholar is 
perceived as one who is industrious, highly motivated by the system, selfless and 
cooperative ... See Medlin et al. (1971, pp. 183,193). 
7. The correspondence principle is described among others by Bowles & Gintis (1976, 
p. 131; 1978, p. 61). 
8. See, for example, Bowles & Gintis (1976, Chapter 4); Braverman (1974). 
9. Giroux (1984, p. 129). This position approximates the grey area between neo-
Marxist and neo-Weberian definitions of power relations in society. The latter are 
seen to result from closure based on both property and status groups. See Parkin 
(1979), Murphy (1986) as well as the more contemporary position taken by Bowles 
& Gintis (1981,1986). 
10. Illich (1972, pp. 30-1). 
II. Reisman et al. (1954, pp. 83-4) . 
. 12. Husen (1974, p. 18). 
13. Taken from Freire (1972, p. 59). 
14. Cohen-Rosenthal (1984, p. 8). 
IS. Rousseau and Mill, theorists of participatory democracy, have their ideas on 
education discussed in Pateman (1970, Chapter 2). 
16. See Dewey (1966); Freire (1972). 
17. These are, once again, the ideas of Rousseau, Mill, George Cole and more recent 
radical theorists of Education, such as Gorz (1973) and Lerner (1973). 
18. Hyman (1971) describes how trade unions in western democracies have become 
integrated into the existing social fabric by failing to challenge fundamental property 
prerogatives, thus performing a legitimating function for the existing power relations. 
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Przeworski (1985) discusses how socialist parties degenerate when they succumb to 
electoralism and inevitably take up stakes in healthy capitalism. Wilson (1966) has 
argued how evangelical sects, established as a reaction to institutionalized religion, 
became secularized and fully fledged churches themselves, if they survive at all. The 
degeneration of worker cooperatives or their tolerated existence because of functional 
articulation within a capitalist/centrally planned economy has already been discussed. 
19. For example, Haddab (1985) discusses how lifelong education projects in Algeria 
became mere ideological pronouncements, fulfilling the objectives already held by 
institutions that form part of the traditional educational system. The outcome of the 
Comilla Project has been described in Chapter 3 Note 55. 
20. Schuller (1981, p. 285). 
21. Many suggestions emerge directly from my personal experience as tutor and 
educational coordinator of a number of adult education courses organized by the 
Workers' Participation Development Centre, at the University of Malta. 
22. Rizzo (1988, p. 51). 
23. Lee & Entwistle (1966, pp. 105-6). 
24. Hopkins (1985, p. 42). The argument is similar to Marx's criticism of vulgar economics 
in contrast to political economy. See Marx (1970, p. 85); Rowthorn (1974). Freire 
(1972) makes a similar point in his emphasis on de-codification in education.' 
25. Gelpi (1985a, p. 18). 
26. Vanek (ed.) (1975, p. 36). This principle is discussed further in Chapter 7. 
27. Lewis (1969, p. 31). 
28. This has been argued with respect to all professionals by IIIich (1977). The metaphor 
'cultural capital' is also used by Bourdieu (1973). 
29. Hopkins (1985, p. 168). This may find expression in a frenzy for note-giving, 
strengthened by a desire and expectation of note-taking by students. 
30. Batstone (1979, p. 269). 
31. Gamson & Levin (1984, p. 242). 
32. Hopkins (1985, p. 170). 
33. A pioneering study over the effect of leadership styles on group performance is 
that by White & Lippitt (1960). 
34. This point is taken further in Chapter 8. 
35. Wilson & Nichol (1977). 
36. The advantage of using games as educational tools has long been recognized by 
military schools and, more recently, by management development agencies. See for 
example Williams (1961). 
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37. Such is the Freirean pedagogy of conscientization. See Freire (1972, 1974). Such 
approaches generally utilize elements of popular culture that could be considered as 
counterpoints and show that there is already some kind of resistance to the dominant 
culture on which counter-cultural education could be based. See Huizer (1975). For 
a concrete application of the Freirean perspective see the educational objectives and 
processes of the International Cooperative University in Mexico in Haubert (1986). 
38. Faure et al. (1972, p. 78). 
39. This author (Baldacchino (1985» discusses the importance of worker education 
as a means to improve the chances of successful negotiation by worker representatives 
in their dealings with professionally trained, managerial staff. 
40. Within this perspective fall many of the practices of the Human Relations School. 
See for criticism Pan itch (1978); King & Van der Vall (1978, Chapter I); Pateman 
(1983, passim). 
41. Hopkins (1985, p. 193). In Italy the 150 hours educational leave is mainly used 
for the completion of compulsory schooling. See Lichtner (1985, p. 122). 
42. The use and misuse of radio as an educational medium is discussed in relation 
to Dahomey (Benin), Togo, Mali, Niger and Zaire by Defever (1977). 
43. For example, so many individuals have been conditioned to see North American 
('Red') Indians as the 'bad guys' standing in the way of progress, rather than victims 
of imperialism in their struggle with the white man. Exposure to innumerable western 
feature films and serials has most likely played a part in fostering such a value judgement. 
44. IIlich (1972, p. 76). 
45. As argued by Pateman (1983, pp. 115-18). 
46. Even in the Mondragon Cooperatives, women have not acquired equal access to 
higher job strata. See Thomas & Logan (1982, pp. 65, 69). Hacker (1988) pushes the 
analysis deeper. 
47. Vanek (1977). He also suggests five other principles to guide educational provision 
for worker cooperation: full disclosure; transparency; pairing of co-workers; proximity 
between educational activities and the workplace; subordination of training in skills 
to the development of a critical consciousness. Levin (1980, 1981) identified indepen-
dently five other dimensions: the ability to participate in group decisions; capacity 
for increased individual decision-making; minimum competences in basic skills; capacity 
to receive and give training to colleagues; cooperative skills. 
48. Thomas & Logan (1982, pp. 52-9). 
49. The main thesis being elaborated in this text, iflimited exclusively to macro, structural 
propositions, would leave no space for the political decisions and actions of key 
individuals who are indeed influential in fashioning social history. In this sense, one 
may review the criticism levelled by Mouzelis (1980), Banaji (1977) and Friedman (1976) 
on the reductionist articulation theory, as well as the remarks of Leys (1977), Brenner 
(1977) and Forbes (1984, p. 73) on the core-periphery model, which is also reductionist. 
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PART TWO: EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
5 INTRODUCING THE MALTESE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITION 
Why Malta? 
The selection of the small, Mediterranean island state of Malta as the 
location to apply the theory developed above requires solid justification, 
which must go beyond the obvious convenience of the case for the author. 
Malta is still a developing nation state, but its economic structure 
corresponds closely to that of an industrialized country. The resulting 
environment, then, is an interesting blend of socio-economic variables 
related to industrialization and its consequences (industrial trade union-
ism, a significantly large and skilled working class, a market-oriented 
economy) and cultural variables related to a dependency historically 
engrained by colonialism. 
At the same time, Malta also serves as a typical example of a mediated 
society, with various social forces and pressures, not all of which can 
be seen as reflections of a dominant, hegemonic, economic and cultural 
condition. These social forces - be they individuals, pressure groups or 
fully-fledged social movements - have been amply documented over a 
time period which now encompasses almost a century of mediation. 
Of these, a number present themselves as countervailing forces. Rhetor-
ically and ideologically they project themselves as progressive and counter-
hegemonic, seeking a more egalitarian distribution of power, correspond-
ing to a front for wider social democratization. Malta also conforms 
to a western-style parliamentary democracy, which, relatively speaking, 
serves as a tolerant medium for the expression of opposing values. These 
are the ingredients for a Gramscian 'war of attrition', including attempts 
at counter-hegemonic education. 
The battleground for this heterogeneous social structure is found 
in the ongoing developments concerning workplace democracy. Already 
for almost twenty years, diverse forms of participatory management have 
been cultivated in Malta in a mixed economy setting. The largest enterprise 
on the island was turned into a self-managed firm in 1975. Other interesting 
.and hotly debated developments included the establishment of worker 
cooperatives in 1983-84 and an escalation of worker directors on the 
boards of parastatal companies over the periods 1970-76 and 1983-88. 
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Malta's small size also makes it a very convenient social laboratory 
in which all social phenomena active in larger societies present themselves 
just the same but on a manageable scale. Malta may be small but it 
is nevertheless a total society. 
I have been able to monitor and assess developments in Maltese 
society from the objective and academic perspective of a relatively 
autonomous institution, without pressures from vested interests, and 
under d~erent governments. In addition, as a research officer since 1982 
with an educational, consultancy and research agency operating at the 
University of Malta committed to the development of local workplace 
democratization, I have been a privileged observer and, at times, an 
active participant in this process of social flux. Presenting the case from 
my viewpoint does have its problems though; it is necessarily a sUbjective 
view of life and might only give a partial and distorted semblance of 
what has actually taken place. Nevertheless, work responsibilities in-
volving dispassionate, academic research on sensitive political events has 
been useful training in societal observation and analysis. Having said 
that, close contact with the unfolding series of events has exposed me 
to the resilience of traditional cultural traits arid power relations and 
the degenerative effect they have had on the process of social trans-
formation. 
The following section highlights the Maltese socio-economic and 
cultural environmental syndrome and applies this to an understanding 
of how such conditions serve to bolster or brake social change directed 
towards worker cooperation. This is done with direct critical application 
to Maltese experiences with alternative relations of production. 
Malta: Ever Heard OJ It? 
Malta qualifies easily as a micro-state. 1 It consists of an archipelago 
of raised limestone blocks, of which the three largest are inhabited. These 
three main islands are Malta, Gozo and Comino respectively. Together, 
they comprise a resident popUlation of approximately 345,000 and a 
surface area of 316 square kilometres.2 Although it is small, the island 
enjoys a widespread popularity. Many more people are aware of the 
existence of Malta than they are of, for example, Kiribati, Saint Vincent 
or Sao Tome. 
Two important events are responsible for this. The flrst was Malta's 
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unwitting involvement in one of the dramatic voyages of Saint Paul, 
documented in the Acts of the Apostles in the New Testament. On his 
way to RomeJor trial, Saint Paul was shipwrecked off the Maltese coast. 
He and all his fellow travellers were saved from the wreck and, during 
a short stay on the island, were blessed with the hospitality of the Maltese 
people. The gesture was recorded for posterity. 3 
The second episode was more recent and concerns Malta's crucial 
role in the Mediterranean arena of the Second World War. From this 
strategically located and lonely British outpost, Allied forces played havoc 
with the Italian and German supply lines to North Africa. Nobly suffering 
under acute aerial bombardment and a state of siege, the unsinkable 
aircraft carrier was awarded the George Cross for its valour and courage.4 
These two historical sketches serve as an appropriate preamble to 
a discussion of Malta's environmental fabric. Apart from being showpieces 
of Malta's chequered history, the two events highlight important aspects 
of the Maltese culture and economy. These continue to influence and 
fashion the present local condition, and therefore affect the contemporary 
development of worker cooperation. 
The Maltese Socia-Economic Environment 
Fifty years ago, the British Authorities considered Malta to be a priceless 
outpost to be defended at all costs. This was understandable, not from 
an economic standpoint, but from a purely strategic one. Such a comment 
is important to this study, because Malta's strategic rather than economic 
value affected the development of the Maltese economy under .colonial 
rule. Malta had nothing to offer a colonizing power in terms of agricultural 
production, mineral resources, or an abundant popUlation that could 
be carried off to slavery. Malta had none of these. 
Back in 1530, Grandmaster L'Isle Adam reluctantly accepted the 
offer of Malta as the new home of the Sovereign Military Order of 
St John of Jerusalem from Charles the Fifth of Spain. It was a very 
harsh contrast to fertile and fruitful Rhodes, their previous Mediterranean 
island home and the offer was only accepted because there was no 
alternative. 
Six years before, in 1524, an eight-man commission had reported 
the island's condition to the Grandmaster. This is one of the earliest 
documented reviews of the Maltese islands. In summary, the report 
69 
described Malta as a small, barren island covered irregularly with patches 
of rocky soil, that was not even suitable for growing cereals. There were 
no trees and little other vegetation; its supply of drinking water was 
extremely limited and in summer there was unbearable heat. A small 
population of about twelve thousand eked out a precarious existence 
selling honey and growing figs, melons and cotton. Gozo, the sister island, 
was more fertile and had small groves of orange and olive trees. It had 
about five thousand inhabitants. As for Comino, only birds could survive 
there. Mdina, the capital city of the islands, was built on a rocky outcrop 
and most of its houses were deserted. The only two advantages that 
Malta offered were a fine sheltered harbour and soft stone which could 
be easily worked and dressed.5 
The report was discouraging but quite objective. Such was the physical 
state of affairs of the Maltese islands at that time. What the report did 
not mention, though, was the obviously superb strategic location of the 
Maltese islands, being right in the middle of the Mediterranean basin. 
The Mediterranean is a most diverse meeting place of cultures: 
Christianity and Islam, Rome and Carthage, Arabs and Jews, are just 
some of the confrontations of cultural forces which interacted, not without 
the occasional skirmish or a fully-fledged crusade, on the Mediterranean 
sea and littoral. 6 Even today, the Mediterranean remains a sensitive geo-
political area. 7 
The Maltese islands lie in this ebullient context, 93 kilometres to 
the south of European Sicily, 290 kilometres to the north of African 
Cyrenaica. Malta commands the isthmus between the western and eastern 
Mediterranean basins. Gibraltar lies 1800 kilometres to the west and 
Alexandria, Egypt lies 1500 kilometres to the east. 8 As well as its strategic 
position in a politically sensitive sea, Malta has naturally deep and 
sheltered harbours. It adds up to a territory of great strategic value 
to anyone interested in becoming a Mediterranean power. For this reason, 
Malta has at various times been the coveted possession of several 
Mediterranean potentates who struggled for supremacy in the area. The 
Carthaginians, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Arabs, the Normans, 
the various royal houses of Spain, the French and finally the British 
followed each other in successive waves of colonial rule.9 
The economic consequences of colonization for strategic (as opposed 
to economic) interests presented themselves in an economic structure 
geared exclusively to the maintenance and furbishing of the foreign 
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military/naval garrison. This fortress economy condition was a gradual 
development that gathered momentum during the last phase of colonial-
ism, in the period of British rule (1800-1964). Firstly, it involved the 
dismantling of indigenous manufacturing industry and, secondly, the 
incorporation of the Maltese labour force into the military and admin-
istrative activities of the occupying powers. In this way, loyalty would 
be cultivated for the colonizing power because it was the only source 
of gainful employment. IO Of course, the meagre natural resources and 
the lack of alternative means of livelihood meant that the British Crown 
had to take full responsibility for job creation if it were to remain in 
effective control of the islands. Having a trouble-free (and therefore 
gainfully occupied) local population is a major precondition for having 
a secure military base and a viable 'fortress economy'. 
Such a dependence on foreign-generated employment was compound-
ed by the demise of the textile industry. Practically the whole population, 
men and women, the young and the old, in some way or another, had 
been engaged in this indigenous manufacturing activity. The complete 
production cycle, from sowing the seeds to the making of cotton garments, 
was undertaken by the Maltese in their own homes, making use oflocally 
developed implements and with all parts of the plant being utilized. 
Unfortunately, the large scale production of cotton fabric and cloth 
depended on the availability of foreign markets. These were gradually 
lost, mainly because the Maltese could not compete with the technological 
improvements of their cotton-producing rivals, mainly Egypt and the 
American Southern States. The British also contributed to the demise 
of the local industry by imposing a duty on locally-grown cotton, as 
well as introducing foreign made textile goods. 11 
A significant pull factor was the generation of new industrial 
employment opportunities in the harbour area. With the opening of 
the Suez Canal in 1869, the strategic importance of Malta as a bulwark 
of British military and commercial interest greatly increased. The harbour 
became a haven for shipbuilding, shiprepairing and related industries 
and services including bunkering, trade and finance. With these devel-
opments emerged locally for the first time both an industrial workiag 
class and a business and commerce-oriented middle class. 
Gradually, a pattern of local affluence and poverty established itself. 
By the late 1800s, the bulk of the Maltese labour force was dependent 
upon the British Colonial Administration for employment. But such 
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employment in a fortress. economy fluctuated according to the exigencies 
of military security. Paradoxically, war in the Mediterranean meant 
employment and an economic boom for the Maltese; peace was the 
harbinger of depression and redundancy because public expenditure 
dropped; Rampant unemployment during peacetime"was so acute and 
potentia.1ly ciangerous that the colonial administration sought to imple-
ment policiel;l, which woulq reduce the extent of dependency on public 
sector jobs. Large tracts of barren land were leased out to landless workers, 
in the hope that this would provide them with a means of livelihood 
and improve the output of an already strained agricultural sector. A 
number of new fields were established successfully in this way but the 
amount of labour absorption was minimal. A more successful policy 
option was mass emigration. Settling permanently in North Mrica and 
other Mediterranean sites was encouraged. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, there were well over 50,000 Maltese scattered in such settlements. 
The boom and depression cycle persisted well into the twentieth 
century. The Napoleonic Wars (1801-14); the Crimean War (1854-56); 
the First World War (1914-18); the Fascist threat and the Second World 
War (1939-45) and the Cold War period (1949-55) were periods of relatively 
full employment. In 1957, though, a radical British defence review 
concluded that Malta was no longer of crucial importance to British 
military interests. I2 A rundown was put into operation. Within a short 
period of time - eventually extended to 1979 - the British military presence 
on the Maltese islands was to come to an end. 
A national crisis was inevitable. For the first time in its recorded 
history, Malta was faced with the challenge of opting out of a fortress 
economy. 
Even for the British, it was quite clear that considerable alternative 
means of employment had to be created to make up for the loss of 
thousands of jobs. Efforts to achieve economic diversification were stepped 
up; luckily this coincided with an outflow of European and American 
capital away from the industrialized centres of the globe in search of 
profitable investments in developing countries. Malta had an English-
speaking and relatively cheap labour force, was physically close to the 
European market, was keen to offer tax subsidies, low rents and generous 
grants and loans and, therefore, met with a generous response. The 
situation was ripe for Malta to take off Rostow-style into a period of 
rapid development. 13 This coincided with the granting of political 
independence in 1964. 
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The lack of local minerals or raw materials for industrial production 
means that the Maltese economy must import almost everything, including 
a substantial amount of its food requirements. The country has only 
a small domestic market, so it cannot also achieve economies of scale 
by catering exclusively for local consumption. It is therefore obliged 
to remain for the most part an open, export-oriented economy, providing 
manufactured goods (particularly labour-intensive textiles) to the Euro-
pean market. In contrast to manufacturing, the tourist economy, which 
has a low import content, has been booming over the last 25 years, 
thanks to the sudden demand for sun, sand and sea by northerners 
increasingly able to afford holidays abroad. 14 
The Maltese Cultural Environment 
The sheltered harbours of the Maltese islands, at the confluence of the 
main sea routes of the Old World, could not fail to attract seafarers 
from different cultures. Nor could the small local population prevent 
this froin taking place. 15 Permanent exposure to foreign interaction has 
made the Maltese hospitable and courteous, as well as accommodating 
towards a physically dense tourist presence. The natural friendliness of 
the local population was acknowledged by Saint Luke in the Acts of 
the Apostles. The Maltese provide personalized tourist services with a 
smile, which is greatly appreciated by many foreign visitors. It also helps 
the Maltese endure the seasonal mass invasions of sun-worshippers, who 
exercise a continual strain on the island's already depleted physical and 
infrastructural resources. 16 
Of course, foreign invasions, albeit peaceful ones are nothing new 
to Malta. It has been heavily occupied by foreigners - be they tourists, 
soldiers, sailors or colonial administrators - since time immemorial. Given 
the small size of the islands, a fair degree of cultural and religious 
interaction is bound to take place between the foreign settlers and the 
locals. The Maltese language is evidence of this. 
Until Arab rule (870-1090 AD), the structure of the Maltese language 
remained almost purely Semitic. After the Norman Conquest, the Maltese 
fell under the influence of European languages. A large number of words 
of Romance origin, mainly Sicilian and Italian, were attached onto the 
existing vocabulary and many were Maltesized in the course of time 
to conform to the rigours of Semitic construction. In later years English 
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words have been assimilated at a rapid rate into the existing language. 
In spite of these accretions, Maltese remains a fully-fledged language 
in its own right, and the official one, together with English, in the public 
administration-·of. the islands.----
It may come as a surprise that such a small island with a small 
population has managed to develop and cultivate its own distinct 
language, even though it is in continuous interaction with foreign cultures 
and foreign tongues. The explanation for this is that the Maltese language 
found a rational reason for existence because of, not in spite of, the 
intense foreign presence on the island. Apart from being a medium for 
abstract thoughts and symbolic expressions, the Maltese language has 
served as a national rallying point for the local population, a living 
symbol of what is Maltese in contrast to the threat of cultural invasion. 
The Semitic basis of the Maltese language also made it rather difficult 
to master by romance-oriented administrators. The Maltese language, 
therefore, was both a defence mechanism and a safety valve through 
which anti-establishment resentments and protests could be channelled 
without reprisal or fear of decoding by the foreigner. 
In a similar fashion, the Roman Catholic faith has been another 
powerful symbol of Maltese nationhood, particularly during the period 
of British (that is, non-Catholic) colonial rule. Even before that, during 
the short French occupation (1798-1800), disrespect to church property 
sparked off a national rebellion, inspired and coordinated by, among 
,others, priests and a bishop. Indeed, the Order of Saint John (itself 
a religious body) and then the British tried not to interfere in the daily, 
local life of the Maltese. They maintained good relations with the Church 
and even encouraged it to develop a dominant role in local, village affairs. 
The Maltese had been converted to Christendom during the stay of 
Saint Paul on the Islands and they remain today an overwhelmingly 
religious popUlation, despite obvious secularization. l7 
Culturally, the Church's influence in Malta today cannot be under-
estimated. Institutionally it is intimately involved in the main events 
of the human life cycle - birth, marriage, death. Religious rites and 
ceremonies stamp the individual's standing in the eye of the community 
at different stages of maturation, as well as being occasions for affirming 
social solidarity. Around three-quarters of the population attend Sunday 
Mass regularly and listen to weekly homilies from the pUlpit. l8 A 
considerable percentage of cultural productions - music, drama, ppetry, 
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prose - carries a religious theme or contains undercurrents of the powerful 
role of the Roman Catholic Church, not only as a social institution, 
but as a moulder and reproducer of specific values which affect one's 
attitude and perception of reality. This solid presence of the church at 
the heart of Maltese life is paralleled spatially by the central, dominant 
position of the church edifice proper, which commands the hub of all 
local towns and villages. The existence of 313 churches over a total 
land area of 316 square kilometres speaks for itself and leaves an astound-
ing visual impression when observed from the air. 
At the grass-roots level, the Church operates via direct and indirect 
agents. Historically, the parish priest has been the representative of village 
and community interests to the secular authorities governing Malta, in 
the absence of any form of local, civil government. In this way, the 
separation between the political and religious domains remains unclear. 
As in other Latin cultures, the Don Camillo-Peppone situation can flare 
up into bitter politico-religious disputes. 19 The result is that the Maltese 
parish priest has become more respected and influential for some people, 
but has lost his legitimacy to others by involving himself in temporal 
affairs;20 
Apart from the parish priest, the Church operates among the rank 
and file as a powerful cultural force by virtue of a multitude of church-
inspired organizations. In some villages, these bodies remain the only 
ones that organize social events locally, apart from the activities held 
in and by the Church proper. Notable among these organizations are 
the Church schools. Almost all privately-owned schools in Malta are 
run by nuns, priests and/or ecclesiastics. Together they educate today 
almost 40 per cent of the total school population, from kindergarten 
to pre-university level. Access to such schools is openly and hotly contested 
since they are popularly considered as better than the alternative state 
schools. The proper status of Church schools in the nation's educational 
system remains the subject of fervent debate. This is very understandable 
considering that education is popularly believed to be the key to rapid, 
upward social mobility.21 
Apart from religion and language, the long drawn-out experience 
of colonialism has had powerful cultural consequences on the Maltese 
population. M~lta has always been a prized strategic colony, and the 
administration of it, over the years, is therefore dominated by a number 
of features: 
75 
ALIENISM: The colonial rulers have always been foreign, never Maltese. 
The correspondence between poor and powerless locals and rich and 
powerful foreigners reinforced Malta's status as a client state at national 
leveL At the individual level, it encouraged the locals'-disposition-to 
whatever the foreigner had to offer, and not only in terms of jobs and 
foodstuffs. Hence a preference, which is still evident, for anything foreign 
- whether it be language, goods, services or culture.22 
REMOTENESS: Colonial administration was a heavily centralized affair. 
Not only were village mayors non-existent for most of Malta's history 
but affairs of major importance were decided even further away, beyond 
the Maltese shores. This created a political vacuum at the local level, 
which was filled very well by the Church. The parish priest, to all intents 
and purposes, acted as the village mayor, while the village feast and 
associated revelry served as a celebration of micro-independence and 
local solidarity.23 
Alienism and remoteness do not in themselves make for stable 
government. In a fortress economy, these attributes must be balanced 
in some way by the powerholders to mitigate the emergence of national, 
class or any other form of collective consciousness antagonistic to the 
colonial rulers, which would threaten the latter's position and authority. 
Legitimacy of control must be preserved at all costs and the use of 
sanctions to maintain power is to be employed only as a last resort. 
rherefore, other features of colonial rule in Malta included: 
PATERNALISM: Power holders in Malta have cultivated an image of 
themselves as benevolent, paternal figures, thereby masking the wielding 
of power in a guise of appropriateness. This ideology was easy enough 
to promulgate. After all, there was widespread dependence on the colonial 
rulers for employment, defence, avenues of social mobility, and access 
to certain privileges. The relation of exploitation between the powerful 
and powerless is conveniently reshaped as a gesture of paternal affection. 
This also has the effect of reducing social distance and promotes a greater 
identification of the islanders with the colonial rulers. This philosophy 
also implies its correlate, namely, that the powerless are underdeveloped, 
immature and in need of a fatherly hand for guidance. 
PATRONAGE: That a father seeks redress for a suffering child, or bestows 
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a favour upon him, is a natural affair. The cultivation of patron-client 
networks fitted very comfortably within the Maltese paternalist frame-
work. The Maltese population has always been ready to go beyond the 
formal, institutionalized channels to satisfy social needs. Through elab-
orate networks, manipulations and coalitions, use of a friend of a friend, 
the right person is contacted to satisfy a particular need or receive 
assistance, this serving also as an exercise in deference.24 The cultivating 
of patron-client links was a common practice, which the colonial rulers 
condoned. It was a palliative to the permanent, savage competition for 
the island's scarce resources. At the same time, one-to-one relationships 
established through patronage, prevented or helped to break down class 
barriers or other forms of solidarity expressions and thereby discouraged 
a compact, anti-colonial front. 
Faced with the syndrome of colonial control, the Maltese reacted 
in many different ways, and at different social levels. By and large they 
accepted the legitimacy of the colonial authorities as long as avenues 
for individual advancement were not blocked. This prevailing attitude 
was certainly paralleled and subsequently further legitimized by the 
Maltese perception of the function of saints. In a very transparent 
reflection of human life, catholic imagery and tradition has proposed 
a vision of an alternative world which reproduces faithfully the hierarchy 
of infallibility - the patron-client situation, as well as paternalist and 
hierarchical relations of political life on earth. The saints, some ascribed 
with more influence than others, are jostled by the mortals below to 
intercede with the absolute yet fatherly power holder on their behalf. 
In Malta this parallelism is more obvious and forceful because the Maltese 
words for patron and for saint are one and the same, qaddis. 25 
The demographic conditions of small size and high population density 
also appear to have played a key role in fostering the Maltese cultural 
condition.26 A small number of people, living necessarily close to one 
another in a tightly-knit web of interrelations, has ensured a high degree 
of social visibility. Knowledge, which elsewhere is either private or 
unavailable, is quickly acquired, even inadvertently, and rapidly made 
a public good, via the exchange of information and gossip. Such 
relationships and knowledge are valuable assets for fabricating functional 
networks of patronage. Individual manipulation of such a kind may 
also be seen as a psychological reaction, a person defending the little 
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independence, privacy and freedom of action afforded to him by the 
dense psycho-social atmosphere by avoiding too close an association 
with others and therefore opting for an individual, rather than a collective, 
route to goal satisfactionY Nor is the officious acquiesence to institutional 
channels a rewarding position to take, once it is public knowledge that 
there is savage competition for any locally available resource - be it 
jobs, school placements, plots for construction or consumer durables. 
This is a condition exacerbated by limitations of what the island can 
offer, the high population density and, last but not least, the high 
expectations developed by a close association and identification with 
West European tastes and standards of living. Indeed, following the rules 
is widely believed to be penalized by goal frustration. 
The effects of Catholicism and colonialism on Maltese culture can 
be profitably gleaned from a review of existing Maltese proverbs, idioms 
and other expressions, which have been handed down orally from one 
generation to another. Their persistent recurrence and usage in everyday 
parlance bears testimony to the philosophy of life which these expressions 
capture and which remains valid today.28 Recurrent advice includes the 
importance of having friends or saints to help one advance in life;29 
the benevolence of God the Father;30 the unavoidable fierce competition 
for scarce resources;3l the avoidance of risk and insecurity where money 
and employment are concerned.32 The latter condition may be seen as 
a reaction to the unpredictable cycles of boom and depression associated 
with the fortress economy. 
A cultural trait of not so ancient history, but with very powerful 
contemporary effects, is a product of political organization and affiliation. 
Malta in fact exhibits today the characteristics of a dual society: there 
are two major political parties, two large trade union federative bodies, 
and two important national holidays. The split runs deep and pervades 
practically all aspects of civil and occupational life. Friendship links, 
patronage coalitions, attendance at social functions, even the colour of 
clothes that one wears and the vocabulary that one uses, are affected 
(particularly during election time) by this cultural divide. In many respects, 
then, Malta presents itself as the contested territory of two nations, the 
reds and the blues, in an eternal struggle waged with strong emotional 
and moral overtones. Partisan sympathies are often established during 
primary socialization and steadfastly maintained with the same fervour 
and commitment of a religious belief. 33 Both major parties each have 
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almost fIfty per cent of total election votes guaranteed in this way as 
well as via intensive mobilization campaigns, which preach to the con-
verted. 
This local bipolarity is likely to have originated in the period of 
British colonial administration. It has already been described how the 
expansion of harbour and port facilities led to the development of 
indigenous social classes. The new middle class was composed of im-
porters, contractors and traders, as well as civil servants and other 
employees engaged in civil administration. The working class was mainly 
composed of the shipbuilding, shiprepair and other manual employees 
engaged in harbour work for the British Admiralty.34 Both these classes 
recognized the importance of the English language as the avenue for 
employment and social mobility. They eventually clashed with the 
traditional Maltese social61ite lawyers, doctors, landed gentry, university 
professors - who, along with the Catholic Church hierarchy had studied 
in Italy, spoke Italian and respected it as the language of culture. The 
issue, which came to a head in the 1880s, was on the language that 
was to be the medium of instruction in local schools.35 The pro-Italian 
and pro-English factions organized themselves to lobby more effectively 
on such a matter of crucial importance, because education was the channel 
by which each faction hoped to socially advarice and reproduce itself. 
Fanned by the subtle divide-and-rule tactics of the colonial administration, 
these factions evolved to form the basis of contemporary political party 
organization. The pro-English lobby eventually emerged as the Malta 
Labour Party (MLP) of social democratic inspiration. the pro-Italian lobby 
was shaped into the Nationalist Party (NP), of demo Christian orienta-
tion. 36 
Conclusion 
It would have been over-ambitious to attempt a detailed elaboration 
of all that makes Malta what it is, in economic, cultural and political 
terms. This has been tackled more competently and exhaustively by others 
and such an exposition is beyond the scope of this case study. In looking 
briefly at the Maltese environment, though, it should be emerging clearly 
that the Maltese are largely individualistic, competitive and wary of taking 
risks, who are prone to resort more to individual manipulation than 
to collective or cooperative action to improve their social position and 
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to defend or promote their interests. This dominant cultural pattern, 
fuelled by the long historical rigours of colonialism for strategic interests, 
corresponds to the Gramscian concept of hegemony. Reinforced by 
Catholic imagery, the islands' .scarce resources and. high-population 
density, it is a powerful force, influencing any attempt at cooperative 
organization. 
One point must be made before concluding this chapter. The 
hegemonic, compliant, submissive deference to authority structures 
wielded by benevolent rulers has been carried over beyond the political 
and economic circumstances which spawned it in the ftrst place. In spite 
of achieving political independence in 1964 and dismantling the fortress 
economy in 1979, the dominant Maltese cultural pattern shows few signs 
of abating. It persists in contemporary values and attitudes, promoted 
by current social and economic practices, as well as by Maltese social 
institutions. The analysis of contemporary Malta, undertaken in Chapter 
6, will highlight the neo-colonial orientation of Maltese society, the 
capitalist orientation of its economy and the legitimation and reproduction 
of such a social order undertaken by local institutions. A review of the 
local cooperative sector will be at the prime focus of attention. Its limited 
achievements and at times pitiful actions become understandable in the 
light of the peculiar economic, cultural and political contextuality of 
Malta. 
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NOTES 
I. The study of micro-states is a new and promising one. It emerged as a fully-
fledged area of research following the entry of 20 independent island states in the 
United Nations - the first being Malta - between 1964 and 1984. An exact definition 
of what constitutes a micro-state has not yet been agreed on. An upper cut off point 
of one million population is conventionally accepted. See the review by Hein (1985). 
2. The population estimate is from the latest Census, conducted in October 1985. 
See also Table 5 in the Appendices for a comparison of Malta's size and population 
density with those of other micro-states. 
3. Acts of the Apostles: 28: 1-10. 
4. On Malta's strategic role in the Second World War see, for example, Shankland 
& Hunter (1961). 
5. A summary of the report is found in Bradford (1961, Chapter 2), and Sant (1984), 
among others. 
6. The complex dynamics of the Mediterranean region are ably documented by the 
economic historian Braudel (1966). 
7. Witness the Yugoslav-Albanian; Jewish-Arab; Greek-Turkish crises, apart from 
Lebanon, Cyprus and the strong naval presence of the superpowers in the area. 
8. Map I in the Appendices shows the Mediterranean area. 
9. The one notable exception to this was the long presence of the Knights of the 
Order of Saint John (1530-1798). The Knights had no pretentions of Mediterranean 
grandeur. They served, however, as a convenient buffer and vanguard to the forces 
of Christendom, as long as the Ottoman Turks were a potential threat to Western 
Europe. Indeed, the Ottoman Turks were the only European power to have failed 
to add Malta to their empire. They tried especially hard in 1565, but the Knights 
repulsed them after a 3V2-month siege. 
10. This strategy conforms to the model of unequal exchange, whereby a colony is 
organized as a periphery or satellite refurbishing the core or metropolitan centre. See 
Emmanuel (1972) and Wallerstein (1974, 1979). The dismantling of the indigenous 
manufacturing base is part of this imperialist strategy. Similar dismantlings occurred, 
for example, in the case of Kano Cloth in British West Africa. See Illife (1983). 
11. A more detailed analysis of the Maltese cotton industry in the nineteenth century 
is provided by Busuttil (1973) and Baldacchino (1988b). 
12. The 1957 decision was caused by a constellation of factors. Among these was 
the inevitable decline of Britain as a superpower; its dwindling revenues from foreign 
settlements clamouring for independence; the disappointing British involvement in the 
Suez crisis of 1956 and the shifting geopolitical considerations due to nuclear arms 
deployments, which suggested at that time that conventional warfare had been 
superseded once and for all. The last British troops in fact left Malta in March 1979. ' 
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13. See Rostow (1971). For a review of Maltese economic development since 1959 
see Sant (1984) and Briguglio (1983). 
14. The restructuring of the Maltese economy over the last decades can be appreciated 
from the statistics on labour force distribution provided in Table 2 in the Appendices. 
15. For most of the early Middle Ages, the Maltese population fell victim to many 
raids by corsairs and pirates, who ravaged the countryside and enslaved the villagers. 
In 1551, a raid on Gozo by a Turkish force carried off the entire population of 5,000. 
16. Annual tourist arrivals since 1976 have been consistently more than the total resident 
population. This is a staggering feat, considering that the island is already heavily 
populated and that tourist arrivals peak sharply in the summer months. 
17. On the secularization of Maltese society see Vassallo (1979) and Tabone (1987). 
18. As reported by a census among church-goers carried out in October 1983. 
19. As has occurred in Malta at least twice in the last fifty years. See Chapter 7 
Note 17. 
20. Boswell (1982) studied Maltese perceptions of occupational status. The Maltese 
parish priest ranks ninth in a status ranking of 138 occupations, although there is 
a large deviation in the scores. 
21. Boswell (1982) reports that educational attainment is the best explanatory variable 
for social mobility in Malta. 
22. Boissevain (1969c). 
23. Vassallo (1979, p. 7) refers to the Maltese Catholic Church as an almost surrogate 
form of political expression and nationalism. See also Zammit (1984, pp. 15-16, 
36-7). 
24. Patronage occurs 'whenever men adopt a posture of deference to those more powerful 
than they and gain access to resources as a result'. Davies (1977, p. 132). See also 
Boissevain (1974). 
25. On the Maltese saints see also Boissevain (1969b, 1988). 
26. Malta's resident population density, over 1,200 persons per square kilometre, is 
the highest in the world for a small island-state. Refer to Map 2 in the Appendices. 
27. Hatt-Arnold et al. (1964, pp. 45-6). A Maltese proverb goes 'Ahjar jik1uk il-klieb 
milli tigi bzonn in-nies' (Better to be eaten by dogs than to require help from others). 
The idioms and interpretations which follow have been taken from Grech (1972). 
28. Such a priceless resource base has been involved in sociological and anthropological 
studies by Boissevain (1969b, passim); Zammit (1979; 1984, passim); Stafrace (1984, 
p. 77); Baldacchino (1988a, pp. 14-19). 
29. 'Ahjar habib fis-suq milli mitt skud fis-senduq' (Better a friend in the market than 
a thick wallet). 'Min ixahham jitlahham' (He who pr.pses and grants gifts gets what 
,;;}~~~~'.~' ... :. 
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he wants). 'Minghajr qaddisin rna tagh mel xejn' (Nothing can be done without the 
help of Saints/patrons). 
30. 'Alia jaghlaq bieb u jiftah mija' (God may deprive you of one opportunity but 
he will surely make another hundred available). 'Alia fuq kollox u fuq kulhadd' (God 
is above everything and everyone). 'Dak Ii jaghmel Alla kollox sew' (What God does 
is invariably good). 
31. 'Ghal kull ghadma hawn mitt kelb' (There are one hundred dogs for every bone). 
'Mhux kull min jigri jiehu l-ewwel' (Success in life depends not only on ability - the 
best runner will not always win the race). 
32. 'Ahjar ghasfur fidejk milli mija fl-arju' (Better a bird in hand than a hundred 
in flight). 'Ahseb fil-hazin biex it-tajjeb rna jonqosx'; 'Arfa u sorr ghal meta tigi bzonn' 
(Save for a rainy day). Bowen-Jones et al. (1962, p. 352) describe how the distribution 
of settlements in Malta and the huge wealth and effort invested in Churches are other 
reflections of fear and insecurity. 
33. From a study undertaken by Gallup (Malta) during 1984,55 per cent of respondents 
considered themselves close to a political party, compared to 39 per cent in Europe. 
Reference: Gallup (Malta) Ltd Press Release, 26 June 1984. 
34. Zammit (1984, p. 25, note 48». See also Frendo (1979). 
35. On the language question see Dobie (1967) and Cauchi (1978). 
36. Voting patterns since 1947, when the first Maltese parliament was elected, are 
summarized in Table 4 in the Appendices. 
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6 THE MALTESE COOPERATIVE SECTOR 
Introduction 
The Maltese environmental condition described in the previous chapter 
is the starting point for any valid critique of the Maltese experience 
of worker cooperation. As suggested by the theoretical discussion of 
Section One, such a macro-level perspective, traced to infrastructural 
(economic) and superstructural (cultural, institutional and political) 
features, is indispensable to identify with accuracy the reasons for 
cooperative performance. 
This chapter will attempt precisely such an application of contextual 
conditions for an understanding of the origins, nature and plight of 
the local cooperative sector. 
A Vicious Circle of Cultural Reproduction 
In post-independent Malta, the cultural adaptations to colonialism, which 
are not conducive to cooperation, have been largely perpetuated. In spite 
of rhetorical and ideological pronouncements to the contrary, the 
historically-ingrained cultural features appear to remain as strong as ever. 
The explanation for this lies in a vicious circle of top-down social 
practices and bottom-up civic expectations. The State continues to project 
itself in paternalistic overtones, not only in terms of vocabulary, but 
also in terms of policy, whereby it continues to consider itself as responsible 
for solving all social ills. 1 The electoral system of proportional represen-
tation helps to keep alive the tradition of patron-client relations between 
candidate and electorate.2 Within this set-up, the limits of a candidate's 
influence and actions on behalf of his voting client are boundless. Although 
hard evidence in such matters is obviously difficult to find, it is widely 
believed that individual manipUlation through a political party machinery 
does provide jobs or promotions, improve access to consumer durables, 
allow the avoidance of customs duty. Pressure on those in power to 
succumb to these requests is always considerable, since elections are lost 
and won, thanks to the system of proportional representation, because 
of a handful of votes.3 
Powerful social institutions in their own way continue to inculcate 
the hierarchy of infallibility, attitudes of submission, inferiority and lack 
of initiative.4 
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Take the Maltese educational system as an example. As a social 
institution, the Maltese School remains functionally addressed to pro-
ducing the workers and skills required by professional, public and private 
employment demands; it also produces the values and behaviour patterns 
which legitimize employer domination. The requirements, then, for 
effective cooperative performance remain unavailable to the large majority 
of students obliged to follow full-time attendance. 
The persistence of a 'banking orientation' to education as outlined 
in Chapter 4 is well illustrated by a recent survey of the teaching of 
social studies in th~.Malt~se state primary schools. This subject is perhaps 
the most appropriate for jrnparting skills in the practice of cooperation, 
as well as exposing pupils··at, least to an understanding of what is a 
cooperative. However, the evidence suggests rather the stifling effects 
of examination pressure and of traditional, authoritarian, non-cooperative 
teaching teci::>.aiques, which reinforce traditional submission and lethargy: 
- most teachers do not utilize all the allocated time for Social Studies 
teaching (three hours per week) and use the time for further teaching 
in the three main subjects English, Maltese, Mathematics - in view 
of the preparation for the pre-secondary examination; 
- most teachers still rely on blackboard work for teaching the subject, 
the commonest 'activity' reported being note-taking; 
- examination pressure leads pupils towards a cramming of facts, since 
what is required to pass the exam is the reproduction of such facts.s 
It becomes evident, then, that most Maltese are not familiar with the 
experience and maybe even the existence of modes of collective leadership, 
responsibility and decision-making. The school also remains another arena 
where the struggle over scarce resources finds expression. In this case, 
it is the cut-throat competition for the eventual acquisition of desirable 
jobs, which is reproduced and rehearsed annually in the keen competition 
for placement in a good class, in a good school and in an obsession 
for certification.6 In Maltese society, with its limited prestige and status 
outlets, this struggle becomes more intense, aroused and fanned by 
expectations and aspirations resulting from an improved standard of 
living, the adoption of middle-class values and western-inspired criteria 
of what job is best. Admittedly, in recent years, the stigma long associated 
with technical training has been dampened and university courses have 
been more aligned to the world of work. Yet, access to desirable schools 
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and jobs is determined, certainly from the point of view of student, 
teacher and parent perceptions, by the outcome of an educational rat-
race.7 
A review of political party mobilization adds fuel to the process. 
The party faithful are actively encouraged to display and express emotive 
support for their flag and leaders. This show of solidarity is requested 
on practically a continuous basis, since electoral campaigns go on from 
one election to the next, culminating in a physically and emotionally 
taxing frenzy every five years or so. Under such pressure it becomes 
impossible to undertake a cool, dispassionate and critical analysis of 
a party political programme. The newspapers, financed by the respective 
political organizations, cultivate this indoctrination and dogmatism on 
a daily basis. At the same time, it is the leader of the party who symbolizes 
the party image in an absolute manner. Great pains are taken, whenever 
there are changes in the local party leadership, to build up a charismatic 
figure endowed with all human virtues. 8 Political party support becomes 
normative and a question of morality, not of ideology or evaluation. 
These structural features find correspondence and stimulation amongst 
the cultural expectations that Maltese individuals have from the social 
system. Many are of the opinion that the State is indeed responsible 
for all social ills. The State is in fact referred to in personalized, male 
terms and looked upon as a remote, distant entity, which is to be treated 
with suspicion and preferably kept at a distance, unless for reasons of 
personal advancement.9 Thus the State remains culturally an alien, 
colonial imposition with potential, paternalistic channels of interest 
satisfaction. 
Many individuals and groups turn to traditional leadership figures 
- such as teachers, lawyers, priests and more recently, politicians - to 
take the initiative. The authoritarian role modelling is reinforced by giving 
such leadership figures almost divine attributes, charisma and paternalistic 
symbolism, which justifies and cultivates passivity and apathy among 
the rank and file. 
Civic organization for the pursuit of common objectives is a very 
infrequent and fleeting occurrence. In the face of evident and commor.ly 
recognizable problems - such as inefficient public transport, insufficient 
consumer protection from indiscriminate sellers, unemployment, water 
shortages, environmental neglect - the civic reactions are predictable: 
grumbling; outcries against the government of the day to do something 
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about the problem; individual solutions to problems, often in competition 
with others. 10 
lrifrastructural Correspondence 
This cultural cluster of submission, apathY, transfer of responsibility to 
others and authoritarian-cum-charismatic leadership styles is a con-
temporary component of a general, dominant, non-cooperative attitude. 
Although in itself a superstructural condition, this component can easily 
be accommodated within the exigencies of Malta's socio-economic base. 
The paucity of Malta's natural resources means that the country 
has always been economically dependent on patron states for all its 
requirements, even food and water, to satisfy its relatively large resident 
popUlation - hence Malta's natural disposition to a client status. I I This 
has been preserved even in post-colonial and post-fortress base conditions. 
Although an independent state since 1964 and no longer servicing a 
foreign military base on its soil since 1979, Malta remains dependent 
on foreign aid, foreign capital and foreign skills to preserve its standard 
of living. The ability of Maltese political leaders is indeed partly assessed 
on the basis of how much aid they manage to attract to Malta's shores. 12 
Income from abroad, whether as grants or loans from friendly govern-
ments or as remittances from Maltese living abroad, constitutes a 
significant component of the country's annual balance of payments. 13 
The pillar of the country's industrial production is provided by West 
German, British, US and Italian capital which produce goods intended 
for their own respective markets. 14 The country's tourist industry is 
evidently dependent on foreign customers, predominantly the British. 15 
As in other micro-states, it appears that the only form of sustainable 
development for Malta is not de-linking but, rather, the perseverance 
and strengthening of a rentier status. 16 This integration into the inter-
national economic system exercises pressure for the maintenance of the 
capitalist work ethic in Malta, implying a preservation of non-cooperative 
attitudinal patterns. 
The Local Cooperative Sector 
In the context of this scenario, it is surprising that a cooperative sector 
exists at all in Malta. An examination of the origin, nature and conditions 
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of this sector, though, should confirm the validity of adopting a contextual 
analysis to the issue of worker cooperation. 
In fact, the cooperative sector in Malta is almost exclusively agri-
cultural and made up of service cooperatives which, therefore, maintain 
and do not challenge the capital-labour relationship.17 It has already 
been described in Chapter 5 how Maltese agricultural labour was already 
in sharp decline in the late 1880s. To blame were both push and pull 
factors. These include the offer of more attractive jobs in the harbour 
region, and in the manufacturing and tourist industry, the encroachment 
of urban and industrial development on farm land and the lack of adequate 
water for irrigation. This decline has levelled off recently, so that now 
the full-time agricultural labour force stands at about 3 per cent of the 
gainfully occupied population. 18 
The unit of agricultural production remains the labour-intensive 
household farm with an insignificant wage labour force cultivating a 
number of small non-adjacent plots. 19 The fraction of owner-occupied 
farms is very small, but, although most farmers are tenants, rates of 
surplus extraction are very 10w.20 
These low rates reflect the strategic importance enjoyed by the farming 
labour segment in the Maltese economy for many centuries. There are 
a number of reasons for this. Firstly, in contrast to many other countries, 
Maltese landowners were never a powerful or compact class. The Catholic 
Church and its various religious orders inherited many tracts of land 
over the years from the faithful and often gave these out at very low 
rents for long leases to whoever was willing to work them. Secondly, 
the power position of other landowners declined sharply with the 
availability of non agricultural employment and the wave of urban-
directed proletarianization that took place in the nineteenth century. 
Apart from this, output from a poor, rain-dependent soil in a dry climate 
was always meagre and scanty. Thirdly, because of the limited food 
production and a rapidly expanding popUlation, landowners' concern 
was more with how to interest potential farmers into working their land. 
This concern was shared by the British colonial administration, par-
ticularly because food scarcities could lead to social unrest, which would 
undermine the image of the British as benevolent paternalistic rulers. 
Over the last four hundred years, parcels of land have been passed to 
prospective tenants at very favourable rates, in the face of a popUlation 
explosion and an imminent food crisis. The thirst for usable arable land 
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was so strong that attempts were made to create artificial fields by sur-
rounding bare rocky surfaces with rubble walls and then spreading a 
layer of topsoil, but these would at best provide output of only marginal 
quality. 
For a time, the British also seriously considered devdojJing the -neigh-
bouring islands of Pantelleria, Lampedusa and Linosa as food-producing 
centres for Malta.21 Ingenious plans for expanding agricultural production 
have also figured regularly in Maltese Government policies.22 Such a 
condition has made agriculture a strategic economic sector and has given 
even tenant farmers strong control over their farms. 
One structural feature, which was reducing farmers' income and 
therefore dampening the attraction of agricultural self-employment, was 
the existence of the middleman in the marketing structure of Maltese 
agricultural produce. In the years preceding the Second World War, 
Maltese farmers are reported to have been plagued by an insecurity of 
income and a dependence on moneylenders, many of whom were also 
wholesale dealers in agricultural products. Farmers indebted to money-
lenders were forced to channel all their produce via their creditors, who 
capitalized on the farmers' powerlessness and low level of literacy.23 This 
considerable monopolistic position enjoyed by the moneylender-cum-
wholesale dealer (known as il-pitkali) was spectacularly demonstrated 
during the Second World War, when the colonial administration bypassed 
the pitkali and collected all produce directly to enforce a rationing system 
in the face of the Axis blockade. Many farmers were surprised to see 
their profits increase, while the market price of their produce actually 
fell. This acted as an eye-opener for the administration and the farmers 
alike, who could now see the potential of doing away with middlemen 
and improving the sector's verticalization of production. As elsewhere 
in the British colonies, the legal structure used for this purpose was 
the agricultural service cooperative.24 Thus, the Maltese cooperative 
movement was ushered in specifically as a cost-saving, profit-enhancing 
mechanism to boost agricultural efficiency and productivity. It involved 
no commitment to cooperative values, and it was not inspired by a 
cooperative ideology. 
Apart from the cultural and economic environmental syndrome 
already described, the absence among Maltese farmers of a commitment 
to cooperation can also be seen as the result of other factors. Firstly, 
the typical Maltese farmer does not suffer from the disadvantages, which 
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lead elsewhere to the so-called deprivation trap. This drives peasants 
and landless workers to adopt cooperative solutions to ease their plight.25 
Since rates of surplus extraction are low and average incomes are quite 
satisfactory, tending also to be supplemented by off-farm wage employ-
ment by the farmer himself and/or by other household members, there 
is no perception of being in a structural bind and there is therefore 
no pressure to act collectively in that respect with other farmers. 26 
Secondly, the skills and practice of cooperation, along with the economic 
and technical requirements of running a modern business enterprise, 
are generally unknown. Thirdly, the farmer's long experience of mo-
derately successful agricultural production, undertaken on a family farm 
with family labour, has withstood the test of time. So, suspicion and 
disinterest in new techniques of farming, including a cooperative or-
ganization of services, would be a normal reaction. Even if ideas on 
cost-benefit analysis, rapid response to market conditions, soil conser-
vation and use of high-yielding crop varieties and chemical inputs are 
known, they are nevertheless generally dismissed. Risk-taking and in-
novation are lacking, because failures can mean the loss of one's livelihood, 
apart from earning the mockery of one's neighbours. The following 
narrative is a humorous but significant example: 
On an irrigated holding, carrots proved a profitable cash crop. The farmer was 
told by a returned migrant that paraffin spray was very suitable as a weed killer. 
He chose a small patch, in his own words, 'where no one could see what I was 
doing and laugh' and tried the new treatment. Eventually convinced of efficacy, 
this farmer was able to observe the slow visual impression made on his neighbours. 27 
These conditions explain how, in spite of the State's preoccupation 
to reform the farming community's practices and ideas, farming remains 
highly labour-intensive, family-based, lacking the benefits of economies 
of scale. It suffers from decreasirig soil fertility; and there is no adequate 
system of animal and plant health, water conservation an<;i irrigation, 
with crop rotation cycles often going back many generations. It is no 
wonder, then, that the bulk of the farming community remains dependent 
on a chain of intermediaries for marketing, grading, processing and 
distributing agricultural produce. The persistent existence of these in-
termediaries is explained also in terms of debt relations and sentiment, 
rather than simply traditional practices.28 In any case, most of the existing 
service cooperatives can hardly be said to serve as positive demonstration 
effects. 
91 
A Case in Point: Prickly Pear Cooperative29 
The Prickly Pear Cooperative was established for reasons similar to those 
of other Maltese agricultural service cooperatives: the exploitation by 
wholesale dealers (in this case dealers in prickly pears), who set the 
product's price and which farmers had to accept, because there was 
no alternative market outlet. 
The cooperative was committed by statute to purchase all the prickly 
pears produced by its farmer-members. It started off with very few 
members, so it was suggested that members should be paid a higher 
price for their produce than other dealers. The policy certainly succeeded 
in raising membership figures. However, it has since become a standard 
procedure to pay farmer-members higher prices for prickly pears than 
those set by the State, regardless of the level of profits being made. 
This attitude is indicative of conflicting interests which have been described 
as follows: 
On one hand, the farmers produce prickly pears for the cooperative acting as 
suppliers of raw materials. On the other hand, the farmers have the democratic 
power of running the cooperative and of deciding how much to pay for prickly 
pears ... The members seem unable to realize the benefits of redeploying profits 
into the cooperative for its development and expansion and are intent only on 
removing from the cooperative every last cent that is their profit. This concentration 
on the short-term will have lasting effects in the long run, if the cooperative 
survives ... The conflicting interests ... have reduced the cooperative to a secure 
market for prickly pears and interest in it as a profit-making organization is 
lacking in members. 3D 
The running of the cooperative is not simply infected by this short-
term orientation among farmer-members, which refuses to see the interests 
of the cooperative as a whole as being also one's own. There is also 
a lack of business sense, a weak investment in managerial skills and 
intermittent invasions of the spheres of competence of professional 
management by the farmer-members on the management committee, 
which strains the organizational set-up and blurs respective respons-
ibilities: 
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- the Management Committee of the cooperative has tended to be composed 
of the same members, year in, year out. For many years until recently, this 
committee was dominated by one individual who stifled democratic decision-
making processes and effectively restricted the development of management 
skills; . 
- the farmers are convinced that the processed prickly pear juice their cooperative 
produced is good enough to sell itself. They therefore view any marketing 
and product promotion as unnecessary; 
- the Management Committee has asked the cooperative's accountant to refrain 
from producing accounts because these are a waste of time and effort. 
Professional management at the cooperative has in practice been de-skilled, 
with the quality control manager and accountant performing clerical and 
secretarial functions. 31 
That the Prickly Pear Cooperative survived for some years is due in 
large part to its involvement in a profitable side-activity under licence. 
This activity was however unrelated to the objectives which led to the 
cooperative's establishment. Eventually, even this profitable practice ran 
into difficulties and only a major recovery operation engineered by the 
Cooperatives Board saved the whole ·enterprise from dissolution.32 
Conclusion 
Malta may be predominantly a capitalist-oriented economy with deferen-
tial, individualistic cultural traits, but it is also a mediated society with 
countervailing forces at work, both in the cultural and economic spheres, 
which are certainly bent on challenging the established social order. There 
are strands of cooperation in both cultural and economic Maltese spheres 
of social life; also, a number of active social movements, each of which 
contain elements disposed towards worker cooperation; and there have 
been experiments (some still ongoing) with worker cooperatives. But 
do such social forces intend to normalize 'cooperation' in Maltese society? 
Are they scattered or outrightly hostile to each other? Are they equipped 
to cultivate (at least the potential of) a veritable counter-hegemony 
championing the cases of worker cooperation? And which are the degen-
eration pressures bearing upon the process of social transformation? These 
are the key questions to be addressed in the following chapter. 
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NOTES 
1. Particularly during the three most recent Socialist governments (1971-87), the State 
assumed greater powers, involving itself more strongly in re-distributive policy, as weIl 
as becoming a major employer, energy importer and manufacturer. This in<:rC;!!s~d 
responsibility in social and economic affairs was a reaction to aIleged rampant 
inegalitarianism and the persisting control of strategic industries and services by foreign/ 
private capital. The 1981-85 recession was met in Malta by an expansion in public 
sector employment: a reaction contrary to the self-initiative and self-employment which 
characterized the general labour force response elsewhere. Overmanning in the local 
public sector may herald a crisis in the Maltese work ethic. 
2. Boissevain (1969b, p. 132). With the PR system currently in force, Malta is divided 
into 13 electoral districts, each electing 5 members to a one-house Parliament. The 
minimum number of votes thus required to be elected is only about 3,000. 
3. For example in the 1971 general election, the MLP gained 28 seats while the NP 
gained 27 seats. In the fifth electoral district, 5 extra votes decided one seat in favour 
of a Labour candidate. Had the 5 votes been for the NP, the latter would have won 
the election. For the slim majorities regularly resulting in general elections see Table 
4 in the Appendices. 
4. Malta has been described as forming part of a Latin/Mediterranean cluster of 
cultures, where societies manifest authoritarian, feudal and hierarchical traits. This 
means that rigid status and power demarcations are observed, leading to ponderous 
bureaucracies; government is distrusted; the law is seen as oppressive rather than 
regulatory; heads of state, ministers, mayors, priests and other leadership figures assume 
charismatic stature and exercise strong power. See Pitt-Rivers (1963). Mann (1973, 
Chapter 5) relates such a condition to unnaturally rapid and uneven development. 
5. The survey findings were part of an assignment submitted by students in the Faculty 
of Education at the University of Malta. They are summarized in Decelis et al. (1985). 
6. Credentials, like marks, simplify and legitimate the process of social closure. See 
Parkin (1979, pp. 54-60). 
7. As was expressed in an interview with Dr Alfred Sant, then President of the Malta 
Labour Party and Chairman of the Commission for the Development of Higher 
Education: 'One consequence (of the present system for entry into higher education) 
was that students just went flat out for as many subject grades as possible ... The 
real difficulty is that nobody has a working alternative solution to what is being done 
now'. The Teacher (Movement of United Teachers publication), New Format, No. 17, 
May 1986, p. 16. 
8. Such expressions of neo-colonial paternalism, with religious overtones, are evident 
from the slogans, expressions and statements made in connection with political leaders 
and partisan political campaigns and activities. For example, Dom Mintoff, long-time 
leader of the Malta Labour Party and Prime Minister has been hailed as a teacher, 
'a man sent to us from God', and the Saviour of Malta. See his personality analysis 
in Zammit (1984, Chapter 4). 
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9. In Malta 'the state' and 'the government' are used interchangeably, without 
distinction. One reason for this is the exercise of power personalization. Bowen-Jones 
et al. (1962, p. 344) describes I/-Gvern (the government) as ... 'a remote centre of 
authority which is endowed with every conceivable power and which is held responsible 
for many economic and social problems'. 
10. Such reactions are in contrast to forms of grass-roots organization, which may 
be resorted to in the face of common problems - such as consumer associations, 
environmental pressure groups, organized lobbying and of course worker cooperatives. 
II. Boswell (1980, pp. 27-30). 
12. A split'in the Malta Labour Party in the late 1940s was triggered off when the 
MLP Deputy Leader accused the then Labour Prime Minister of not having been 
a sufficiently hard bargainer with the British Colonial Office on Marshall Aid allocation 
to Malta. See Pirotta (1987). 
13. Grants and loans from abroad constituted 4.3 per cent, 9.2 per cent and 5.8 per 
cent of government revenue in the years 1982, 1983, and 1984 respectively. See The 
Year Book 1986 (De La Salle Brothers Publication) p. 237. 
14. An objective indicator of such economic dependence is difficult to obtain. However, 
from independent research and privately circulated documents, it appears that almost 
12,000 Maltese workers from the 26,700 engaged in the private manufacturing sector 
work in export-oriented firms, which have total or considerable West German, British, 
Italian and US investment. In addition, of the total exports during 1986, 32 per cent 
had West German destinations, followed by British (14 per cent) and Italian (11 per 
cent) ones. Source: Trade Statistics. 
15. In spite of attempts at diversifying the tourist flow, British tourists continue to 
contribute over half of all-arrivals. 
16. This point is made by Bertram (1986) in relation to Pacific micro states but his 
thesis applies equally well to Malta. 
17. Statistical data on the contemporary Maltese cooperative sector may be found 
in Table 3 in the Appendices. 
18. About 2,900 according to official statistics published in June 1988. 
19. The most recently available Census - see Department of Agriculture (1984) - had 
noted the following statistical details of the contemporary farming population: 
There are 4,383 full-time farmers (3.7 per cent of the gainfully occupied population) 
of which 3,785 are male and 598 are female. Delia (1987) has subsequently deduced 
that over 2,000 farmers were being counted twice. 
Agricultural land area worked out at 32,165 acres (41 per cent of total land area) 
of which only 4.5 per cent is fully or partly irrigated. The percentage of land 
area worked was 56 per cent in 1959. 
Over 92 per cent of farm holdings are under 5 acres in extent. These are usually 
95 
composed of fragmented, scattered units with an area of a quarter of an acre 
or less for each one. 
20. The amount of total agricultural land owned by individual farmers and their families 
was approximately 10 per cent in the early 1950s. The rest is held under rental or 
emphyteutical arrangements. Source: Bowen-Jones et al. (1962, p. 303, Table 40). 
Nevertheless, I have calculated the amount of surplus extracted by landowners as rent 
from tenant farmers to amount to an average of 2 Maltese pounds (around US$6) 
per full-time farmer per year in 1983. Rent in kind is not normally practised. Source: 
Department of Agriculture (1984, pp. viii, 16). 
21. Blouet (1972, p. 172). 
22. These include solid waste recycling projects to provide effiuent for irrigation; land 
reclamation schemes; poultry and other specialized farming; and concentration on high-
priced crops. 
23. Camilleri (1984, pp. 3-5); Delicata (1975, passim). 
24. As for example, in Kenya, Uganda and India. See Spear (1982, p. 41) and Brett 
(1970). 
25. For details on the deprivation trap see Chambers (1983, pp. 108-14). The relative 
affiuence of farmers, arrived at via independent research, assumes a homogeneous 
farming population. Therefore the suggestion that middlemen 'often get a bigger share 
for their services than the farmer himself might apply to the less well-off farmers. 
See Optima (1985b, p. 5). Zammit (1973, p. 9) claims that animal breeders get only 
50-65 per cent of the final price, the difference being shared between the middleman 
and the retailer. 
26. The structural bind is a term coined by Young (1970) to describe peasants who 
know that they cannot redress an unequal power balance individually, but believe 
they can do so collectively. See Galjart (1975, p. 77). 
27. Reported in Bowen-Jones et al. (1962, p. 328). 
28. Zammit (1973, p. 4). 
29. While details reported here are true, the name of the cooperative and its product 
are fictitious. 
30. The quotation is taken from a dissertation by a University undergraduate completed 
in 1984. 
31. Details taken from the same dissertation. 
32. Prickly pear deposits kept by the cooperative and worth thousands of Maltese 
liri had to be thrown away because they had gone bad. Fresh loans, grants, secretarial 
assistance and foreign expertise were made available by the Cooperatives Board in 
1987 and two new products were subsequently launched in the local market. 
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7 ELEMENTS OF MEDIATION IN MALTESE SOCIETY 
Introduction 
It has already been emphasized that no society is structurally or culturally 
completely homogeneous. The Maltese environmental condition described 
above, with its evident non- and anti-cooperative elements, is only present 
by and large. There are, unmistakably, various structural and cultural 
forces and dynamics in contemporary Maltese society that cannot be 
easily integrated within the dominant, cultural configuration. Indeed, 
there is already a long history of cultural and economic mediation, 
including well organized and developed social movements, with some 
potential towards cooperative-directed change. 
Cooperative Reactions to Colonial Rule 
During the long colonial period, the conditions of alienism and remoteness 
did not exacerbate an exclusive orientation on the part of the Maltese 
for individual manipulation and paternalist expectation. Through Maltese 
colonial history, strands of collective behaviour emerged, in spite of 
benevolent authoritarian rule. 1 
Certainly since the arrival of Napoleon in 1798, power holders with 
alien cultures and religious beliefs have served as powerful anti-referent 
groups. These provided a rational basis for cultivating symbols of national 
solidarity, most important among these being language and catholicism. 
Indeed, the closest that the Maltese ever came to a revolutionary con-
sciousness occurred during the Napoleonic occupation, when the French 
started despoiling the local churches of their precious metals and treasures. 
Hitherto acquiescent, if not actually supportive of the French presence, 
the Maltese were soon up in arms, under the organization and leadership 
of the clergy. In this way the French, once and for all, lost their legitimacy 
to rule over Malta.2 
The remoteness of power centres and the conscious non-interference 
by the colonial authorities in church-inspired village affairs also ushered 
in a host of village-based community initiatives. These served as a psycho-
logical displacement to the nation's denial to self-determination via 
colonialism. The Maltese involved themselves, physically and emotionally, 
in the majestic baroque construction of village churches and an exuberant 
97 
display of local skill, ingenuity and organization on the occasion of the 
annual village feast. Such revelry was an opportunity for an all-round 
local effort, under the direction of the parish priest, to declare the village's 
identity and display its talents. 3 
The unstable cbndition of the fortress economy set:.up, with the 
unpredictable cyclical fluctuations of boom and depression, also fostered 
a sense of entrepreneurship among the Maltese. Low risk, labour-intensive, 
self-employment, family enterprise and cooperative work efforts have 
been and remain widespread and signify a natural reaction to unstable 
formal employment.4 They are also opportunities which generate extra 
income, preferably without being declared for the purposes of taxation, 
which explains why most of these initiatives never find their way into 
official statistics. The latter, by itself, cannot adequately explain Malta's 
favourable standard of living.5 Most of the black economy initiatives 
are individualistic, but collective enterprise is not uncommon.6 This 
preference for anonymity and informality is another likely explanation 
for the reluctance of the Maltese to form officially registered cooperative 
units, unless there are obvious financial advantages tied to registration. 7 
The issue of power alienism also explains how expressions of local 
discontent are seen and felt to be permissible and valid. Such expressions 
can be individual and collective, ranging from harmless but quite 
widespread grumbling, to petty acts of theft or sabotage, to fully-fledged 
industrial or political antagonism. These actions are justified because 
any liabilities they incur are understood to be beyond local concern 
and responsibility.s Such reactions to benevolent but alien paternalism 
were not continuous, nor did the Maltese who resorted to this kind 
of behaviour maintain exclusively such an attitude in relation to colonial 
rule. Rather, these expressions represent ascendant consequences of 
different and specific power relations, physical experiences as well as 
personality factors within the generalized colonial condition. 
Experiences of collective political activism and antagonism certainly 
assumed a significant primacy among the industrial workforce centred 
at the dockyard, because of the specific power relations to which, for 
many years, that workplace was exposed. Such relations were influenced 
by the geographical isolation and concentration of the worksite, which 
fostered a high level of group consciousness and solidarity.9 Exposure 
to British trade unionism via interaction with British workers, sailors 
and passengers,1O as well as the strategic nature of the work involved, 
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have moulded the drydocks labour force into a labour aristocracy, 11 
the cradle and vanguard of what is called the Maltese Labour Movement 
(MLM). 
The Maltese Labour Movement 
The emergence of the MLM as a social movement can be traced to 
historical, cultural and political reactions to colonial powerlessness, which 
first found expression as craft or trade union consciousness. In 1884, 
an attempt was already being made to set up a fully-fledged fitters' union 
at the drydocks, at a time when the social climate was not at all supportive 
of such initiatives. 12 The first strike at the drydocks over a pay claim 
in 1917 was successful. However, the lack of any institutional machinery 
for negotiation,13 and the insecurity of employment made unionism rather 
ineffective until 1943 when the first general union, the General Workers' 
Union (GWU), was formed, again on the initiative of drydocks workers. 
The GWU was the collective response of Maltese wage workers to the 
mass redundancies looming at the end of the Second World War. With 
the approaching cessation of hostilities, there would be also the inevitable 
retraction of the British military and naval presence in Malta. Within 
a month of its establishment the GWU had over 10,000 members and 
within a year there were over 20,000. 14 A Labour front was established 
with the Malta Labour Party (MLP) in 1946 and its pressure contributed 
to the enactment of favourable labour legislation. 15 Policy disagreements 
with the British government in the late 1950s16 and a second bitter 
politico-religious dispute in the 1960s17 further cemented the bond 
between the industrial (GWU) and political (MLP) arms of this front. 
By 1971, the MLP was elected to power on a GWU-MLP joint electoral 
manifesto. Subsequent successful re-elections occurred in 1976 and 1981. 
The front was institutionalized in 1978 when the GWU and the MLP 
were united by statute. The MLP is now back in opposition having 
lost marginally the 1987 general election. 
During the 16-year long period of Labour Government, the MLM 
has actively attempted with some success to supplant traditional power 
structures and their associated perceptions with more egalitarian ones. 
These include: promoting the mobility and dignity of manual labour; 
a narrowing of income differentials; the expansion of social services; 
the granting of equal pay for equal work to women; nationalizing basic 
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industries and major commercial banks; the promulgation of national 
pride and consciousness. 18 
One significant component of this strategy to transplant traditional 
power structures has involved a willingness to experiment with novel 
forms of production relations. These top-down initiatives bear the un-
mistakable stamp of Dom Mintoff, the former MLP leader (1949-84) 
and former Prime Minister (1955-58; 1971-84). While the establishment 
of a socialist society remained the foremost long-term objective, such 
a development could not in Mintofrs mind, take place without the 
achievement of national economic self-sufficiency through worker self-
sacrifice and higher productivity. Inspired by the remarkable Yugoslav 
experience, Mintoff ushered in various forms of participatory manage-
ment. These were intended as a vehicle for social democracy, as well 
as a departure from confrontational and economically wasteful industrial 
relations practices. 19 
The most far-reaching participatory inroads have been achieved at 
Malta Drydocks, the country's biggest enterprise, with the largest 
workforce and, not coincidentally, with record levels of political activism 
and very strong trade union consciousness.2o The process at the drydocks 
was incremental and originally an ad hoc solution to chronic bankruptcy 
and industrial strife. West German style co-determination (with joint 
GWU and Government appointed directors) was introduced in 1971 
immediately after the MLP electoral victory. Both industrial peace and 
profits were restored in a few years. From 1975 onwards, the Drydocks 
Council started being completely elected by the workforce, introducing 
the first experience of worker self-management in Malta. Then, in 1977, 
the first departmental level worker committees signalled a further 
refinement in the participatory system. For more than a decade now 
the drydocks experience has served to demonstrate how Labour can 
control Capital and how the experience of worker participation in 
management is in itself educational and does lead to shifts in worker 
perception and attitudes.21 
Other examples of participatory initiatives include the appointment 
of worker directors to the boards of public corporations22 and manage-
ment committees set up within 18 state-owned manufacturing companies, 
as well as within certain departments of the civil service.23 Through these 
and the drydocks initiative, workers have been encouraged to question 
the legitimacy of the control of Capital over Labour, especially if they 
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are facing serious financial and organizational difficulties or unemploy-
ment. Such directions in alternative relations of production could be 
understood as threats to the network of ideological and cultural relations, 
which forms part of the Gramscian apparatus of hegemony. Indeed, 
not only do they challenge but, more dangerously to the hegemonic 
condition, they propose alternatives to the Maltese worker's self-concept 
regarding managerial authority, oppositional trade unionism, extrinsic 
orientations to work and the legitimacy of surplus value extra.ction~ 
It remains debatable whether the Maltese participatory story of the 
1970s was intended as a peaceful yet dramatic transition to worker self-
management. Certainly, it was inspiring enough to be described as a 
test case for the Gramscian evolutionary social movement approach to 
social democratization.24 The spirit of the transition was very much 
captured by the Malta Development Plan, operative at the time.25 
Unfortunately, with the exception of the drydocks and solitary worker-
directors on company boards, the transfer of self-management soon 
ground to a halt. A power struggle ensued between the civil service 
management committees, comprising mainly CMTU (that is, non-GWU) 
union activists, and the traditionally responsible authorities, leading to 
a de Jacto winding up of these structures. On the other hand, the parastatal 
industries had run into financial difficulties - their technology was 
outdated, and the technical and professional staff required was not 
available. In order to salvage some of the jobs involved, it was decided 
to convert these ventures, fully or partly, to foreign or local, private 
ownership. One condition in doing so was the dismantling of all other 
than traditional industrial relations practices. 
A number of worker sit-ins and take-overs in the private sector have 
also occurred during the MLP's term of office, most with the full backing 
of the GWu. In almost every case, worker management has been only 
a temporary, stop-gap affair; the worker-managed enterprise reverted 
to traditional forms of management within a short time-span, going back 
to private capital control or being transformed into a form of public 
corporation.26 
Jolted perhaps by the undesirable directions that participatory devel-
opments had taken in the late 1970s, the MLM's policy on worker 
participation during its last term in office was concentrated away from 
the shop-floor initiatives with their potential for increasing worker ex-
pectations and demands and upsetting established power balances. It 
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focused instead on ~he promotion of worker directors (generally GWU-
appointed) to the b.9flrd of parastatal enterprises; these in minority 
positions and with.'out the" :stru,ctural and educational support necessary 
to foster a wider democratization of workplace relations.27 
The ec6nornicrecessi()li()f the early 19808 hammered niore- nails 
into the coffin of the transition to counter-hegemony. On a national 
policy level, a painful re-evaluation of development planning was made. 
The attraction of more foreign investment had become a sine qua non 
to create productive employment for the jobless thousands and open 
up further foreign markets for locally made goods. The drive of recent 
development plans shifted, therefore, from a relatively self-reliant, de-
linking direction towards a stronger integration of Maltese economy with 
satellite status into the capitalist world system.28 
In the case of Malta Drydocks, unfortunately, economic viability 
has not kept ;lace with innovations in democratic management. A regular 
series of heavy losses since 1982 has served to make the enterprise 
dependent on the State for its financial flows, while the drydocks workers 
have partaken only marginally and indirectly in responsibility for non-
profitability. 29 
The transition towards industrial democracy in Malta was, not 
unexpectedly, ushered in from above with the backing and inspiration 
of a progressive social movement. An overall assessment can be made 
today with the benefit of hindsight: it has not been possible to overcome 
political/trade unionistic antagonism in the context of the civil service, 
because moves to greater democracy are seen as a threat to established 
power relations. The movement has had to bend or break in the face 
of hostile economic developments. Rather than having a spillover, 
expansionary and transformative effect, the drive for industrial democracy 
to date can now be more aptly described as corporatist and integrative. 3D 
The crucial question of accountability and responsibility of workers and 
their representatives has also remained unresolved. 31 
The Malta Labour Movement did not exclude worker cooperation 
from its experiments with novel forms of production relations. The 
development of cooperatives was enshrined in Malta's 1974 Republican 
Constitution.32 Outdated cooperative legislation, introduced by the British 
colonial administration thirty years before, was also amended. 33 Actual 
pragmatic experiments, though, again predictably top-down, did not come 
about as a result of a conscious worker cooperative policy. All the same, 
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that Maltese worker cooperatives exist at all is very largely due to the 
initiative and leadership of specific individuals inspired by (or actually 
involved in) the MLM, as well as to the wider ideological, financial 
and organizational support provided by the same social movement. More 
recently, the MLM has embarked upon what are intended as counter-
hegemonic educational initiatives. Such an investment may have been 
strongly influenced by the 1987 electoral defeat, a result which has led 
the MLM to appreciate more than ever the tenacity of the dominant 
cultural and economic environmental fabric. 34 The promotion of pro-
letarian culture, in different forms, has been given increased priority 
by both the MLP and GWU in their respective spheres of action. 
The task at hand for the MLM is a difficult one. Educational initiatives 
can very easily distort themselves into self-righteous political propaganda 
in view of the prevailing charged partisan atmosphere. From the benches 
of the parliamentary opposition, the MLM also finds it much easier 
to oppose hegemony rather than propose alternatives to it, thus failing 
to reconsider the difficulties of implementing directed social change. All 
the same, some noteworthy cultural presentations of educational value 
have been successfully put forward recently.35 
The Nationalist Party 
An equally powerful and broad-based social movement in Malta is that 
under the leadership and inspiration of the Nationalist Party, in govern-
ment since 1987. The roots of the NP can be traced back to the Anti-
Reformist League of the late 1880s, established to lobby in favour of 
the preservation of the traditional privileges and status enjoyed by the 
Maltese. The conservative character of this party was reinforced by its 
leaders and followers, invariably drawn from among the professionals 
and clergy.36 The rift between the NP and the MLP was for many years 
neatly coincident with social class divisions. 
The NP's pro-Italian sympathies caused it to lose considerable support 
in the period immediately following the Second World War, during which 
Italian planes had bombed the island into a heap of rubble. Electoral 
support for the NP has continued to increase steadily since 1947 and 
reached 51 per cent in 1981 and 1987.37 
Such a wide, popular following would not have been achieved had 
the NP maintained a rigid, conservative, pro-Italian stand. The NP has 
103 
evolved over the years, championing the cause and acquisition of Maltese 
independence in the 1960s and adopting a moderate demo-Christian 
platform as its ideology.38 Upholding this mass populist image, the NP 
has advocated with some vigour the principle of participation and 
collective responsibility in enterprise and civic management,founded~on 
the notion of the dignity and resourcefulness of the individual, as well 
as on the principles of co-responsibility and devolution of centralized 
authority. 39 
The NP was restored to power in May 1987, following a 16-year 
spell in opposition, so it is unfortunately still too early to posit an effective 
analysis of pragmatic applications of this participative philosophy.40 In 
the meantime, the MLP affirms that any inroads into democratization 
are impossible for the NP to implement in practice and are therefore 
merely vote-catching slogans.41 
The Church 
Potentially, the third social movement of note in contemporary Malta, 
and one with even older traditions and a stronger cultural presence than 
the MLM or the NP, is that inspired and led by the Roman Catholic 
Church. The Church's influence today in Malta cannot be underestimated, 
and its pervasive presence as a cultural force and as a social institution 
has already been outlined.43 Yet, while the Catholic Church in Malta 
continues sporadically to call upon the faithful on a national basis to 
take stands on particular social issues, such calls are generally directed 
at stopping social change, not at promoting it in desirable directions.43 
Indicators of such leanings toward workplace democratization have 
not been lacking. The social teachings of the Church have long pro-
pounded that increased worker participation in enterprise management, 
profits - and ownership contributes to a humanization of the socio-
economic environment and to the promotion of the dignity of the worker 
as a human being.44 Such social doctrine can be traced back to Pope 
Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum (1891);45 Pope Pius Xl's Quadrogesimo Anno 
(1931);46 Pope John XXIII's Mater et Magistra (1961)47 and, recently 
by Pope John Paul II in Laborem Exercens (1981) and Sollicitudo Rei 
Socialis (1988).48 
The Church authorities in Malta have failed so far to take advantage 
of their powerful cultural position and extensive proliferation in com-
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munity and educative spheres, by coming out with a clear policy in 
favour of Maltese workplace democratization. The affinity between the 
religious and the secular, between Church and State, and the still high 
level of social control exercised by the Church in many spheres of activity 
is perhaps too strongly entrenched to permit the institution to cultivate 
and give expression to progressive ideas.49 It is also likely that the 
damaging politico-religious disputes and the inexorable onset of secu-
larization on a Church, which for a thousand years has never been 
threatened by other religious or social forces, has fostered a certain 
escapism. It does this, firstly, at the institutional level, by adopting a 
much less active role in social, economic and political affairs and, secondly, 
at the individualleve1, by a dogged perfunctory preservation of traditional, 
ceremonial and largely symbolic ritual. 50 
Nevertheless, some priests and ecclesiastics have reacted courageously 
to the trauma of secularization and, in continuation of the Church's 
traditional leadership role, direct and animate various socially oriented 
projects and organizations. 51 These include progressive stands, some on 
evident, cooperative lines.52 
One such body, closely connected to the local cooperative sector 
is the Social Action Movement (SAM). The driving force behind SAM 
is' a Catholic diocesan priest, who comes from a family of prominent 
political activistsY SAM was set up in 1955, with the overall objective 
of working for the cultural, moral and economic betterment of society 
and especially of workers. To attain such a goal, SAM takes its inspiration 
from the principles of Catholic social doctrine, and either takes direct 
action or helps in the setting up of independent or autonomous bodies, 
which engage themselves in specific fields of social action. 
The achievements of the Movement over three decades have been 
quite impressive, thanks mainly to a proliferation of action committees 
which have strong grass-roots representation among farmers, social 
workers, working women, teachers and clerical workers in particular. 
Such accomplishments include the unionization of farmers, workers and 
women, and a host of educational activities. 
SAM has also set up, promoted or financially assisted a number 
of cooperative ventures54 and it has been the driving force in the setting 
up of a Federation of Maltese Cooperatives with 14 primary societies 
as members in December 1973. Although, there was some enthusiasm 
initially, this federation never succeeded in mobilizing itself into an 
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effective voice or force. It blamed the Government of the day for ignoring 
it55 and suffered from damaging personality feuds.56 The Federation was 
discreetly disbanded after some years, when its functions were effectively 
taken over by the newly-appointed Cooperatives Board at the Department 
of Agriculture and Fisheries in 1976.51 
An Appraisal of Worker Cooperation in Malta 
The elaborate preamble about the Maltese environmental syndrome has 
identified the forces significant to an understanding of the state and 
characteristics of worker cooperation in Malta, although actual expe-
riences of the latter have. been very few in number. Apart from three 
worker cooperatives still in operation, there are only five other docu-
mented cases, the oldest going back only to the late 1960s. All of these 
can be traced to one of the locally active social movements described 
above. 
The earliest indication on record of a worker cooperative venture 
was the Solidarity Building Scheme, established by SAM. The venture, 
which lasted a couple of years, involved the construction of 7 houses 
by their seven eventual occupiers on a collective basis.58 
The next recorded initiative was a stevedore cooperative set up by 
the General Workers' Union in 1974. The coop offered cargo transport 
services, which were competitive mainly because of the cooperative 
.organization that permitted the reduction of overhead costs, some work 
centralization and the purchase of otherwise too costly machinery. Interest 
in the cooperative by its members apparently dwindled over the years 
and only 15 members were registered in 1985. In 1987, the surviving 
members, contrary to the normal procedures, decided to dissolve the 
coop and distributed all its outstanding assets among themselves. 59 
The Nationalist Party itself established a series of stop-gap worker 
cooperatives in the summer of 1982. Many NP sympathizers had obeyed 
a party directive not to report to work on a specific day, as part of 
the campaign the NP was waging in protest at the anomalous election 
result achieved in 1981.60 The Labour government reacted with an iron 
hand, and many of those who had absented themselves from work were 
suspended indefinitely from their jobs with public or parastatal corpo-
rations. The NP was therefore morally obliged to assist these supporters 
in finding alternative means of survival. One of these means was the 
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organization of many small cooperative activities teaching, carpentry, 
secretarial work, electrical installation. The whole project was abandoned 
once the suspended workers were reinstated.61 
The most significant drive in favour of worker cooperation occurred 
in 1983-84 and was instigated by activists from the General Workers' 
Union and the Malta Labour Party. The First Clothing Cooperative 
(21 registered worker members) and the Kordin Clothing Cooperative 
(26 registered worker members) were twin companies set up in 1983 
following the initiative of Alfred Sant, an economist and MLP activist. 62 
These two enterprises were intended specifically to provide employment 
to workers, mainly females, who had been made redundant from the 
textile industry. They have produced clothes on a 'cut, make and trim' 
basis, usually handling small orders with very diverse specifications. 
Unfortunately, the cooperatives have lacked marketing expertise, effi-
ciency levels are low because of the constant shift in garment quality, 
and the machinery they operate is obsolete. As a result, Kordin Clothing 
has been liquidated in 1988, while the survival of First Clothing remains 
uncertain.63 
Cooperative Maintenance Services, with 10 registered worker mem-
bers, was set up in 1983 as a business concern bringing together 
unemployed workers skilled in different crafts. They offered plumbing, 
electricity and pest control services. This time the initiative was due to 
a young intellectual, Adrian Gauci, who had also actively supported 
the setting up and early programme of the Workers' Participation 
Development Centre. The coop members benefited from a LM 400 per 
capita loan, free office premises and a steady number of orders for their 
services through the Government's Cooperatives Board. The worker-
members did not take the challenge of the cooperative seriously though. 
Output was low because members persevered in non-cooperative, in-
dividual odd jobs. The CMS was also liquidated in 1988. 
The Catering Cooperative (22 worker-members) was set up in 1984 
in a more dramatic manner. A private catering chain, forced to cut 
down its number of operating catering outlets from six to three because 
of reduced sales, offered the three 'surplus' outlets lock, stock and barrel 
to its redundant employees, instead of redundancy payments. Following 
protracted neg9tiations between the catering chain's management and 
the General Workers' Union, in which the catering chain's workers were 
unionized, 22 redundant workers took over the three fast food outlets 
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and commenced operating them on a worker cooperative basis. The 
cooperative is still going strong, under the chairmanship of a GWU 
shop steward, and is likely to announce the settlement of all outstanding 
debts in 1988.64 Because of seasonally fluctuating sales, however, the 
coop employs additional staff who, although parta.kiIigOfprbfit-bbnuses;-
do not enjoy membership rights. Unless handled carefully, the condition 
is ripe for developing into capitalist labour relations, where a few 
shareholders control and employ 'second class' labour.65 
The last and most recent worker cooperative establishment is a second 
Stevedores Cooperative, with 47 worker-members and established in 
August 1987. The cooperative draws its members particularly from the 
two towns of Qormi and Zebbug, long associated with stevedore work. 
The organizer and legal advisor of the coop is a young advocate, George 
Hyzler, also from Qormi, whose father, a doctor, is a Nationalist Party 
activist and a member of the current government cabinet. The son, 
however, apparently enjoys popularity and following from both NP and 
MLP sympathizers. 
Social Movement Dynamics 
The Maltese economic, cultural and political condition is not kind to 
worker cooperation, by any stretch of the imagination. Both infrastructure 
and superstructure remain powerfully geared to reproducing and legit-
.imizing a dominant non-cooperative hegemony. This condition is not 
readily transformed. Indeed, the size, origins, performance and problems 
of the Maltese worker cooperative sector bear witness to this Maltese 
contextuality and confirm the social movement thesis for bringing about 
social change in specific directions. Such social engineering, though, is 
not immune from ideological degeneration, economic pressure of domestic 
or international provenance and/or relapses to traditional paternalism 
and clientelism. 
The Maltese case is certainly fortunate in having three powerful and 
legitimacy-wielding social movements disposed towards worker coop-
eration, in words if not also in deeds. The relationship that exists between 
these movements, though, leaves much to be desired. The politico-religious 
disputes involving the Malta Labour Movement. and the Church have 
sharply dented the latter's image as the symbol of all that is Maltese. 
The MLM may have desired this head-on collision with the Church 
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as a necessary, purging conflict towards the building of a socialist society, 
rising from the ashes of a traditionally mystifying, and therefore alienating, 
religious hegemony.66 Education, welfare, patron-client networks, village 
administration, housing, marriage - areas where the local Church had 
long enjoyed an unchallenged monopoly - were gradually taken up by 
a State anxious to embark on rapid socio-economic development. In 
this way the Church's socio-political role was cut down to size. The 
transition may well have been desirable, necessary and quite inevitable. 
Unfortunately, it could only be undertaken in such a short time span 
by an active iconoclasticism on the part of the MLM. The result is 
a vacuum of legitimacy and self-identity, which even threatens the 
existence of a national, Maltese consciousness. 
In the course of this struggle fOf cultural and political supremacy, 
the Nationalist Party became identified as the political defender of the 
interests of the Catholic Church. The NP thus offered a channel for 
political activism and support to a religious people with a socially 
dismantled Church. In this way, the MLM-Church frictions have become 
institutionalized in the party political arena. The MLP-NP divide, then, 
goes beyond simple ideology or class interests; it represents the struggle 
for total,cultural as well as political, social control. 67 
The advances of worker cooperation are insignificant in the context 
of this all-pervasive dualism, which dominates the Malta stage. The slogan 
of cooperation, as with the related one of worker participation, can 
easily fall victim to manipulation, serving as a mere pawn in the overall 
chess game of power politics. 
Autonomy versus Dependency 
In this scenario, the responsibility for developing a 'culture of partici-
pation' and for promoting the normalization of cooperation in the Maltese 
context cannot depend indefinitely on social movements. At the same 
time, the initiative of social movements towards developments in work 
cooperation and self-management continues to be recognized as a sine 
qua non. It is unrealistic to expect any significant grass roots initiative 
towards worker cooperativism to occur. And even if these grass roots 
initiatives do emerge, the likelihood of liquidation or degeneration looms 
large, unless a social movement slips in to supervise and support. In 
this way, a critical choice between autonomy and dependency presents 
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itself; a social movement may be deemed responsible for supporting 
fleClgling cases of worker cooperation. At the same time, such a movement 
must help workers to self-actualize and educate themselves in the practice 
of genuine self management.68 
The critical choice faced by the social movement is between creating 
a genuine self-managed sector, where people are recognized as being 
ultimately the masters of their own development;69 or keeping down 
and manipUlating people, not necessarily because of Machiavellian prin-
ciples, but simply out of paternalist good will.70 The Malta case demon-
strates how the situation is ripe for devolving into a dependence on 
external initiative and charismatic leadership; it is also vulnerable to 
political indoctrination.7l 
This choice may be within the social movement's control, and 
determined by the power dynamics among its leadership. Otherwise, the 
choice may be made implicitly by the outcome of certain courses of 
action. 72 Alternatively, the choice may be determined by the power struggle 
between the social movement and the cooperative sector it is fostering 
and which may be developing aspirations for fuller, democratic self-
management. These possibilities (and there may be others) indicate that 
an element of faith and trust in the leadership of the social movement 
may be quite inevitable. After all, in terms of power and influence, 
fostering an autonomous cooperative sector is against the social move-
ment's interests. At the same time, the process of counter-cultural 
development is a dynamic one, not only in terms of the perpetual struggle 
against degeneration, but also in terms of the shifting and diverse political 
objectives of the cooperative process held by those involved and which 
are in some way resolved.73 
Certain developments at Malta Drydocks, which since 1975 has 
operated under a form of self-management, certainly appear to have 
happened in spite of and not because of the MLP leadership's support. 
Although this hypothesis cannot be substantiated forcefully, it is not 
unlikely that the experiment went much further than its initial proponents 
ever imagined.74 Strong demands for more widespread worker partici-
pation were also made on the MLM by its significant and articulate 
Drydocks membership.75 Unfortunately, the economic slump in shiprepair 
since 1981 has forced the Drydocks to concentrate on lower order, survival 
needs.76 
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Courses for Future Action 
Promoting the normalization of cooperation in Malta, therefore, might 
be on the future agenda of Malta Drydocks, if the latter overcomes 
its financial crisis and evolves a powerful set of perceptions and attitudinal 
styles, which are more independent and self-reliant in outlook. The 
impetus need not remain the sole responsibility of Drydocks workers, 
though. The social movements themselves can undertake valid contem-
porary initiatives in the cooperative direction. 
One way of inculcating and fostering the appropriate set of percep-
tions and attitudional styles is for the social movement to combine its 
inspiration and leadership with an investment in 'counter-hegemonic' 
supportive institutions. Despite introducing legislation that is supportive 
of democratized production relations, and despite having concrete 
examples of such production units, major social institutions in Malta 
remain solidly fixed to their traditional role. If such institutions had 
been oriented in such a way as to produce men and women as highly 
versed in appropriate knowledge, experience, skills and attitudes, and 
with the same back-up of supportive agencies as are capitalist managers 
today, then the cooperative story of Malta, and elsewhere, might well 
have been different. 77 
One such institution involves the administration of finance. The 
scarcity of funds has caused many cooperatives to collapse; one reason 
for this is that the finance available to workers' coops has been much 
less than that available to their conventional counterparts. So, in the 
long-term, worker cooperatives should develop their own banking 
structure. In the meantime, though, the social movement could step in 
and facilitate the cooperatives' financial flows. The trap to be avoided 
is to make cooperators comfortably dependent on the social movement 
for all their cash requirements. 
A second institution in need of developing counter-hegemonic orien-
tation is the educational system. It has already been described how Maltese 
schools breed non-cooperative and non-participatory skills, under pres-
sure as they are from the cultural conditions and economic demands 
of the local environment. But this does not exclude the possibility of 
investing in an out-of-school educational programme. The Church and 
the main political parties have not neglected this form of cultural and 
ideological reproduction and their out-of-school education projects attract 
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many participants. 78 Most of these initiatives, though, are of the socializing 
form of education, not the mobilizing kind.79 The Workers' Participation 
Development Centre, although not aligned to any particular social move-
ment, has also undertaken some educational programmes connected with 
cooperative development:8o But c()nsidering the narrow resource base 
of the WPDC these initiatives are few and far between. The attraction 
of out-of-school education is that it makes possible both training and 
instruction in the knowledge of skills required for effective and viable 
cooperation; concurrently it presents the possibility for the cooperative 
organization of education, so that both curriculum and style of instruction 
will be cooperative-based.81 Ideally, the cooperative enterprises themselves 
should establish and organize their educational system to impart technical 
and cultural education appropriate to the cooperatives' needs and projects. 
While these institutional reforms are fundamentally addressed to the 
needs of the cooperative sector - that is, providing finance, training 
and other inputs - they are also in themselves potentially educational. 
Thus, their organization should be cooperative to the greatest possible 
degree,82 as much as self-management itself. In this way they become 
sites of accruing experience in cooperation and therefore widen the social 
spheres in which cooperation and work democratization become a 
normalized activity. 
Cooperative experiences at school should be complemented by more 
elsewhere, and these should occur at different levels and within different 
political, economic and cultural spheres simultaneously, to enable a 
normal evolution of democratic skills and values.83 Such an escalation 
and normalization of worker cooperation involves setting up more 
cooperative activity at the workplace. Once again, it is the social 
movements in Malta which can be realistically expected to take the lead. 
Experiments in public sector democratic management have already been 
tried and have failed. 84 Attempts at setting up new cooperatives are 
glaringly absent and, when they do occur, often remain submerged in 
the traditional morass of patron-client networks, dependency and be-
nevolent cooptation. All the same, new pilot schemes involving a local 
version of semi-autonomous workgroups may be in the pipeline. 
Natural starting off points for such participatory developments are those 
groups of public sector employees, who already operate de facto as 
occupational communities. 85 Admittedly, there is no clear evidence that 
a process involving the escalation of consciousness arises automatically 
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from a democratized work setting.86 Still there is probably no better 
educational experience than the actual practice of workplace democracy.87 
Degeneration, in the guise of stifling articulation, may be mitigated 
by a rationalization of production by the existing cooperatives themselves. 
The economic spin-offs of verticalized production are not easily shrugged 
off; the lesson has been learnt and put to good use by cooperative and 
non-cooperative organizations alike.88 Mutual assistance between coop-
eratives in various endeavours - counter-trade, services, establishment 
of new cooperative ventures, pooling of [mance, research and consultancy 
- serves to expand the cooperative enclave. In addition, of course, it 
increases the likelihood of viability and profitability, through the ad-
vantages of economies of scale and the reaping of more value added 
by the cooperatives over the goods and services that they themselves 
produce. -
A further option available for the normalization process involves 
the hitherto neglected area of civic participation in decision-making. Since 
colonial times, nearly all government services in Malta have been 
administered from the capital. 89 There have never been any village mayors, 
headmen or councillors who represent or administer individual towns 
or villages.9o This is not entirely correct, though, because, as has been 
discussed earlier, the parish priests have long been the traditional 
spokesmen at town and village level in both religious and secular affairs 
for the fervent Catholic population, in the absence of secular authorities.91 
That town and village consciousness is most evident on holy days such 
as festas is therefore no coincidence; the Church and its social functions 
have been practically the only channel available for community-based 
initiatives. 
Proposals for introducing neighbourhood committees have been 
suggested in a number of political manifestos, but have never been 
implemented, arguably because they create a structure which competes 
against political clientelism.92 Of course, the 'dependency versus auto-
nomy' dilemma breaks to the surface once again: by granting genuine 
possibilities of community participation in local affairs, bureaucratized 
and centralized power structures are essentially reducing their own voice 
and influence. Yet, some degree of decentralization in the civic sphere 
remains a necessary condition for an effective, self-managed cooperative 
sector to function. 93 Initiatives in this direction in Malta also appear 
in the making.94 
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Conclusion 
It has been suggested earlier that the introduction of a new form of 
work organization does not necessarily entail any change of working 
patterns, or of attitudes, or of socio-economic structural change. To expect 
cooperatives by themselves to transform the social environment has been 
shown to be quite illusory. Nor can one expect miracles from education 
programmes fof actual or would-be cooperators organized in isolation 
from other developments. For cooperative-oriented strategies to be effec-
tive it is necessary to understand, and to a considerable extent control, 
the process of social change. 
Instead of simply planting cooperatives in an unsuitable environment 
and hoping for the best, efforts should rather be directed towards fostering 
changes in the society's infrastructural and superstructural fabric.95 The 
ambitious task at hand is none other than the normalization of the 
culture of cooperation, involving a recodification of social institutions, 
economic forces and cultural traits. 96 
The Malta case provides a concrete example of how socio-economic, 
cultural and demographic variables explain the existence of an a-coop-
erative or anti-cooperative environment. This, therefore, enables the 
understanding of the present state and size of the Maltese cooperative 
sector. It also illustrates the assorted forces of mediation at work and 
the effect that social movements could have on social engineering by 
adopting the Gramscian style 'war of attrition' strategy, which questions 
traditional authority and power relations and promotes the acceptability 
and operationality of an alternative, cooperative culture. In view of the 
recognized structural limitations imposed on social institutions, which 
do not permit them to support such a strategy of social transformation, 
a number of alternative sites have also been proposed whereby a culture 
of participation could be normalized and serve as an educational and 
socializing agent; in cooperative production, in civic participation and 
in out-of-school education. The threat and influence of degeneration, 
however, remains a very real one. In particular, the dilemma between 
autonomy and articulation is not easily resolved and remains sensitive 
to voluntarism and personality. 
If, as a consequence to the initiatives suggested above, a counterpoint 
value system and cooperative culture do develop, then dependence on 
external agencies to finance, education, political support, as well as in 
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counter-cultural terms, might well decrease in the long run. In that case, 
the cooperative sector itself would be able to organize Mondragon-style 
its production and reproduction, independent of external support.97 
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NOTES 
I. Zammit (1979, 1984) relates Maltese traditional adaptations to the condition of 
national powerlessness. Such adaptations are taken over from Merton (1968) and are 
analyzed as consequences of alienation and anomie both on a national and on an 
individual level. The collective expressions in open conflict against the established power 
structure correspond to the rebel syndrome in the Mertonian classification. The other 
Mertonian categories - the deferential or conformist, the ritualist-retreatist and the 
innovationist - are juxtaposed by Zammit to correspond in the Maltese scenario to 
compliance to paternalism, retreat to localism in village affairs and resort to patron-client 
networks respectively. 
2. Descriptions of the Maltese revolt during the French occupation are provided by 
De Boisgelin (1804) and Castagna (1890, pp. 366-97), among others. 
3. On the frenzied enthusiasm for 'festa partiti' which are religious feasts having 
strong political overtones, see Boissevain (1969b, 1988). 
4. This widespread resort to non-market oriented production, including the production 
of use-values for personal use, one's family and/or friends is a common condition 
in industrializing economies. The'value added generated in these ways does not find 
its way into official GNP estimates. 
5. Do-it-yourself jobs inside the home, part-time catering, carpentry, electrical, 
plumbing and auto repair services, private lessons, dressmaking and petty trade are 
widespread, such that practically every family, undertakes some form of value added 
activity other than formal employment. No official or academic research data on such 
local activities is available. An objective indicator is the widespread extent of part-
time farming, which is registered in sporadic census exercises. The latest exercise, held 
in 1982, identified 10,903 part-time farmers. See Department of Agriculture (1984). 
This dichotomy between official proletarianism and unofficial, off-work, black entre-
preneurship is common in state socialist systems such as Hungary. See Kemeny (1982). 
6. Fishing and construction are such activities, involving small-sized workteams 
typically practising non-hierarchical power relations, job flexibility and democratic 
decision-making. Port workers also operate as autonomous work groups. 
7. According to the Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act of 1978, persons in Malta 
setting up a cooperative may qualify for loans from the State. 
8. Tapping once again the common sense philosophy reflected in Maltese idioms, 
a popular saying goes 'thallas ir-Regina'. Translated as 'the Queen will pay', it reflects 
the irresponsible nature of incurring losses, whether through sabotage, petty theft or 
mass unrest. 
9. This high degree of group solidarity and militancy is apparently a world-wide 
phenomenon among dockyard workers. See Sandbrook (1981, p. 18). 
10. It was also an Englishman, Matthew Giles, who came from Britain specifically 
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to reorganize drydocks workers into three branches of one national labour union in 
1920. See Zammit (1984, pp. 44, 52). 
II. The meaning of labour aristocracy in this context refers to a group of workers, 
who have achieved a high status ranking and high wages among workers by virtue 
of class consciousness and radical unionism. The concept begs qualification, because 
widely contrasting versions of the term have been used. For a review of these versions, 
see Waterman (1975). 
12. This union was forced to change its function into that of a mutual aid society 
for the sick. Its name was also changed to 'Societa Operaia Cattolica San Giuseppe'. 
See Kester (1980, p. 24). 
13. The earliest legislation which allowed for trade union recognition was the Trade 
Union Act of 1929. 
14. As documented by Fino (1983, p. 32). By the year 1945/46, hardly two years 
after its establishment, the GWU organized 29,660 workers in Malta; all the other 
unions together had only 3,649 workers. Fino (1983, p. 60). 
15. These included the Trade Union and Trade Disputes Ordinance (1945); the Industrial 
Training Act (1948); the Conciliation and Arbitration Act (1948) and the Conditions 
of Employment (Regulations) Act (1952). 
16. These revolved round two main issues - the flouting of integration proposals with 
Britain and the commencement of the British Services sudden run-down. 
17. Already in the 1930s, the Malta Labour Party and the Constitutional Party had 
been blacklisted by the Roman Catholic Church following an escalation of tensions. 
At the root of the trouble was the continuing active participation of Maltese priests 
in local politics. 
In 1958, the Church did not support the MLP's integration proposals of Malta with 
Britain, on the grounds that they did not safeguard the interests and influence of 
the Catholic Church in Malta. The quarrel grew more bitter when the MLP was accused 
of socialist and communist tendencies. The stigma of mortal sin was cast over the 
MLP, its publications were condemned and its top leaders interdicted from 1961 to 
1969. This excruciating experience purged the MLP ranks and permanently alienated 
many of its diehard supporters from the Church. See Koster (1981, Chapters 8 & 
9); Sammut (1984, Chapter I). 
18. These achievements are discussed in Zammit (1984, Chapter 4). 
19. For a personality profile of Mintoff from a sociological persPGctive see Zammit 
(1984, Chapter 4). For a chronology of worker participation initiatives during the 
MLP government see Baldacchino et al. (1986, pp. 189-94). Fora more elaborate 
analysis of the period 1971-79 see Kester (1980). 
20. Studies of worker participation at Malta Drydocks, mostly undertaken with the 
direct involvement of the Workers' Participation Development Centre, include Bal-
dacchino (1984, 1989); Baldacchino et al. (1986); Borg Bonello (1983); Gauci (1982); 
Kester (1974,1980,1986); Portelli (1983) and Zammit et al. (1982). 
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21. The heightened political el{pectations of drydocks workers and their readiness to 
involve themselves in decision making as a right is one conclusion of the opinion 
survey conducted by the Workers' Participation Development Centre in December 
1982. See Baldacchino (1984, p. 47). Baldacchino et al. (1986) gives details of the 
tQ!lll sUJvey res~Ks. 
22. These include TeleMalta and EneMalta Corporations, Marsa Shipbuilding, Air 
Malta, Tug Malta, the Bank of Valletta and Construction & General Engineering. 
For the one single academic study on the worker-director in Malta to date, see Zammit 
& Baldacchino (1989). 
23. Their establishment, structure and eventual demise is reported in Zammit (1980) 
and Kester (1980, pp. 128-31; 150-3). 
24. Kester (1980) as well as Zammit et al. (1982). Woodworth (1981) questions the 
considerable logic that Kester (1980) attributes to the Maltese transition, suggesting 
that this may have been merely a series of quasi-accidental and haphazard events, 
ad hoc manipulations to serve the end of political expediency. 
25. Malta Dev..:iopment Plan 1973-80:'the Plan's vision was of 'a Malta standing 
on her own feet, sustained by the ingenuity and resourcefulness of her people, and 
containing within herself the economic power and sinews to maintain self-reliant growth' 
(1974, p. 61). 'Industrial democracy in its various forms is now recognized as not 
only socially desirable but also imperative for efficient production. Malta is pioneering 
new forms of ownership and control in this area' (Ibid., p. 68). 
26. A management committee at the country's only Casino was discreetly made defunct 
when a private buyer for the establishment was found. An indefinite sit-in at the local 
radio and television broadcasting stations led to the formerly British-owned firm 
becoming a state-owned company; a worker take-over in a metal furniture factory 
was fomented by the GWU Metal Workers' Section, in view of wages being regularly 
overdue to workers. Control was normalized when the issue was settled. 
27. This policy has not been systematic, with some worker-directors being elected 
by the respective workforce, others nominated by the GWU, but endorsed by the 
Minister responsible. A critique of the worker-director as a form of workers' par-
ticipation in management is provided by Kester & Schiphorst (1983, pp. 59-67) and 
Zammit & Baldacchino (1989). 
28. This is evident from the emphasis on mass tourism and export-oriented manufacturing 
industry, which highlights the 1986-88 Malta Development Plan. 
29. The apparently ambivalent juxtaposition of fixed stable wage rates and chronic 
losses in a self-managed firm are only understandable from a political and cultural 
perspective. Drydocks workers and their union continue to expect the State to cover 
their enterprise's losses in full and to guarantee them a fixed wage. This confluence 
of participatory and traditional value systems is discussed in Baldacchino (1989). 
30. 'The presumed integrative function ... consists of giving workers a stake in their 
job in a particular enterprise, fostering an identification of workers with their own 
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enterprise and thus bringing about acquiescence to their position in the existing social 
order' - Stephens (1980, p. 3). 
31. Some of these pending issues are neatly captured in the article 'Worker Directors 
in Malta: the Present Situation at Law', The Times (daily local newspaper, Valletta, 
Progress Press) 29 Feb. 1988. 
32. Article 21 of the Constitution of the Republic of Malta (1974) states: 'The State 
ackn<?wledges the social contribution of cooperative societies and shall encourage their 
development' . 
33. The Cooperative Ordinance of July 1946 was ol!ly slightly amended in 1949 and 
remained in force until superseded by Act 6 of 1975 and the Cooperative Societies 
(Amendment) Act 26 of 1978. 
34. See for example the letter by Mario Azzopardi, an artist involved in the setting 
up and activity of Politeatru (see Note 35 below) in Orizzont (daily local newspaper, 
Valletta, Union Press) 24 July 1987. 
35. A proletarian theatre, called POLITEATRU is putting on socio-political dramatic 
pieces, including works by Brecht, which inspire a radical critique of the social order. 
The activities of the WPDC, the pedagogy of which is elaborated on in Chapter 4, 
are also aimed at a democratization of Maltese society, but of course these are not 
tied to any particular partisan political alignment. 
36. A socio-historical account of the emergence of the MLP and NP as political parties 
is provided by Frendo (1979). 
37. The support gained by the respective political parties in all general elections since 
1947 is documented in Table 4 in the Appendices. 
38. One cannot disregard the fact that it was MintoIT's long, spectacular and dramatically 
successful career as Prime Minister and the consequential cultural and socio-economic 
socialist reforms set in motion, which caused the NP to moderate its stand, rather 
than risk political extinction. 
39. For example: 'A cardinal principle of Christian democratic ideology is that all 
should participate in decisions which affect them closely; this not only in the political 
but also in the economic sphere ... Elsewhere, we encourage the development of 
cooperatives .. .' translated from Partit Nazzjonalista (1986, pp. 17-19). See also the 
most recent political manifesto of the NP in Partit Nazzjonalista (1987): Section II 
7 on worker participation; Section III 7.5 on participatory management in the public 
sector; Section III 7.6 on cooperative promotion and Section III 9.1 on local civic 
councils. 
40. Notable indicators include the Prime Minister's commitment to maintain worker 
participation at Malta Drydocks and the setting up of an Inter-Ministerial Committee 
to draft a strategy for implementing forms of worker participation in the public sector. 
A prominent Nationalist Member of Parliament has also indicated the importance 
of endeavouring to establish 'A culture of participation'. See Frendo (1988). 
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41. Alfred Sant, former MLP President and cooperative animator, had this to say 
during a conference on worker participation held in September 1988: 
Ironically, during the late seventies, the right wing forces of this country were 
engaged in an effort to transform themselves into a mass movement. To do so, 
they needed to attract support from within the ranks "of the workingclass:'I'hey 
could not afford to alienate any possible pockets of workers' support, and thus 
adopted a mixed bag of so-called 'progressive' call signs that were never given 
a clear policy content ... 
42. Koster (1981, p. 262) comments that even the Maltese hit parade has been dominated 
for months on end by a semi-religious song rendered by a group of Maltese missionary 
priests; A recent' survey has also established that the weekly religious programme on 
the local TV station by the Church, 'Dawl il-Hajja', has the highest audience of 120,000; 
this is 20,000 more than the next best, which is the audience for the daily news bulletin, 
II-Gens (weekly Church newspaper, Blata I-Bajda, Media Centre) 7 Oct. 1988. Lin-
guistically, the Church's influence is underlined by numerous references to God and 
sacred objects in everyday parlance: AlIa jbierek (praise be to the Lord); jekk AlIa 
jrid (God willing); Mn'Alla (fortunately); AlIa hares (God forbid) and common swear 
words. 
43. One recent example has been the Church's campaign in favour of the financing, 
freedom and status of church schools in Malta in autumn 1984. A third politico-religious 
dispute-of-sorts (which Koster had predicted) thus erupted in the context of educational 
policy. 
44. This is neatly captured in a Vatican Council II document, Gaudium et Spes, (London, 
Catholic Truth Society, 1966, p. 95): 'In economic enterprises, it is persons who work 
together, as free and independent men created in the image of God. So long as unity 
of direction is assured, a suitable share in management should be aimed at for everybody 
proprietors, employers, management and workers'. For more powerful, contemporary 
statements coming from Catholic Bishops in the United States, consider their Pastoral 
Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the US Economy. See National Conference 
of Catholic Bishops (1986), Chapter 4a. For an academic analysis of the position of 
the Catholic Church on worker participation see Skalicky (1975). 
45. 'Each needs the other completely: capital cannot do without labour; nor labour 
without capital'. See Rerum Novarum, para. 28. 
46. 'In the present state of human society, we deem it advisable that the wage contract 
should, when possible, be modified somewhat by a contract of partnership ... In 
this way, wage-earners and the other employees participate in the ownership or the 
management or in some way share in the profits' - Quadrogesimo Anno, p. 65. 
47. ' ... the present demand for workers to have a greater say in the conduct of 
the firm accords not only with man's nature, but also with recent progress in economic, 
social and political spheres' - Mater et Magistra, paras. 32, 77, 85-103. 
48. 'Both liberal capitalism and Marxist collectivism ... promote at the economic 
level, antithetical forms of the organization of labour and of the structures of owner-
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ship, especially with regard to the so-called means of production' - Sollicitudo Rei 
Socialis para. 20. See also Laborem Exercens, para. 14. 
49. As suggested by Boissevain (1969a, p. 79). 'The Church and all its activities, the 
belief systems and the accompanying ritual that it endorses were found (by Boissevain) 
so intertwined that any deviant behaviour soon became the subject of correcting social 
forces'. See Vassallo (1979, p. 97). 
50. Suggested by Koster (1981). Note that these reactions correspond to the Mertonian 
retreatist and ritualist response categories as well as to those reformulated by Zammit 
as reactions to alienation and anomie. See Note 1 above. 
51. These include CARITAS (Malta), the Media Centre, the Can a Movement, the John 
XXIII Peace Laboratory, The Institute for Social Education, The Emigrants' Com-
mission, The Missionary Movement, The Residential Homes for the Handicapped. 
All these are under the helm of different priests and monks. 
52. Notable among these are the Young Christian Workers (YCW), the local :'ranch 
of an international movement inspired by the writings and actions of Josef Cardijn, 
a Belgian priest. The YCW, in association with other progressive representatives of 
the local clergy, were the first to raise the slogan of worker participation in Malta 
in the 1960s. A diocesan priest was also for many years the Chairman of the Gozo 
Milk & Agricultural Cooperative Society. 
53. Reverend Furtunato Mizzi, founder and President of SAM, is the grandson of 
Furtunato Mizzi (leader of the Anti-Reformist Party in the 1880s) and the son Enrico 
Mizzi (Leader of the Partito Democratico Nazionalista of the early 1920s and of the 
Nationalist Party until his death, as Prime Minister, in 1950). 
54. These include the MAS Consumer Cooperative and the Fishermen's Cooperative, 
which are still in operation. Other initiatives with only short-lived success include the 
Pioneer Credit Union, two agricultural service cooperatives and a poultry-breeders' 
cooperative. Reference to an ad hoc building coop is made further on in the text. 
55. 'Government is putting aside the Federation and its member cooperatives and 
has chosen to deal only with a small number of cooperatives which are not members 
of the Federation .. .' Resolution passed by the Federation of Maltese Cooperatives, 
19 June 1974. 
56. These were essentially between the representatives of the strongest cooperative bodies: 
Mr E. Soler (of the Milk Producers' Coop, KPH), Dr J. Desira Buttigieg (of the Farmers' 
Wine Coop and the Agricultural Trading Coop) and Mr S. Attard (of the Federation 
of Central Cooperative Societies). 
57. Via an amendment to the 1946 Cooperative Ordinance, which set up a cooperative 
board with a chairman instead of simply a registrar. 
58. This is docum.ented in the publicity bulletin This is the Social Action Movement, 
Malta, Lux Press, 1971, pp. 14-15. Confirmed during an interview with the Reverend 
Fortunato Mizzi, SAM founder and director, in June 1987. 
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59. Information on this Stevedores' Coop (1974) is reported in The Labour Post (GWU 
publication), Valletta, Union Press, March 1981. Information on all local worker 
cooperative initiatives was also forthcoming from Joe Galea, Chairman of the Coop-
eratives Board, during an interview held in October 1988. Rizzo (1985a, Chapter 4) 
also gives a concise account. 
60. The proportional representation system, accompanied by the manipulation of the 
boundaries of electoral districts, led to a situation in 1981 whereby the Party gaining 
the absolute majority of votes and that gaining the majority of parliamentary seats 
were not one and the same. The NP did not recognize the election result, having 
remained out of government in spite of having gained 50.9 per cent of the vote. This 
crisis, which dominated the socialist third consecutive term of office (1981-87) also 
contributed to the government's reluctance to embark on any major participative or 
cooperative ventures. 
61. See The Times (Valletta, 'Progress Press) 25 July 1982 and In-Taghna (Pieta, 
Independence Print), 26 July 1982. The Free Workers Coops, as they were called, 
barely lasted 2 weeks. Dismissed workers were reinstated before the middle of August 
1982. 
62. Dr Alfred Sant was Chairman of the Malta Development Corporation at the time. 
Subsequently, he also served as MLP President and as a Member of Parliament. 
63. The economic problems of these cooperatives were identified and documented by 
a Yugoslav consultancy team in December 1985. See OPTIMA (1985a, 1985c). 
64. The Catering Cooperative saga has been extensively reported in GWU publications 
(The daily Orizzont, the weekly Torca and the international monthly Labour Post). 
65. Another move in this direction is the decision by the Catering Cooperative in 
1988 to allow worker-shareholders to dispose of their shares among family.members. 
"66. This is perhaps best spelt out in Mintoff (1961), written at the height of a politico-
religious dispute. 
67. The political polarization of the Maltese population is perhaps best understandable 
from the perspective of racial or ethnic conflict. Friggieri (1987, pp. 70-1) refers to 
each of the two Maltese mass parties as nations. 
68. The autonomy versus dependency issue has a very long history, and is often identified 
with the long debate between Lenin and Luxemburg. Luxemburg (1970, p. 78) argues, 
as does this text, that any new democratic social order ' ... must proceed step by 
step out of the active participation of the masses, ... it must arise out of the growing 
political training of the mass of people'. This position is echoed, among others, by 
Raptis (1980, p. 67) and the life-long educationist Gelpi (1985b, p. 22). Kester (1980, 
p. 16) ascribes a key role to this process of 'growing political training' which he equates 
to 'social objectification'. 
69. Well expressed and elaborated by J. K. Nyerere, former President of Tanzania, 
in his speech on Freedom and Development, October 1968. Reported in Nyerere (1973, 
p.60). 
122 
70. In cooperative practice, the dilemma is discussed among others by Bonow (1966) 
and Inayatullah (1972, pp. 270-1). 
71. 'The propagation of ... self-management ... may be political window dressing 
or even outright manipulation'. See Kester (1980, p. 16). ' ... Self-management might 
simply be a charade, ... a form imposed by the party leadership as a tool of administration 
surveillance and/or indoctrination. See Greenberg (1983, p. 217). 
72. This has in fact been described with respect to educational provision in 
Chapter 4. 
73. Stephens (1980) adopts a similar approach in analyzing the Peruvian experience 
of industrial democracy in the period 1968-75. 
74. Contrary to the Drydocks Act of 1975, Malta Drydocks workers started electing 
the Chairman to their Council of Administration as from 1983; prior to that, he had 
been appointed by the elected council members, as the law stipulates. The 1983 action 
allowed for much less external influence on council affairs, especially on the chair-
manship. 
75. Note, for example, the debate on the motion to expand worker participation in 
industry, held during the 1983 GWU National Conference. The motion and main 
arguments defending the motion were forthcoming from Drydocks Union delegates. 
See lrOrizzoll1 (Valletta, Union Press) of 4 November 1983 and 23 November 1983. 
The debate is reported in WPDC Newsletter 1/84, pp. 1-4. 
76. The constitutional crisis (see Note 60 above) characterizing the period, is not to 
be forgotten as another brake on participatory developments. 
77. A point made by Jones (1976). 
78. So, for example, both major political parties have active education departments 
which organize seminars, publish books and press releases, invite guest speakers on 
topical issues, etc. The Church, of course, has its schools and various other agencies 
of adult education. Refer also to Note 35 above. 
79. This distinction is made by Vanek & Bayard (1975). 
80. Refer to WPDC: A Review of Activities - 1981/86' in WPDC (1987, pp. 18-27). 
81. A review of the WPDC's pedagogy is found in Baldacchino (1985, 1987b). Chapter 
4, of course, is concerned specifically with the question of educational provision for 
effective cooperation. 
82. As recommends Vanek (1975, pp. 35-6). 
83. As argued by Baumgartner et al. (1979). 
84. Refer to Note 23 above. 
85. Recommendations to this effect were made by Baldacchino (1986a). An occupational 
community refers to a cultural condition involving a strong sense of occupational and 
communal experiences which make for feelings of fraternity and comradeship. See 
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Lockwood (1966). It acts as an normative sub-system, which can not only serve as 
an effective barrier to the dominant social values but could produce an alternative 
value-set to guide the sub-group members' behaviour. Parkin (1967) applies this 
hypothesis to explain party political preference in Britain. In Malta, 21.5 per cent 
of drydocks workers sampli:!Q in. 1982 claimed that friendship networks at work spilled 
over into non-work activities. See Baldacchino (1984, p. 40). The study of drydocks 
workers by Zammit (1984) generally confirms the effect of local community and 
occupational milieux on images and perceptions of the wider society. 
86. Greenberg (1983, p. 198). He refers to Marx's criticism of incrementalist socialists 
like Proudhon who believed that producer cooperatives in themselves held the key 
to social transformation, neglecting the necessity of capturing state power, and other, 
wider, environmental support. Rather, even cooperatives with counter-cultural objectives 
may tend over time to become characterized by declining social concern and a-political 
or anti-political orientations. Herbert Stratton, Director, New School for Democratic 
Management, interviewed by E. Greenberg, July 1982. Quoted in Greenberg (1983, 
p. 218, Note 15). The point is also made by Baumgartner et al. (1979). Greenberg 
(1986, pp. 151-3) suggests that this could not be otherwise in such cases as the US 
Plywood Cooperatives given their unmediated environment. 
87. ' ... participation has a major effect on consciousness, serving to modify general 
values about work relationships and leading not only to increases in the desire for 
participation among workpeople but also to its acceptance as a "normal" means of 
reaching decisions within society'. See Poole (1975, p. 29). See also Gorz (1982). 
88. Edilfornaciai, a building coop from Bologna, Italy, makes its own building material; 
CAMST, a catering coop from the same' locality, makes its own pasta. G. Massarenti 
Cooperative, of Molinella, also from near Bologna, grows its own agricultural produce, 
provides back-up services and sells its products via a consumer coop. This information 
is from first-hand experience, gleaned from a visit in February 1988. Large Multinational 
'concerns such as 3M, BTR, IBM and Royal Dutch Shell produce commodities profitably 
by controlling the process of production from the extraction of raw materials up to 
the final output. Only in specific segments of the production process, where costs exceed 
revenues, is subcontracting or outside purchasing resorted to. 
89. The few exceptions include certain postal, banking, and social services. However, 
all ministries and government departments remain situated in the capital city or its 
immediate suburbs. 
90. The French and the British actually established short-lived village councils in 1798 
and during the nineteenth century respectively. The Gozo Civic Council (1961-73) 
has been the most recent attempt to undertake a measure of local government. Koster 
(1981, p. 264) however calls it a 'complete failure'. Gulia (1966) and Gauci (1986, 
pp. 85-97) hold different opinions. 
91. Boissevain (1966, p. 2). 
92. Koster (1981, pp. 263-4) feels that local government in Malta is doomed to failure 
because of rampant political polarization and several petty conflicts which exist at 
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village level. Local councils would also threaten the strict discipline exercised by political 
parties over their regional executives. 
93. As argued, for example, by Stojanovic (l973a). 
94. Proposals for local government had been put forward in the 1981-85 Development 
Plan but were not implemented. See Office of the Prime Minister (1981, p. 190). More 
recently, proposals for civic councils have been put forward by the Nationalist Party 
in its 1987 electoral manifesto. Such councils appear to be earmarked to administer 
local social and public services, cultural programmes, environmental protection and 
informatics. See Partit Nazzjonalista (1987, Section III, 9.1). 
95. While the Maltese cultural, political and economic conditions appear malleable 
via a social movement approach to social change, the demographic conditions, that 
is the small size and high population density, remain beyond feasible and acceptable 
manipulation. Thus, the geophysical context of Malta wiJI remain badly disposed to 
cooperative efforts. 
96. The converse of the Freirean idea is neatly captured in George Orwell's 1984, 
whereby Newspeak, the official language, becomes the cultivator of 'proper' worldviews 
and mental habits, an instrument designed to diminish the range of thought. 
97. Provision for this already exists in the Cooperative Societies Act (1978). Bringing 
into force Section 24. would establish an autonomous apex organization, which will 
provide, organize and supervise effective centralized services for the local cooperative 
sector, including cooperative education and training, With respect to the educational 
system in Mondragon, see Thomas & Logan (1982, pp. 52-66). 
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8 LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD 
Answering a Key Question 
How can the workers of the world find viable answers to repression, 
exploitation and ideological incorporation? The question has been asked 
innumerable times and will, no doubt, recur many times in future. This 
text can be seen as one version of the answer to this interpolation. In 
this case, the answer goes beyond the defencism of anti-statements and 
posits a viable, working alternative: Worker cooperatives are recognized 
as instruments capable of redirecting inequality, poverty and reduced 
job opportunities. They are also acknowledged as avenues for alleviating 
the alienation, des killing and the tr~atment of labour as mere chattel 
such as prevails in the immediate workplace experience of both state 
socialism and private capitalism. 1 This is not to imply that the issue 
of labour control/motivation becomes irrelevant in a worker cooperative 
setting. Indeed, the absence of clear positions of authority may make 
it more problematic.2 Rather, labour control/motivation is recognized 
as a necessary feature of any society which depends upon labour power 
for the process of production.3 Worker cooperation is nevertheless seen 
as holding a potential for a form of labour control/motivation which 
is more attractive and rewarding, less dehumanizing but just as stable 
as any other. 
A Review of the Argument 
This paper recognized from the start the importance of some form of 
external support and supervision to exist with respect to a cooperative 
sector, such that the latter's democratic principles and minimal standards 
of working conditions are upheld. This was followed by an examination 
of the factors leading to poor cooperative performance, from which the 
significance of the socio-economic, cultural and political environment 
on cooperative success was identified. With this contextuality in mind, 
the degeneration of a worker cooperative into yet another structure which 
reflects and reproduces the existing dominant socio-economic relations 
and cultural traits appears in many cases inevitable and only to be 
prevented by a definite investment in social transformation. Hence the 
need for external support recurs with a more concrete agent in mind: 
127 
a progressive social movement which will advance (perhaps from a 
position of political power) a long-term strategy of social change, which 
it will motivate, defend and inspire from above. Concurrently, the social 
movement should promote an effective educational and mobilizing 
strategY, which nurtures arid expands the radius and influence of counter:: 
hegemonic culture from below, taking advantage of existing cooperative 
features, which serve as the embryonic depositories of a transformed 
social order. All the same, one must remain aware of the dangers, both 
structural and voluntaristic, which could subvert the counter-cultural 
strategy itself: the degeneration problem is not specific only to worker 
cooperatives but to all elements anomalous to the dominant value system 
and relations of production. 
A number of general propositions have been brought to light from 
the theoretical argument and the corresponding research into the local 
Malta condition. These are presented below in point form, serving as 
a summary fact sheet of various key statements made here and there 
in the text. Their critical but serious consideration is recommended 
particularly by those interested or involved in setting up and promoting 
successful worker cooperatives: 
128 
the worker cooperative form of production can be functionally 
advantageous to its· broader economic context by effectively sub-
sidizing it, with the consequences of low wages and unsuitable 
conditions of work for cooperative members; 
the socio-economic, cultural and political environment, apart from 
being a reflection of power relations at the infrastructural level, is 
in itself a powerful factor which contributes to the atrophy of 
economically viable anomalous forms of production into conven-
tional ones in any economy. This can be posited as a general 
explanation for the pervasive degeneration problem; 
worker cooperatives can best survive if they are perceived and treated 
as normal entitites. Hence the importance to consider strategies of 
social change directed at the normalization of worker cooperation 
in a salutary environment. This corresponds to the Gramscian 
proposal of fostering an alternative, counter hegemony; 
counter-cultural promotion and normalization involves the existence 
and supportive operations of a progressive social movement, as well 
as the widening of cooperative experiences in themselves educational 
- at work and in the wider society; 
counter-cultural elements exist to some extent in all societies. These 
may be harnessed by progressive social movements to serve as a 
basis for legitimate social engineering; 
counter-hegemonic education remains a key component for the 
introduction of viable worker cooperation. To serve its purpose, 
technical instruction in the necessary skills and knowledge must be 
imparted in as democratic and cooperative a manner as possible. 
Directions for Further Research 
Having reviewed the main considerations put forward in this text, it 
is worthwhile making some further observations on certain points 
developed in the argument, which beckon further and more elaborate 
analysis. 
The first point concerns the location and operationality of a coop-
erative sector. The previous discussion has suggested that the best chance 
of success for a worker cooperative movement is at the meso-level in 
society. The micro-level is weak and vulnerable, liable to degeneration 
and liquidation, more likely to serve a reserve function and having little 
spillover influence,as has been discussed. The macro-level, that is, a 
cooperative society replacing capitalist relations of production, hegemony 
and all, is quite Utopian and unrealistic, certainly in the medium term.4 
If Mondragon, the Cyprus cooperative societies, the US plywood 
cooperatives and the French and Italian building cooperatives can be 
taken as models, then it seems that the medium-term likelihood is for 
a condition of dual power with a cooperative sector/environment in 
articulation with a capitalist one. Thus, unless and until the cooperative 
sector develops into a self-sufficient, self-contained enclave,S it is recog-
nized that there will always remain external constraints impinging on 
the working of cooperative firms, such as market mechanisms, state 
policies, international events, the requirements of economic viability and 
competitiveness, the inflow and outflow of goods and services.6 In other 
words, while cooperative production can be expected to have positive 
spin-offs at the level of organization of the enterprise, such benefits will 
be constrained within non-cooperative mechanisms of allocation.7 The 
strategies of coping with this inevitable economic articulation become 
crucial for the prevention of degeneration. However, given a liberal-
pluralist political framework which allows for legitimate avenues of 
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counterpoint promotion, an interesting dynamic of cooperative and non-
cooperative modes presents itself. The ensuing articulation need not be 
one of structural subordination for the sphere of worker cooperation; 
it might be the non-cooperative mode, which in turn suffers from 
cooperative-induced degeneration. So, it would be interesting to adopt 
the constructs developed in the articulation of modes of production debate 
to the question of cooperative-non-cooperative relations. Sufficient ex-
amples exist worldwide for comparative case studies of this dynamic. 
The second item of interest is leadership. It is probably not just 
coincidence that cases of viable cooperation are accompanied by charis-
matic personalities.8 This in itself confirms the importance of voluntaristic 
elements for successful cooperative promotion, although there is some-
thing paradoxical about placing powerful leaders at the helm of coop-
erative, autonomous entities.9 1t appears to be a case of servant leadership, 
characterized by interdependence, mutual responsibility, collegiality and 
creativity, such that interdependent group decision-making becomes a 
normal state of affairs.1O If having a leader among the self-led is an 
indispensable condition for viable cooperative management, then it would 
be pertinent to consider ways of identifying or promoting servant leaders 
for worker cooperation. In particular, the cooperative's educational 
system must be geared both to develop such leadership qualities as well 
as to identify their recipients. The technique is suggestive of elitism and 
human bio-engineering. 11 Indeed, there is a danger of servant leadership 
degenerating into dictatorship, given the authoritarian styles most people 
have been bred to expect and accept. Whether the democratic, growth-
directed educational programmes outlined actually promote effective 
servant leadership remains a subject of inquiry. 
The third worthwhile point to ponder is a reconsideration of Marxist 
theory. The overriding concern with contextuality in the foregoing analysis 
faithfully supports the hypothesis that no society can escape its past 
while looking for a future. 12 True to the Marxist vision, every society 
lies embedded in an historical process determined by the way people 
relate to each other in the course of production. Going beyond strict 
class dynamics, other cultural and political elements have to be added 
to this movement to provide a general structure of hegemony, in whose 
context social stability and change are to be understood. So, while the 
concept of hegemony as domination is useful to appreciate how social 
and cultural reproduction and legitimation take place, it could be extended 
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to include an analysis of how it functions to empower specific social 
movements to engage in, and bring about, social change. 13 
The hypothesis that social change can be brought about despite the 
heritage of the past requires further investigation. It is debatable to what 
extent Marx's well-known statement,14 that it is men's social being which 
determines their consciousness, is reductionist. 15 After all, it may be 
precisely on the extent to which a society can escape from being 'the 
captive of its own history'16 that the potential of progressive social 
movements for bringing about social change is based. It can be argued 
that Marx's historical determinism, influenced by Hegel's dialectic, does 
recognize the potential for social change. 17 Nor is such change, even 
to Marx's mind, confined to the relatively fixed direction of class 
dynamics. 18 Marxist laws of social development can be seen as laws 
of tendency only19 and this, perhaps, is how Marx himself intended them 
to be seen.20 
If this transcendence of class analysis and reductionism is acceptable, 
a neo-Marxist perspective may be useful to assess the effects, if any, 
of progressive social movements on people's values and social percep-
tions:21 It would also help in determining the structural conditions and 
processes that lead to the emergence of the actual movements.22 
Epilogue 
The large majority of the world's citizens remain consuming objects in 
workplace, classroom, parish and constituency, leaving all responsibility 
for social, political and economic development in the hands of the few.23 
Worker cooperatives have been proposed as the models of a hopeful 
alternative to this state of affairs. While constrained and distorted by 
their environment, they nevertheless constitute the workings of a third 
way, an alternative form of rationality which can contribute to the 
democratization of the workplace and to the future transformation of 
the social orderY Such is the challenge to be faced. 
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NOTES 
1. 'Labour is not a chattel' is an often-quoted statement from Pope Leo XIII's Rerum 
Novarum (1891). 
2. Refer to Chapter 3, and in particular to Note 10. 
3. See Harrod (1987) who also suggests that control and motivation as applied to 
Labour are interchangeable. 
4. Although, admittedly, the overthrow of capitalism was the long-term objective 
of the Gramscian vision. 
5. As it may be tempted to do as a defence mechanism of self-preservation. 
6. Vanek (1982) considers some of these constraints. They include inflation, depreciation 
and investment decisions. See also Greenberg (1983, pp. 201-2). 
7. For example, the Mondragon cooperatives have embraced scientific management 
practices to achieve high levels of productivity. See Spinrad (1984, p. 200). 
8. These include Don Jose Maria Arizmendi in the case of Mondragon; Akhtar Hameed 
Khan at the Comilla Kotwali Thana; Guillermo Alvarez Macias at Cruz Azul, Mexico; 
and Mohammed Yasin at Deeder cooperative, Bangladesh. In the Maltese setting, one 
can mention Sammy Meilaq, Malta Drydocks Chairman; Joe Grima, Catering coop-
erative Chairman and George Hyzler, Legal Advisor to the Stevedores Cooperative. 
On leadership in the two Bangladesh cases cited see Ahmad (1986, pp. 59-61). On 
'Don Guillermo' refer to Gavito et al. (1986, passim). 
9. This paradox is suggested by Manz and Sims (1986) and Yeo (1980). 
10. The notion of servant leadership is developed by Greenleaf (1977). A brief profile 
is provided by Darmanin (1985, pp. 85-6). 
11. As described in the science fiction Utopia of Huxley'S Brave New World and Skinner's 
Walden Tivo. See Huxley (1967) and Skinner (1976) respectively. 
12. Hyden (1983, p. 191). 
13. Giroux (1984, p. 121). 
14. Taken form Marx (1911, p. 15). 
15. See, for example, Cottrell (1984, Chapters 1 & 2) for an attempt at reconciling 
different degrees of reductionism in the works of Marx. 
16. Hyden (1983, p. 213). 
17. For an analysis of the influence of Hegel on Marx, see Balinsky (1970, Chapter 
2). 
18. As argue, for example, Aronowitz (1981) and Giroux (1984). 
19. Merrington (1968, p. 147). 
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20. Ibid., p. 146. He argues that this blind belief in the irreversible forces of history 
is not a legacy of Marx but of the professorial Marxism of the Second International. 
21. Zammit (1979, 1984) studied Malta Drydocks GWU shop stewards for evidence 
that they were internalizing socialist perceptions propounded by the MLM leadership. 
The hypothesis was that, being the vanguard followers of the MLM, they would be 
the most likely to manifest such perceptual shifts from the entire Maltese population. 
The results of the study suggest that minimal perceptual shifts have taken place. 
22. In this respect, the theoretical contributions of Offe, Habermas and Touraine, as 
applicable to contemporary society, are useful. They all go beyond exclusive class 
analysis. See a review of their position in Cohen (1982). An essay discussing the character, 
strengths and limitations of social movements is Frank & Fuentes (1987). 
23. As discussed by Sik (1984, pp. 261-2). 
24. As proposed by Marx himself (1977, p. 440). 
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Map 1: Location of the Maltese Islands in the Mediterranean Region 
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Source: Baldacchino (1988a) p. 156. 

Map 2: Scale Map of the Maltese Islands Showing Variations in Population Density 
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Table 1: Basic Demographic & Economic Statistics/or the Maltese Islands 
Item 1987 1988 
Jan-Aug Jan-Aug 
VITAL STATISTICS 
Population 
Total 344,565.0 347,761.0 
Males 169,846.0 171,474.0 
Females 174,719.0 176,287.0 
Births 
Total 3,471.0 3,541.0 
Males 1,788.0 1,806.0 
Females 1,683.0 1,735.0 
Marriages 
Total 1,513.0 1,743.0 
Deaths 
Total 2,094.0 1,870.0 
Males 1,069.0 972.0 
Females 1,025.0 898.0 
Infant Mortality 
Total 22.0 36.0 
Per cent of Births 0.6 0.9 
Migration (Departures) 430.0 356.0 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
Total production (Lm million) 210.5 225.0 
Employment 31,234.0 31,523.0 
FOREIGN TRADE (Lm million) 
Imports 262.2 288.5 
Consumer Goods 59.3 65.8 
Industrial Supplies 148.2 177.9 
Capital and Others 54.7 44.7 
Exports 135.8 151.6 
Domestic 125.1 139.0 
Re-exports 10.7 12.6 
Table 1: (continued) 
1987 1988 
Item Jan-Aug Jan-Aug 
~ ---
RETAIL PRICE INDEX (1983 = 100) 
All Items 101.2 104.6 
Vital Items (62.10) 101.1 105.8 
Other Items (37.90) 101.5 102.7 
TOURISM 
Total Arrivals 502,601.0 528,056.0 
UK 302,394.0 314,169.0 
Italy 34,034.0 39,747.0 
Germany (W) 46,070.0 50,191.0 
France 22,459.0 18,127.0 
Scandinavia 16,115.0 16,496.0 
Others 81,529.0 89,326.0 
CRUISE PASSENGER ARRIVALS 24,229.0 30,121.0 
GROSS EARNINGS FROM TOURISM 71.2 81.2 
(Lm million) 
MALTESE GOING ABROAD 64,866.0 66,000.0 
EXPENDITURE BY MALTESE ABROAD 21.9 26.0 
(Lm million) 
Source: Economic Trends (August 1988). Valletta, Malta, Central Office of Statistics. 
Exchange Rate: 1 Maltese Lira = US$ 2.82 (Aug. 1987) US$ 2.89 (Aug. 1988). 
Table 2: Distribution of Maltese Labour Force: 1948-87 (by %) 
Sector 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1979 1985 1987 
Manufacturing and Shipbuilding/repair 9 11 10 18 21 30 33 28 30 
Construction and Quarrying 8 7 8 7 10 4 5 5 5 
Agriculture and Fisheries 24 11 9 9 7 7 6 4 3 
Commerce 9 14 12 13 13 12 10 9 9 
TransportlBanking and Private Servi-
ces 11 13 14 14 17 18 21 22 18 
Government Services 13 17 19 18 19 20 22 24 31 
Defence Establishment 24 26 24 14 19 5 
Registered Unemployment 2 4 7 4 5 3 8 4 
Absolute Total (100%) 92,171 85,297 92,330 93,515 100,019 102,546 120,020 122,091 126,205 
Sources: Malta Development Plan 1981-85, p. 49. 
Economic Survey, Jan.-Sept. 1985, Ministry of Trade & Economic Planning, p. 24. 
Kester (1980) p. 39. 
Economic Survey, Jan.-Sept. 1987, Economic Planning Division, Office of the Prime Minister, pp. 25-8. 
Table 3: Registered Maltese Cooperatives in Business 
Date Member-
Established Sector ship Employees 
Service Coops 
Gozo Milk & Agric. Coop 1959 Agric. 820 4 
Agric. & Trading Coop 1965 Agric. 716 13 
* Rabat Farmers Coop 1947 Agric. 301 2 
Milk Producers' Coop 1958 Agric. 231 44 
Pig Producers' Coop 1958 Agric. 185 1 
* Dingli Farmers' Coop 1947 Agric. 104 
* Siggiewi Farmers' Coop 1947 Agric. 96 
* Mgarr Farmers' Coop 1947 Agric. 82 
Farmers' Wine Coop 1960 Agric. 73 5 
* St Paul's Bay Farmers' Coop 1947 Agric. 63 
* Zebbug Farmers' Coop 1947" Agric. 61 
* Zabbar Farmers' Coop 1947 Agric. 43 
* Qormi Farmers' Coop 1947._ Agric. 39 
Farmers' Central Coop (FCCS) 1948 2nd-level Agric. 37 
MAS Coop 1974 Consumer 21 
The Fisheries Coop 1964 Fishing 211 4 
Worker Coops 
Stevedores Coop 1987 Transport 47 55 
Catering Coop 1984 Catering 21 37 
First Clothing Coop 1983 Textile 26 28 
Membership figures are as at December 1987; employment levels are as at October 1988. 
Both kindly made available by the Board of Cooperatives, Ministry of Productive 
Development. 
The number of full-time employees includes members in the case of worker cooperatives 
only. 
* Members in the second-level FCCS. 
Table 4: Outcome of Maltese General Elections: 1947-87 
(The number in brackets stands for the number of parliamentary seats gained) 
1947 1950 1951 1953 1955 1962 1966 1971 1976 1981 1987 
Registered Voters 140703 144516 151979 148478 149380 166936 161490 181768 217785 238341 246292 
Actual Voters 106116 106941 113368 119328 121243 151595 144873 168913 206843 225700 236720 
Valid Voters 105494 106129 112625 118453 120651 150606 143347 168059 205440 224151 235169 
Nationalist Party 19041 31431 39946 45180 48514 63262 68656 80753 99551 114132 119721 
(NP) (7) (12) (15) (18) (17) (25) (28) (27) (31) (31) (35) 
Malta Labour 63145 30332 40208 52771 68447 50974 61774 85448 105854 109990 114937 
Party (MLP) (24) (11) (14) (19) (23) (16) (22) (28) (34) (34) (34) 
Malta Workers 24616 21158 14000 
Party (MWP) (11) (7) (3) 
Constitutional 10584 9150 1385 
Party (CP) (4) (4) 
Other Parties and 23308 9166 2163 5117 3694 36370 12917 1858 35 29 511 
Independents (9) (2) (9) 
Source: Il-Qawmien (Social Action Movement Publication) no. 637, June 1987, p. 7. 
Table 5: Some General Statistics Concerning Micro-States 
Island State 
Seychelles 
Maldives 
Malta 
Barbados 
St Lucia 
Cyprus 
Jamaica 
Vanuatu 
Fiji 
Surface Area 
(km2) 
280 
298 
316 
431 
616 
9,251 
10,990 
1I,880 
18,274 
Source: Doumenge (1985). 
Population 
(thousands) 
66-
160 
345 
268 
1I8 
630 
2,220 
121 
650 
Population Density 
(indigens per km2) 
236~-
537 
1,092 
622 
192 
68 
202 
IO 
36 
